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Publisher’s Note
The 2015 Brigham Young University Prelaw Review (Journal),
continues to demonstrate Brigham Young University’s commitment
to excellence in scholarship and student development. Throughout
this past year, it has been a privilege to work with ambitious students
who want to produce the best possible undergraduate legal journal.
Continuing the vision of the Journal, this year’s staff has worked arduously to present professional and current legal scholarship. As undergraduates, the depth and breadth of the addressed topics required
that these students do much more than just edit. The authors and
editors researched to find court cases and law review articles to support their arguments. During the year, as new information became
available, authors and editors continually updated and refocused
their arguments to provide timely discussions of the current issues.
Consequently, each of these articles reflects the latest decisions from
the courts and scholarship from the legal community.
The goal is always to produce a reputable legal journal. However, this experience also provides the opportunity for the staff to
prepare themselves as members for future professional scholarship
and work in the legal field. Each student has become proficient in
the Bluebook system of legal citations and all have spent countless
hours editing and source checking each other’s legal articles. The
students have also learned to analyze pressing issues, incorporate
legal citations, and present cogent legal arguments, all while receiving training in journal publishing. These students leave the 2015 edition of this Journal possessing the ability to excel in law and other
professional pursuits.
We continue to be grateful for the endowment from the Rawlinson Family Foundation that funds the Journal and the support of
Brigham Young University’s resources to create and print this publication. As you read the topics addressed in this Journal, I’m sure
that you will agree that this is an impressive work produced by these
v

BYU undergraduate authors and editors. It continues to be a pleasure to work with such fine individuals and students on a daily basis.
Kris Tina Carlston, JD, MBA
Director—Preprofessional Advisement Center
Prelaw Advisor
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Editor in Chief & Managing Editor’s Note
The opportunity to oversee the publication of the 2015 edition
of the Brigham Young University Prelaw Review has truly been a
privilege. Each year brings with it new and intriguing issues, and the
2015 Prelaw Review staff has helped capture some of the most salient legal questions of the day. The ideas discussed in this edition of
the Prelaw Review are both exciting and relevant, ranging from patent trolls to drug policy, from the indefinite detainment of American
citizens to the conundrum of curtilage. Each article in this review
will not only educate the reader, but the innovative claims presented
will enlighten and broaden one’s perspective.
This publication is a testament to the hard work and dedication
of this year’s staff. Authors were selected in June of 2014. Since that
time, their ideas and claims were honed and polished over hours of
devoted study and discussion. After selecting their topics, authors
and editors worked together to research and draft their papers.
Throughout the process, teams effectively met the hurdles of new
case law and counter opinions, adapting their arguments to present
the soundest claims possible. The result is truly a tribute to their
desires and vision.
Each of the students contributing to the Prelaw Review sought
out the assistance of professors and legal scholars to produce the
highest quality work possible. Without the assistance of these professors and scholars, this final product would not have been possible.
We also extend a special thanks to Dallin Jack and Alan Hickey for
their continued feedback and edits which contributed to each author’s paper. Additionally, we express gratitude to Kris Tina Carlston
for her faithful efforts in furthering the prestige and success of this
review. Her ability to balance the demands of life while moving academic projects forward deserves extra recognition. We would also
like to thank the faculty and staff of Brigham Young University’s J.
Reuben Clark Law School for the many resources they provided us.
vii

Lastly, we express appreciation to Laura Bean who formatted all the
papers for final publication.
It is with great pleasure that we present the 2015 edition of the
Brigham Young University Prelaw Review. We wish all those involved the best of luck in all endeavors they will pursue.
Andy Hoffman				
Editor in Chief 				

John Griffith
Managing Editor

Crony Capitalism and Its Effects on GSE’s
within the US Housing Industry
Carley Herrick1

E

conomist and Nobel Prize winner Paul Samuelson stated, “Investing should be more like watching paint dry or watching
grass grow. If you want excitement, take $800 and go to Las
Vegas.”2 In the past, corporate America has strived to follow Samuelson’s advice by growing companies through long-term business
strategies and continuous development of company products and
services. However, in recent years through the use of crony capitalism
many businesses have found a “Vegas shortcut” to wealth and success
by utilizing government power to stack the deck in their favor.
By definition, crony capitalism, also known as corporate welfare, occurs when government officials obtain a powerful influence
over the corporate sector by using regulation and intervention to
impact business success.3 While corporate welfare incorporates a
variety of activities, this article will focus solely on crony capitalism presented in the form of government-sponsored entities (GSEs),
specifically concentrating on the effects of corporate welfare within
the GSEs of the mortgage industry and housing market, namely The
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac).
1

Carley Herrick is a senior at Brigham Young University studying Business Management. She will be attending law school in the fall of 2015.
She wishes to thank her editors Jenny Poffenbarger and Briggs Helton for
their contributions.
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paul b. farrell, the millionaire code:
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James M. Roberts, Cronyism: Undermining Economic Freedom and Prosperity Around the World, HERITAGE, Aug. 9 2010.
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The purpose of these GSEs is to create a secondary market for
mortgages to increase the flow of credit within the mortgage industry and reduce risk for investors. As part of their GSE status, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac benefit from various government-granted
rights such as tax exception and exclusive lines of credit from the
Federal Reserve, giving them a significant competitive advantage
in the market. These privileges have allowed Fannie and Freddie to
capture a monopolistic share of the housing market in violation of
Sherman Act, an antitrust law that seeks to promote fairness and
competition within the business sector by preventing monopolies.
Crony capitalism is not only responsible for the creation of the Fannie
and Freddie’s monopoly but also its preservation, as it has facilitated
Fannie and Freddie in circumventing antitrust laws and regulations.4
Failure to properly apply these laws has resulted in negligent and
risky behavior within these GSEs, and is at least, in part, responsible
for the 2009 crash of the mortgage industry and housing market.
This article will make a legal argument in favor of privatizing
Fannie and Freddie in order to prevent crony capitalism in the form
of GSEs from initiating any future market failures within the housing industry. Section I will explore the historical background behind
the creation of Fannie and Freddie, and their involvement in the 2009
housing bubble and subsequent market failure of the housing industry. Section II will discuss relevant antitrust laws and case precedent,
specifically Section 2 of the Sherman Act and the 2009 United States
v. Microsoft Corp antitrust case. In Section III and IV, these laws
and case study will be utilized to explore the legality of Fannie and
Freddie’s market monopoly and support a movement toward privatization. Finally, in Section V potential counterarguments to this legal
analysis will be addressed.

4

Antitrust Laws, http://www.antitrustlaws.org (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
OFFICE OF THE CLERK U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTITIVES, LOBBYING DISCLOSURE ACT GUIDANCE (2013).
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I. Background
(i) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises that establish a secondary market for mortgages in an effort
to increase the flow of credit within sectors of the economy and reduce risk for investors.5 Fannie and Freddie were originally created
in an effort to bring affordable housing financing options to Americans through expanding the secondary mortgage market by pooling
together mortgaged backed securities. These securities were then
sold to investors, allowing for an increased supply of money for new
home purchases, resulting in lower mortgage rates.6
Fannie and Freddie are unique from other GSEs because they
are both privately and publicly owned. Both are traded on the New
York Stock Exchange and run by a board of directors partially appointed by the government and partially elected by stockholders. 7
The unique combination of being a private and government-sponsored enterprise has allowed Fannie and Freddie to obtain a strong
competitive advantage in the market and created an environment
easily susceptible to crony capitalism. Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, both companies benefited from lower federal interest rates, were
legally allowed to disregard industry regulations, and were exempt
from all Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) oversight.8
These exclusive government-granted privileges resulted in Fannie
and Freddie gaining a reputation of being too-big-to-fail with the
public, inflating investor confidence, and allowing both companies
5
Fannie Mae, http://www.fanniemae.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
	Freddie Mac, http://www.freddiemac.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
6

Dimitris Karapiperis, Financing Home Ownership: Origins and Evolution of Mortgage Securitization Public Policy, Financial Innovations and
Crises, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS COMMISIONERS (2012).

7

Peter J. Wallison, The Dead Shall be Raised: The Future of Fannie and
Freddie, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (Feb. 12, 2010).

8

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISION, PRUDENTIAL CORE
BOND FUND (2014).
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to gain a market share of over 75 percent within the secondary mortgage market.9
The government further contributed to the conditions of crony
capitalism within Fannie and Freddie by using their influence over
the GSEs to pressure both organizations to lower loan standards
and guarantee housing loans to increasingly risky investors, including those with bad credit ratings, or incomes that could not support
mortgage payments.10 These government mandates and executive
policies, combined with the resulting false market confidence, created the conditions that led to the fallout of 2008, putting both the
housing market and the U.S. economy in jeopardy.
(ii) U.S. Housing Crisis
In 2006, U.S. housing prices reached an all-time high during a
phenomenon that was later referred to as the U.S. housing bubble.
The housing bubble was created due to a dramatic increase in housing prices, caused by a surge in demand during a time of limited
supply.11 As prices continued to increase, the number of speculators investing in the housing market spiked, due to the belief that
they could make large profits through short-term buying and selling.
However, shortly after the housing industry’s peak in 2006, supply
began to overtake market demand and by December 2008, the US

9

Kate Benner, Fannie and Freddie’s Extreme Makeover, FORTUNE (2008)
http://archive.fortune.com/2008/07/15/news/companies/breakup_fannie_freddie.fortune/index.htm.

10

the financial crisis inquiry commission, the financial crisis inquiry

report: final report of the national commission on the causes of the
financial and economic crisis in the united states

11

39-40 (2011).

Harry Dent, Greatest Real Estate Bubble in Modern History Not Done
Bursting, FORBES (Oct 3, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2012/10/03/greatest-real-estate-bubble-in-modern-history-hasyet-to-really-burst/.
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home price index reported the largest price drop in history, declining
18.2% in just under a year.12 The bubble had burst.
What began as an opportunity for investors to get rich quick
soon turned into a global economic crisis as the US slipped into one
of largest recessions since the Great Depression. Mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures soared; housing securities were reduced
to almost nothing; and investments and spending plummeted.13 The
government reacted to the crisis by proposing a bailout of the U.S.
housing market and allocated over $900 billion in federal funds to
rescue the housing industry, $400 billion of which went to government sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.14

II. Principle Laws and Case Precedence
(i) Sherman Antitrust Act
In 1890, Congress created the first statute establishing antitrust
laws, the Sherman Act.15 This federal anti-monopoly statute consists of seven sections that have aided in reducing the occurrence
of crony capitalism within the business sector by setting guidelines
for restrictions on interstate commerce and competition in the marketplace. Section 2 of the Sherman Act is specifically relevant to the
issue of constraining corporate welfare in the form of governmentinduced monopolies within GSEs. Section 2 states that:

12

Frank Stafford, Mortgage Distress and Financial Liquidity: How U.S.
Families are Handling Savings, Mortgages and Other Debts, U. MICH.
INST. FOR SOC. RES. (May 2012), http://journalistsresource.org/studies/
economics/ housing/mortgage-distress-financial-liquidity-us-familieshandling-savings-mortgages-debts/#.

13

Michael D. Levi, The Impact of the U.S. Housing Bubble and Bust on
Employment 2001–09, THE ECONIMICS DAILY (Jan. 3, 2011), http://
www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2011/ted_20110103.htm.

14

financial report of the united states government: government account-

15

Sherman Antitrust Act, Section 2, 15 U.S.C. 107 (1890).

ability office auditor’s report

(2010).
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Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony.16
In the Supreme Court Case United States v. Grinnell Corp, the court
provided a more detailed interpretation of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act by specifying the requirements for monopolization as:
The possession of monopoly power in the relevant market
[and] the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power
as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.17
In order to meet the court’s first requirement for monopolization, the
company must possess substantial market power through the ability
to raise prices above the competitive market price or exclude new
entry of competitors. This power must be prevalent over a long period of time within the market without experiencing a significant
loss in profitability. In addition to these laws, the Court of Appeals in
the Third Circuit 2005 decision in the United States v. Dentsply Int’l,
Inc. case established the case precedent that “a share significantly
larger than 55% has been required to establish prima facie market
power”18 and stated that a market share between 75% and 80% is
“more than adequate to establish a prima facie case of power.”19
After possession of monopoly power has been established, anticompetitive conduct must then be found. To be deemed anticompetitive, corporations must take exclusionary or predatory action
to acquire and maintain a monopoly. This anticompetitive conduct
may incorporate a wide variety of activities such as dumping, price
discrimination, and exclusive dealing. The court uses the Rule of
16

Id.

17

United States v. Grinnell Corp, 73 U.S. 563 (1966).

18

United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2005)

19

Id. at 188.
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Reason to determine the illegality of these actions on a case-by-case
basis. Under this rule, the court considers all benefits and detriments
of the actions, which includes whether the conduct has unnecessarily
restricted and impaired the competition, or if any valid justifications
for the conduct exist. If the court determines that detriments of the
conduct outweigh the benefits, the action is labeled as anticompetitive and judged an illegal restraint of trade.
(ii) United States v. Microsoft Corp
In the 2009 US v. Microsoft Corp case, Microsoft was found
in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act by employing anticompetitive means to maintain its monopoly in the personal computer market.20 Microsoft was found to be in possession of monopoly
power in the market, due to the company’s 95% share of the operating system market. The court found that Microsoft had the power to
create barriers to entry into the market because software developers
preferred to write Microsoft compatible programs due to consumer
preferences.
Upon evaluation of the second criteria, the willful acquisition
or maintenance of monopolistic power, the court found that Microsoft had worked to maintain its monopoly in the market using anticompetitive and exclusionary means through its agreements with
Internet access providers, which allowed Microsoft to put its icon
on the Windows desktop in exchange for exclusive promotion of Microsoft’s browser. In addition, Microsoft also threatened their supplier Intel, stating that they would work with another computer chip
company unless Intel abandoned its project with Sun Microsystems,
which was creating a program to compete with Microsoft’s products.
Using the Rule of Reason, the court determined that the detrimental
effects of these practices on the market outweighed the benefits and
ruled them as anticompetitive and in violation of the Sherman Act.

20

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 98-1232 U.S. (2007).
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III. Legal Analysis
The unanimous decision from the United States Court of Appeals in the Microsoft Antitrust case supports the claim that Fannie
and Freddie are in violation of the antitrust laws, as these GSEs have
committed monopolistic acts comparable to those of Microsoft. The
Microsoft case will be used as an analytical framework along side
the Sherman Act to demonstrate how Fannie and Freddie have violated the law.
First, in order to show proof of monopolization, Fannie and
Freddie must meet all legal requirements specified by the Sherman
Act in Section 2. Like Microsoft, Fannie and Freddie meet the first
condition, of possessing substantial market power, by holding 75%
of the market share within the secondary mortgage industry, well
above above the 55% minimum set by the courts.21 Fannie and Freddie meet the second criteria, willful acquisition or maintenance of
monopoly power through anticompetitive and exclusionary actions,
through the crony capitalistic activities of these GSEs. The creation
of Fannie and Freddie made homeownership possible for millions of
Americans, causing a huge boom in the housing market. The mortgagors, investors, banks, and industry workers that benefited from
this market explosion quickly gained power and wealth. This group
then used this influence and money to buy political leverage. In the
ten-year period before the 2008 market crash, Fannie, Freddie, and
their allies spent over $176 million in lobbying efforts and campaign
contributions to buy political favors from key congress committee
members in order to block legislation calling for removal of their
special privileges.22
These practices led the Federal Elections Commission (FEC) to
investigate many of the GSEs’ political contributions. In 2006, Freddie Mac was forced to pay out $3.8 million in fines, the largest in FEC

21

See supra note 10, 309.

22

Darrell Issa, Unaffordable and Political Kickbacks Rocked the American
Economy, 412 harv. J.l. & pub pol’y 412 (2010).
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history.23 Unfortunately, this did little to impede the flow of money
or favor-mongering coming from the GSEs. Those who attempted
to expose the cronyism occurring within the GSEs were met with
strong resistance and political retribution. For example, when Congressman Jim Leach proposed to decrease GSE federal subsidies,
the bill was killed within twelve hours of its creation.24 Congressman
Paul Ryan, who attempted to increase GSE regulation, received over
6,000 complaints from angry local mortgage holders, who had been
contacted individually by lobbyists claiming that Ryan was trying to
increase their mortgage rates.25
Similarly, when Congressman Christopher Shays proposed to
end the GSEs’ exemption from SEC oversight, the GSEs responded
by canceling all home-buying forums in his congressional district. 26
Additional proof of willful maintenance of monopolistic power can
be found in the 2001 report from the Wall Street Journal, stating that
the CEOs of Fannie and Freddie had threatened executives of Wells
Fargo Bank, American International Group and GE Capital Services
that they would stop doing business with their companies if they
continued to support lobbyist groups attempting to limit the GSEs’
power.27 These actions provide sufficient proof that Fannie and Freddie have engaged in anticompetitive and exclusionary actions in
order to maintain a monopoly within the industry, and thus meet the
second and final criteria set by the Sherman Act for monopolization
23

federal election commision, federal home loan mortgage corporation

(“freddie mac”) pays largest fine in fec history (2006), http://www.fec.
gov/ press/press2006/20060418mur.html.

24

Darrell Issa, Unaffordable Housing and Political Kickbacks Rocked the
American Economy, read periodicals. (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.readperiodicals.com/ 201004/2046297801.html.

25

Romina Boccia, Revealing Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s Budget
Costs: A Step Toward GSE Elimination, the heritage foundation (Jan. 29,
2015), http://www.heritage.org/ research/reports/2014/03/revealing-fannie-maes-and-freddie-macs-budget-costs-a-step-toward-gse-elimination

26

See supra note 24.

27

John R. Wilke & Patrick Barta, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Accused Of
Making Threats Against Firms, wall st. J. (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.
wsj.com/articles/ SB98400495381381274.
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IV. Recommended Legal Solution
The legal analysis presented in Section III demonstrates that
Fannie and Freddie meet the two criteria for illegal monopolization
and are in violation of the Sherman Act. However, unlike the Microsoft Corporation where the Court found that the company possessed
monopoly power due to external forces (consumer preferences)
Fannie and Freddie created and maintained their monopoly power
through internal means of crony capitalism. These internal methods
included lower federal interest rates, exclusion from state and federal
tax, and prior to 2008 exemption from SEC regulations.28
In order to inhibit corporate welfare and reestablish free market
competition within the industry, the courts must apply the Sherman
Act and Microsoft decision to Fannie and Freddie and order the discontinuance of the government interventions that have prevented potential competitors from entering the market and allowed Fannie and
Freddie to gain an illegal monopoly. It is recommended that the federal government breakup this monopoly by taking steps toward fully
privatizing Fannie and Freddie by liquidating their stake in the company and retracting all special rights and privileges granted to these
GSEs. This would include stripping Fannie and Freddie of their GSE
title by restructuring the companies as two completely private organizations, terminating all exemptions from state and federal taxes
and other fees, and discontinuing them from obtaining exclusive
lines of credit and interest rates from the U.S. Treasury. These actions will reduce Fannie and Freddie’s competitive advantage in the
marketplace by diminishing their monopolistic power and disabling
barriers to entry.

28

Peter J. Wallison, Applying the Microsoft Decision to Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, american enterprise institute Jul. 25, 2001.
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V. Counterarguments
(i) Fannie and Freddie are Market Competitors
It could be argued that Fannie and Freddie do not hold possession of monopoly power within the mortgage industry, because the
two GSEs are competitors and do not individually control a majority
share of the market. Although the case of Fannie and Freddie differs
from Microsoft in that Fannie and Freddie are legally separate entities, the two cannot be considered competitors. A study conducted
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development revealed that
Fannie and Freddie regularly engage in tacitly colluding behavior.
Evidence of this tactical collusion can be found through analysis
of the GSEs financial data, which signifies that Fannie and Freddie have been able to maintain unprecedented profits over the past
few years through a silent agreement between the two companies to
set guarantee fees for securitizing mortgages well above competitive
levels.29 Although tactical collusion is not unlawful, it does provide
the legal proof needed in an antitrust case to show that Fannie and
Freddie are not acting as competitors and would allow Fannie and
Freddie to be treated as though they were one company responsible
for creating a single monopoly in the market.
(ii) Fannie and Freddie’s actions are Procompetitive
In order to comply with the second criteria of the Sherman Act,
the Court must find anticompetitive actions to outweigh any possible procompetitive arguments that the actions of the company in
question stimulate healthy competition within the industry.30 As
in the case of Microsoft, the GSEs would have the opportunity to
show that their actions were procompetitive. It is likely that Fannie
and Freddie would argue that their monopoly and anticompetitive
29

Dwight M. Jaffee, The Effect on the Mortgage Markets of Privatizing
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac univ. of berkeley 9 (Jan. 29, 2015) http://
faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/jaffee/papers/ aeimay00.pdf.

30

cornell legal info. Inst., sherman antitrust act, section

2
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actions within the housing market allow them to bring affordable
mortgage options to Americans who would otherwise be unable to
purchase a home. However, it is estimated that Fannie and Freddie
currently only reduce mortgage interest rates by about a quarter of a
percentage point.31
Furthermore, a recent analysis completed by Genworth Financial shows that the primary barrier for most home buyers in today’s
market is the required deposit (typically 20%), not the interest rate.32
Although it is true that Fannie and Freddie were needed in the past
to encourage home ownership in America, the mortgage market has
matured significantly since the GSEs conception, and is no longer
in need of their support. As a report from the Congressional Budget
Office published in 1996 states:
Dramatic innovations that have occurred in the mortgage
market since the GSEs were created, the case for Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac’s GSE status is weaker today than 30
years ago and policymakers should weigh the desirability of
continuing to provide the current subsidy.33
Market maturity is further sustained by the fact that both Fannie and
Freddie have moved away from their original purpose of simply buying, packaging, and then selling mortgages. Over the past decade,
the two companies have made significant profits, with Fannie Mae
reporting a net income of $84 billion34 and Freddie Mac a net income

31

Dan Green, Mortgage Rates Still Dropping, THE MORTGAGE REPORTS, Feb. 4, 2015.

32

Steve Wilcox, Financial Barriers to Home Ownership, GENWORTH
FINANCIAL INC. (2010).

33

Vern McKinley, The Mounting Case For Privatizing Fannie Mae And
Freddie Mac, CATO POLICY ANALYSIS, Dec. 29, 1997.

34

Trey Garrison, Fannie Mae reports $84.8 Billion Income for 2013 and
$6.6 Billion for 4Q13, housing wire (Jan. 29, 2015) http://www.housingwire.com/articles/29051-fannie-mae-reports-848-billion-incomefor-2013-and-66-billion-for-4q13.
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of $48.7 billion in 201135, by retaining vast amounts of high-yield
mortgages, a practice clearly outside the GSEs’ original purpose of
lowering market interest rates. Due to these facts, it is clear that the
negative effects of Fannie and Freddie’s anticompetitive actions outweigh any current procompetitive benefits derived from their market
monopoly.

VI. Conclusion
This article has analyzed the effects of crony capitalism within
government-sponsored enterprises by examining Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. Through the examination of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act and the U.S vs. Microsoft Corp case, it is clear that crony capitalism has allowed Fannie and Freddie to receive special governmentgranted advantages that have permitted them to create and maintain
an illegal market monopoly. Due to the innovations and progression
in the housing market over the past decades, continuing to give Fannie and Freddie government support will provide negligible benefits
to the American public. In order to correct this illegal market monopoly, it is recommended that the US government liquidate all their
stock within these GSEs and allow them to become fully privatized.
In addition, all special privileges and exemptions previously granted to these GSEs should be discontinued. These legal ramifications
will not only reestablish free market competition and help prevent
corporate welfare from initiating another market failure within the
housing industry, but will also prompt further transformation within
other sectors and organizations of the economy suffering from the
negative effects of crony capitalism.

35

Nick Timiraos, Freddie Mac Reports $48.7 Billion 2013 Profit, wall st. J.
(Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023038013
0457940882190 8415690.

Unmasking the Patent Troll: Bringing to Light
the Role of Patent Assertion Entities in Our
Patent System
Daniel Shen1

I

I. Introduction

n 2013, MPHJ Technology Investments mounted an assault
against the business world: it accused 99 percent of all office
workers in the U.S. of using its patents, and they wanted those
people to pay. At the time, MPHJ owned a series of patents that covered scanning and directly emailing documents, originally claimed
as a patent in 1997.2 To make their image worse, the company was
not manufacturing anything—they were a patent assertion entity
(PAE), a type of non-practicing, patent-holding (i.e. not using its patents for their claimed purposes) firm that earned its money mainly
through lawyers sending demand letters to infringers. Such is the
common image evoked of patent “trolls,” a colloquial term used for
PAE’s that incorporate patent enforcement as a major (or even the
sole) aspect of their business structures.
With this negative image of patent trolls in mind, it is easy to
understand why recent legislation has been implemented to combat
1

Daniel Shen is a senior studying economics and French. He will be attending law school in the fall. Riley Busby and Ben Metcalf, excellent editors
who both plan on attending law school in the next few years, made this
paper a reality with their continual dedication and support.

2

Joe Mullin, Meet the Nice-Guy Lawyers Who Want $1,000 per Worker for
Using Scanners. Ars Technica (Apr. 7, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2013/04/meet-the-nice-guy-lawyers-who-want-1000-per-workerfor-using-scanners/
15

16

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 29, 2015

them. The 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) was the
first attempt at major patent reform in the last half-century, and has
provisions that specifically target patent trolls. President Obama has
also joined the discussion in voicing his animosity towards PAE’s
and giving his support for legislation with the goal of curtailing
or even eliminating them, such as the recent Innovation Act (H.R.
3309) passed by the House of Representatives3. However, despite the
negative attention PAE’s have been receiving, they form an integral
part of today’s patent system. This article will discuss why PAE’s
are vital to our patent economy, their legality, and why current and
future legislation against patent assertion ought to be rejected.

II. Background
At the very heart of each patent holder’s rights is the right to
exclude.4 In essence, this is the right to exclude others from potential profits. These potential profits are considered rivalrous, meaning
that if one firm were to obtain profits in a given market, it must come
about through another firm’s loss of profits in the same market. Others are able to legally enter such markets and produce patentees’ inventions only with authorization through patent license agreements.
But what if a patent holder does not use his patent? Will he still be
entitled to money made from his invention if he did not attempt to
produce it himself? According to the law, the answer is yes—though
the general populace and even President Obama seem uneasy about
this concept.

3

Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Statement of
Admin. Pol’y (2013). http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
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their inventions.
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The law not only protects patent holders, but it also punishes
those who infringe on, or illegally produce, their patents. When this
occurs, there are two forms of relief: injunctive and compensatory.5
With regard to compensation, the court will award “damages adequate to compensate for the infringement but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer,
together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.”6
With this statute, patent holders must prove that profits were lost
due to infringement. If they are not able to do so, or if they would not
have suffered any lost profits (such as research institutes with no production capabilities), then the court awards patent holders a reasonable royalty – the sum of money that the patentee and the infringer
would have agreed upon for a patent license before the infringement
occurred.7
Patent trolls aggressively assert their rights to the patents they
hold, effectively changing patent protection from a “shield” to a
“sword.”8 Since they do not manufacture any products of their own
(or only do so minimally), their business model revolves around
lawyers sending claim letters to infringing firms and demanding licensing fees for infringed patents. The recipients of these letters—
oftentimes small businesses—have the choice of either challenging
the claim and going to court, or paying a less costly settlement with
5
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the patent holder. It has been reported that PAE’s accounted for over
60 percent of all patent litigation in the U.S. in 2012.9 Since many of
these firms are very experienced in this field, they usually demand
a settlement that is just under the expected cost of litigation for the
infringing firms, but still heavy.

III. Patent Trolls and the Current Patent Economy
Whether or not a PAE can legally assert its rights with regards
to patent infringement is clear. In the case of eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C, it was found that infringements upon a PAE’s patent
holds the same weight as if were against any other non-practicing
entity, such as a university or a research institute (often held in higher regard since they are not profit-seeking). Furthermore, it can be
gleaned from this that the law protects the patent of any holder, regardless of their ability or intentions to effectuating the technology
or process behind the patent. In the case mentioned, eBay was found
to be infringing on MercExchange’s patent for the “Buy it Now”
feature, which MercExchange was not actively using at the time, but
still owned. The ruling of the court supports the idea that companies
like MercExchange are under no obligation to produce or use their
own patented inventions in order to fully enforce them.10
As also demonstrated in the Supreme Court case Continental
Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co. in 1908, the patent holder’s
right to exclude does not require a motive.11 Though the case centered on a monopolist who wished simply to exclude potential suppliers and thereby curb competition, the principle remains that those
who hold patents do not necessarily have to use them. As also demonstrated by well-known and reputable firms such as Microsoft12,
9
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Studies Research Paper, Mar. 13, 2013, Paper No. 08-13.
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Kodak13 and Nokia14, which all engage in patent assertion akin to
patent trolls, patents need not simply protect a source of revenue—
they can and do become that source in their own right through licensing or patent assertion suits.
Though well-regarded firms such as those named above engage in patent assertion, it is often the case that less well-known
but equally present firms, such as Intellectual Ventures and Acacia,
are the ones painted with the negative image of patent trolls.15 Many
people are uncomfortable with the idea that PAE’s, which often do
not manufacture any goods at all, are able to “bully” revenue out of
their “victims.” 16 It should be noted that the ability to produce or not
is not a requirement that can be feasibly enforced, as “In many cases,
it would be trivial for a troll to evade this requirement by producing a
token number of units of a product covered by its patent.”17
Even giant companies such as Microsoft and IBM are willing to
enter the lucrative enterprise of enforcing patents. One famous incident in the 1980s involving IBM was documented by attorney Gary
Reback (representing Sun Microsystems). IBM had shown up to Sun
headquarters to demand royalties for seven patents it accused Sun of
infringing. When challenged on the validity of their claims,
13
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An awkward silence ensued. The blue suits [of IBM] did not
even confer among themselves. They just sat there, stonelike. Finally, the chief suit responded. “OK,” he said, “maybe
you don’t infringe these seven patents. But we have 10,000
U.S. patents. Do you really want us to go back to Armonk
[IBM headquarters in New York] and find seven patents you
do infringe? Or do you want to make this easy and just pay
us $20 million?” After a modest bit of negotiation, Sun cut
IBM a check, and the blue suits went to the next company
on their hit list.18
Even in the modern industry of smartphones, Microsoft reigns not
through its production capabilities, but instead through its expansive
patent portfolio. Using its vast array of patents as well as its formidable legal team, Microsoft is able to extract royalties from virtually
all other firms in the industry.19 Evidently, it is just as Continental
Paper Bag did a century earlier.
Now, it is becoming increasingly more difficult to distinguish
between these well-known firms who act as PAEs and traditional
PAEs that are really nothing but a patent portfolio and team of lawyers. One thing is clear: with the current patent system and legal
structure in the United States, they are all here to stay.

IV. Patent Trolls and the Patent Economy’s Wellbeing
Though patent trolls are already deeply entrenched in our economy and are likely to remain that way, they are more than simply a
necessary evil. In fact, PAE’s are necessary for the proper functioning of the patent economy. Patents, like any other right, must be enforced. Unfortunately, there is no enforcement agency in the patent
economy that ensures that patents are not infringed. In fact, no such
agency even exists to investigate whether or not alleged infringe18

Gary L. Reback, Patently Absurd, Forbes (Jun. 24, 2002), http://www.
forbes.com/asap/2002/0624/044.html.

19

Timothy B. Lee, Microsoft’s Android Shakedown, Forbes (Jul. 7, 2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timothylee/2011/07/07/microsofts-androidshakedown/.

Unmasking the Patent Troll

21

ment has taken place—it is all a part of the patent holder’s duty. One
remedy that patent holders pursue, whether or not they are classified
as trolls, is through civil action.20
One claim that many infringers level against their patent troll
accusers is that the patents being enforced are not valid anyway. The
case with MPHJ, described above, seemed farfetched not because
the patent troll was malignant, but instead because the very patent
it was attempting to assert was questionable.21 The reasonable conclusion to be drawn is not that PAE’s should not exist, but instead
that the patents which they assert are sometimes flawed. There is
no dispute that some patents should never have been granted in the
first place, but this is a flaw of the patent system, not the PAE’s that
emerge from it. In fact, in that same case, the enforcers of MPHJ’s
patents ended up not bringing infringers to court since their patents
were being challenged.22
With the exception of a governmental agency, no entity would
have an incentive to defend the right of a patent holder except the patent holder himself.23 Unfortunately, many patent holders, especially
individual inventors, do not have the means to protect their patents.
No matter how valuable a patent is, its value will never materialize if
it is not enforced. Because of this, many inventors make the decision
to sell their patents to other patent holders who are able to enforce
their rights, often PAE’s. The mere presence of PAE’s causes firms
to be more careful in their production so as to not infringe on any
competitors’ patents.
To have a government agency do the job of PAE’s is not feasible,
not simply because of the logistics behind expanding the federal
government, but because such an entity would not have the legal
authority to pursue offenders unless the fundamental patent right
20
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be changed. Since this agency would not own any patents that are
infringed, they would not possess the legal standing to defend any of
the patent rights.24 If somehow a government entity were in place to
carry out patent enforcement, it would quickly be overburdened and
become ineffective as private entities shirk off their own protection
duties.
The presence of PAE’s in the patent marketplace also means that
there are more potential buyers for those who are selling their patents. Without the requirement of actually producing a good, many
firms (including PAE’s) are able to bid for patents. This drives up the
price of a patent which increases inventors’ returns and thus their
incentive to create more innovations in the future.25 Thus it is clear
that not only do patent trolls function as policing entities in the patent economy, but they also increase the value of patents themselves
and thereby spur innovation.
Some may still wonder what good a patent troll will do to innovation if it does not use its patents. It seems intuitive that if an
invention is not being sold, then it is useless. However, this objection
is flawed in many regards. First, patent assertion does not preclude
the use of the invention—it only means that users have to pay the
patent holder. Second, if a producer is unable to pay the patent holder, she may choose to innovate around the patent, which may bring
surprising results to the market in its own way. Third, the option is
always open to challenge the validity of a patent. In fact, doing so
would help keep the patent system from being bloated with frivolous
patents.
Unfortunately, recent rhetoric has turned many people against
patent trolls and the vital function they perform for the patent system. Legislation such as the America Invents Act as well as the pending Innovation Act contains many provisions that specifically target
PAE’s. If successful, these will diminish the policing role of trolls as
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well as decrease the incentive for people to innovate—nothing short
of devastating in today’s age of rapid innovation.

V. The America Invents Act
In September 2011, Congress passed the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act (AIA), the broadest set of patent reform since the Patent Act of 1952.26 One of its provisions strikes down the “joinder of
parties,” stating that “accused infringers may not be joined in one
action as defendants or counterclaim defendants, or have their actions consolidated for trial, based solely on allegations that they each
have infringed the patent or patents in suit.”27 This provision affects
all patent holders whose patents have been infringed, though PAE’s
were specifically targeted with this reform. Given what was stated
above, namely that it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between patent trolls and well-known and reputable firms, this
provision would be difficult to enforce uniformly.
Before this legislation was enacted, PAE’s would usually group
many defendants together (sometimes numbering in the hundreds)
through joinders, done namely to save court costs. The effectiveness
of such a practice may be seen in the following example: suppose
that it costs a certain firm $100,000 to litigate and assert one of its
patents. Said firm will therefore not pursue any infringers that are
bringing about any losses to its rivalrous profits if those losses sum
to less than $100,000. However, if the firm is able to find multiple
infringers, it may join them together in a suit that is expected to at
least recoup its legal fees. Thus, with the limit to joinders from the
AIA, the above firm will be unable to assert its patent against multiple infringers since. Though it is losing money to the infringers, it
would not want to lose even more in legal fees and other resources.
The intention behind the AIA is to increase the costs for PAE’s, both
in terms of time and fees. In reality, its effects are even broader: it
increases the cost of all patent protection.

26
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Many defenders of the AIA assert that patent trolls are bogging
down the United States patent system with frivolous lawsuits.28 The
statistic that in 2012 PAEs brought about 62 percent of all patent
lawsuits is not one to be ignored.29 However, given the above argument of patent trolls’ essential role as enforcers of patent rights in
the economy and how they increase the incentive to innovate, a large
statistic may be seen as indicative of success in those two fields.
Even those who are vehemently opposed to the presence of patent
trolls in our courts ought to be wary of a piece of legislation that
prevents joinders—large, single cases would have to be divided into
multiple cases as a result. If the desire is to decrease the number of
patent cases being litigated, the AIA’s provision on joinders could
very well produce the opposite effect.
Supporters of the AIA provision may be shortsighted in the consequences of increasing costs for PAE’s. The sharp increase in litigation costs results in PAE’s having much fewer resources to devote
to acquiring patents. Economics would tell us that if there are fewer
buyers for patents or if buyers do not have as much to spend on patents, then the price of patents will fall. Lower prices subsequently
lead to a lower “supply” of patents, in essence a fall in innovation
and invention. In the age of technology in which we live, such a hindrance to would-be inventors cannot be tolerated. Inventors will be
less likely to patent and sell their ideas if the returns on such great
investments are diminished.
For the inventors who depend on PAE’s to protect their patents,
the increase in PAE’s costs may simply transfer over to them—and
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even then it would be less costly than pursuing multiple infringers
by themselves.30
Much of the power behind large companies such as Apple,
Google and Microsoft comes from the patents they own. Indeed, it
ought to be noted that these firms engage in costly patent assertion
themselves, with teams of lawyers that would not be deemed much
different from those of other PAE’s.31 Due to their size and power,
they are able to maintain an artificially high price on their goods
and thus hurt consumers in the technology industry. Fortunately,
the presence of other PAE’s provides a small but significant source
of competition in terms of patents, which are quickly becoming the
currency of the technology age. The provisions of the AIA reduce
this much-needed source of competition and devalue the supply of
innovation.
As a whole, the changes brought in by the AIA are expansive
and many have long been expected and needed. However, the provision on joinders should not be supported since its effects are detrimental to our patent system.

VI. An Unpromising Future: The Innovation Act
The Innovation Act, a bill introduced in October 2013, deals
mainly with patent infringement, and would have drastic consequences for PAE’s if passed. One of its proposed provisions states
that,
The court shall award, to a prevailing party, reasonable fees
and other expenses incurred by that party in connection with
a civil action in which any party asserts a claim for relief
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, unless
30
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the court finds that the position and conduct of the nonprevailing party or parties were reasonably justified in law and
fact or that special circumstances (such as severe economic
hardship to a named inventor) make an award unjust.32
There are two areas of concern in the quoted piece of legislation.
First, the act of fee-shifting would all but eliminate the profitability
of patent assertion, further driving PAE’s out of the market. If patents no longer seem worth asserting, their value will plummet—and
the incentive to innovate with it. Second, the legislation leaves open
the question of what is “reasonably justified in law,” since the commercialization of patents is not required by law and patent assertion
is legal. This bill, aimed directly at PAE’s, would cause unprecedented harm to the current patent system.

VII. Conclusion
Legislation such as the AIA and the proposed Innovation Act are
successful in decreasing the effectiveness of PAE’s. This means that
the vital role that patent trolls play in the current patent economy is
also at stake. The limiting of joinders decreases the policing ability of
patent trolls and also diminishes their presence in the market for patents. Thus, the provision on joinders in the AIA should be removed.
The proposed fee-shifting legislation found in the Innovation Act,
though unlikely to be passed due to its extreme nature, is indicative
of the hostile climate in which patent trolls find themselves.
As an economy that is becoming ever more dependent on ideas
and innovation, the protection of patents is vital. Patent trolls, with
their specialization in the enforcement of the rights of patent holders, fulfill this role and ensure that people will continue to have the
incentive to innovate. If we are to stay competitive in this idea age,
the negative image of, as well as the oppressive legislation towards
patent trolls need to be lifted.
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English-only or Ethnocentrism? Toward a
Sociological Understanding of English-only
Case Law
Ian Peacock and Pablo Tapia1

H

I. Introduction

éctor García was a second generation Mexican-American
who grew up speaking Spanish in his home. García was
hired by Gloor Lumber and Supply as a salesman, in part
because of his bilingual abilities.2 The store, located in Brownsville,
Texas, served a large Hispanic demographic, which engendered the
demand for the ability to speak Spanish proficiently. Management
often praised García’s work and he received a bonus in his first year
of employment.3 Gloor Lumber however, objected to García’s tendency to violate the company’s rarely enforced English-only rule.4
Gloor employees, 31 out of 39 of whom were Mexican-American,
1
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were prohibited from speaking Spanish on the job unless they were
helping Hispanic customers. On June 10, 1975 a fellow MexicanAmerican employee asked García about an item that a customer
was looking for. García responded in Spanish that the item was not
available. Alton Gloor, an officer of the lumber store, overhead the
exchange and subsequently informed García that he was fired for
violating the English-only rule.
Invoking Title VII, a statute designed to protect employees from
discrimination based on national origin, García went to court and
charged his former employer with action of discriminatory impact.
The notion was rejected, however, under the court’s ruling that “neither the statute nor common understanding equates national origin
with the language that one chooses [italics added] to speak.”5 Moreover, because García and other bilingual employees could “readily
comply” with the English-only rule, the court dismissed the claim
that the rule had a disparate impact on Hispanic employees.6
Since García v. Gloor, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) has provided guidelines indicating that English-only workplace rules do indeed have a disproportionate impact
on those of foreign origin, even bilinguals such as Héctor García.7
Given that primary language is an immutable characteristic closely
tied to national origin, the EEOC further suggests that courts take
the mere existence of an English-only rule as a prima facie case
of discrimination, thus making employers responsible for providing
thorough business justifications for such policies. However, because
the EEOC’s word holds no binding authority, courts that choose to
apply its interpretation are anomalies.8 In fact, many courts continue
to legitimize employers’ often arbitrary English-only rules and subsequently contribute to the marginalization of certain ethnic groups
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by allowing them to be reprimanded,9 demoted,10 and even fired11 for
noncompliance with rules that reinforce their “second class” status.12
We argue that the ambiguity of the term national origin in Title
VII has occasioned these inconsistent interpretations of Englishonly workplace cases, which allows for similar cases to go through
different pathways of interpretation and has often, in consequence,
unduly harmed Hispanic plaintiffs. Moreover, because many courts
are currently unwilling to rely on the EEOC’s guidelines designed
for interpreting Title VII, they have instead fallen back on dominant
ethnocentric cultural ideologies. These actions by the court have legitimized the ‘symbolic power’ of cultural ideologies and contributed to the marginalization of those of foreign origin. In light of this
current ambiguity and the resulting adverse effects, we advocate an
amendment to Title VII that explicitly grants protection of linguistic
traits.
In part I of this article, we give a background of Title VII, explain the problematic nature of its ambiguous language, and examine
the role of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
guidelines in the interpretation of Title VII. Part II provides a sociological framework for understanding the mechanisms at work in
English-only cases. In part III, we apply the framework to Englishonly cases and demonstrate that courts legitimize cultural ideologies
in place of following the EEOC’s guidelines which is associated with
plaintiffs’ claims being unduly discredited. In part IV, we suggest an
amendment to Title VII that includes both an addition of linguistic
traits, and a specification of how discrimination based on these traits
would be scrutinized. In Part V we address counter-arguments and
show why, despite possible uncertainty, there is a great necessity for
this suggested amendment to Title VII.
9
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II. Background on Title VII, Current Problems and
Methods of Interpretation, and the EEOC
(i) Title VII and National Origin
The landmark Civil Rights Act of June 2nd, 1964, aimed to mollify discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin in government institutions, schools, the workplace, and other
public domains.13 The legislation intended to mitigate economic, social, and spatial inequality based on the aforementioned characteristics and bring an end to a segregation that had plagued much of the
country. Title VII was a fundamental part of the Civil Rights Act,
in so much as it would outlaw discriminatory and unjust hiring and
employment practices that were commonplace at the time. Title VII
decreed it unlawful for an employer or an employing agency
to fail or to refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment….or to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
[or her] status as an employee, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.14
Accordingly, Title VII extended racial and religious minority groups,
women, and those of foreign origin greater protection and rights in
the job market.
While in many ways the statutory language of Title VII is ambiguous, it is the vagueness of the term nation origin that we wish
to examine. That is, the concept of discrimination based on national
origin is accompanied with neither a description of national origin
and its significance nor recognition of the type of discrimination that
should be prohibited by Title VII. For example, did this mean immi13

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.L. No.88–352, 78 Stat. 241.

14

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).

English-only or Ethnocentrism?

31

grants could not be discriminated against? If so, were the children
of immigrants likewise protected? What would discrimination based
on national origin look like? Legal scholar Juan Perea argues that
the creators of the legislation are responsible for its enigmatic nature
arguing that “Congress gave no serious thought to the content of
the national origin term nor to its proper scope.”15 Thus, the statutory language of Title VII, while intended to combat discrimination,
makes it unclear which ethnic or social group the mandate exists for,
and how the discrimination would even be manifested.
Nevertheless, since Title VII’s enactment some plaintiffs have
made the case that national origin is tied to immutable ethnic traits,
such as physical features, ancestry, surname, accent, and language,
and have subsequently claimed that occupational discrimination on
the basis of these traits is a proxy for national origin discrimination.16
Under this rationale, the characteristics one inherits from his or her
own country of origin, or parents, grandparents, great-grandparents’
country of origin, for instance, should not be the reason for which he
or she is not hired, fired, or subject to other kinds of occupational discrimination. Yet there is little or no consensus about an individual’s

15

Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating National Origin
Discrimination Under Title VII. 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805-870, 807
(1993).

16

See, e.g., Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); García v. Spun Steak Co., supra note 1; Maldonado v. City of
Altus, supra note 7.
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linguistic characteristics17 and whether or not the traits are rightfully
ascribed to a national origin.18
(ii) The role of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
To aid with the enforcement and interpretation of Title VII, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was created
at the same time.19 The EEOC’s guidelines were meant to be especially helpful with the interpretation of Title VII’s otherwise broad
17

See, e.g., García v. Spun Steak Co., supra note 10; Maldonado v. City of
Altus, supra note 7.

18

In the case that a court considers employees, whose first language is not
English, protected under Title VII, the most common approach to making
a claim of discrimination is disparate impact. Disparate impact is defined
as employment action or conditions that are “facially neutral in their
treatment of different groups,” but are inadvertently deleterious towards
one social group more so than the same practices are towards those who
are not members of the protected group. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Disparate impact is contrasted against disparate treatment approaches which happen when an employer or employing agency intentionally “treats some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Id. For a
plaintiff to successfully establish a prima facie case for disparate impact
he or she must first provide evidence of a disparity. Next, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the employer’s implementation of a specific policy
or practice has caused the aforementioned disparity. Then the plaintiff
must show that the practice in question is not justified by business necessity, and that the employer could have alternatively used less extreme
policies which would have served the business’ needs in an equal manner.
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).

19

Interestingly, in the early drafts of H.R. 405, the bill that would dictate
the specific role of the EEOC, the House Committee intended to create a
board that would not only establish guidelines for interpretation of Title
VII, but would also take on the responsibility of carrying out the judicial
process. In other words the EEOC would be responsible for hearing and
deciding on complaints of discrimination under Title VII. However, in the
final revision of this Bill the EEOC was ultimately given the role of acting
as an administrative board that would investigate claims of discrimination
under Title VII and provide interpretation for the statute, but the decisive
judicial power remained with the courts. Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM.L. REV. 431 (1966).
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and vague statutory language. In fact, the EEOC developed an extensive concept from the statutory language of “national origin.”
The EEOC’s Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National
Origin delineate a clearer interpretation of national origin, stating
that Title VII protects against employer’s or an employing agency’s
discriminatory action “because an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group.”20 Going
further than the bare meaning of the statute, the EEOC also openly
addresses English-only rules stating:
[Any] rule requiring employees to speak only English at all
times in the workplace is a burdensome term and condition
of employment. The primary language of an individual is
often an essential national origin characteristic. Prohibiting employees at all times, in the workplace, from speaking their primary language or the language they speak most
comfortably, disadvantages an individual’s employment opportunities on the basis of national origin. It may also create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation
based on national origin which could result in a discriminatory working environment. Therefore, the Commission will
presume that such a rule violates title VII and will closely
scrutinize it.21
The EEOC does allow however, for employers to apply English-only rules to certain times or situations, given that the employer “can
show that the rule is justified by business necessity.”22 Furthermore,
the employer must inform his or her “employees of the general circumstances when speaking only in English is required and the consequences of violating the rule.”23 Nevertheless the EEOC presumes

20

29 C.F.R. § 1606

21

Id. § 1606.7(a)

22

Id. § 1606.7(b)

23

Id. § 1606.7(c)
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that existence of an English-only rule of any sort establishes the
plaintiff’s prima facie case.24
While Discrimination Because of National Origin is much
clearer about the meaning of national origin and how discrimination
based thereon is manifested, courts have not endorsed the EEOC’s
guidelines with much consensus. Because the EEOC’s interpretation does not establish legally binding authority,25 courts have openly rejected the EEOC’s English-only guideline.26 The rationale for
dismissal is generally that an English-only rule does not inherently
imply a prima facie discriminatory impact on bilinguals,27 and/or
that linguistic characteristics or aspects of an individual’s “cultural
heritage” are not even protected under Title VII.28

24

Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Elizabeth J. Norman, Employment Discrimination
Law and Practice 81 (2d ed. 2004) 81 (“Even if the rule is limited to certain times, the EEOC guideline... gives it the same prima facie effect …)

25

See, e.g., Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973).

26

See, e.g., García v. Spun Steak Co., supra note 10, at 1489 (in which
the court openly rejects the EEOC guidelines); Kania v. Archdiocese of
Phila., 14 F. Supp. 2d 730, 735-36 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (court also rejects
EEOC guidelines); Tran v. Standard Motor Prods., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d
1199, 1211 (D. Kan. 1998) (court rejects, without discussion, the EEOC’s
presumption); Long v. First Union Corp., 894 F. Supp. 933, 940 (E.D. Va.
1995) (court rejects the EEOC’s presumption); EEOC v. Beauty Enters.,
Inc., No. 3:01CV378 (AHN), 2005 WL 2764822, at *11 (D.Conn. Oct. 25,
2005) ( court rejects the EEOC’s presumption);

27

See e.g., Garcia v Gloor, supra note 1 (where this argument originates);
Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987) at 1411 (a
subsequent case where the logic is reemployed when the court maintains that “An employer can properly enforce a limited, reasonable, and
business-related English-only rule against an employee who can readily
comply [italics added] with the rule and who voluntarily chooses not to
observe it as ‘a matter of individual preference.’”) (citing Garcia v Gloor,
supra note 1, at 270).

28

See, e.g., García v. Spun Steak Co., supra note 10 at 1487.
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III. Symbolic Power, In-grouping-Out-grouping, and
Fundamental Attribution Error
Social theorist Pierre Bourdieu argues that language is a symbolic system, which among many other functions, can be used as
an “instrument of domination.” 29 Put basically, our different uses
of language are exhibitions of our relative positions of power in a
social setting. Therefore those in positions of power can establish
and maintain the legitimacy of specific linguistic and cultural ideologies. Meanwhile those who do not speak the dominant tongue are
consequently subject to “symbolic domination” in a field wherein the
“symbolic power [of an official language] is misrecognized as (and
therefore transformed into) legitimate power.”30
Dominant language ideologies often give way to binary categorization of “us vs. them,” which can subsequently result in the creation of “in-groups” and “out-groups.” The formation of these social
boundaries changes how we cognitively interpret others and their
behaviors. For instance, social-psychologist Susan Fiske and her colleagues have found that those whom we consider similar to us and
part of our “in-group” we generally perceive as more competent and
warm, meanwhile those whom we cognitively categorize as different or part of an out-group are perceived to be less competent or
less warm, or both less competent and less warm.31 Subsequently the
ethnocentric ideology of a dominant in-group has often resulted in
the dehumanization and undue treatment of out-group members.32
The conception of cultural ideologies and out-groups based on
categorical factors like language also contributes to mechanisms of
29

PIERRE BOURDEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMOBLIC POWER 165
(John Thompson ed., Gino Raymond trans. Harvard University Press
1991).

30

Id. at 170.

31

Susan T. Fiske, Amy JC Cuddy, Peter Glick & Jun Xu, A Model of (Often
Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow
from Perceived Status and Competition, 82 (6) JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 878 (2002).

32

Id.
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bias that we make when interpreting the action of others. One of
these mechanisms is referred to as the fundamental attribution error.
The social-psychologist who coined this term, Lee Ross, found that
we have the tendency to understand and over-attribute the behavior
of others to their personal choice and dispositional factors, frequently underestimating the situational and other external constraints or
influences.33 Furthermore, social-psychologist Thomas Pettigrew
found that members of an in-group tend to make the fundamental
attribution error when explaining the behavior of members of an
out-group, often grossly underestimating the situational and social
contexts that shape behavior.34 Thus the way in which we cognitively
group people influences not only how we feel about them but also
how we understand and explain their actions.
In sum, language is used for the establishment and reproduction
of a cultural linguistic ideology. Those who do not use the official
tongue and align with a cultural ideology held by those embedded
in power are subject to symbolic and unquestioned domination and
therefore are cognitively made part of an out-group. Categorization
into an out-group changes the very way in which one is perceived
and understood by those who belong to an in-group. Members of
an in-group often overlook the structural, environmental, and situational constraint influencing an out-group member’s behavior, and
attribute his or her action to personal choice.

33

Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions
in the Attribution Process, 10 Advances in experimental social psychology
173, 173-220 (1977) (Thus following this attribution logic, poor people
are poor not because they were born into a disadvantaged situation with
little resources or because they lost their job or experienced a divorce,
rather it is due to their laziness, carelessness, irresponsibility, and lack of
work ethic).

34

Thomas F. Pettigrew, The Ultimate Attribution Error: Extending Allport’s
Cognitive Analysis of Prejudice, 5(4), PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN, 461-476 (1979).
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IV. Analysis
This section applies the previously outlined sociological framework to English-only court cases to underline some of the social
mechanisms at work with the current ambiguous interpretation
of Title VII. This section further illustrates the several pathways
through which courts can take a case involving English-only due the
aforementioned problems of interpretation. The ambiguity of Title
VII also allows courts to use ethnocentric cultural ideologies as a
reference point which leads to cognitive in-grouping and out-grouping. Hispanic plaintiffs, as members of an out-group, are generally
understood as having a cultural deficit from the point of view of
the ethnocentric in-group; subsequently, their claims receive more
scrutiny than employers, and their adverse outcomes are often understood as self-inflicted.
(i) Evidence of Cultural Bias and Out-grouping of Hispanic
Plaintiffs
By closely examining the language and reasoning of courts, we
can uncover subtle evidence of a cultural ideology and cognitive
grouping. In certain cases, both employers and court officials demonstrate that they view the Hispanic plaintiffs as inferior in warmth,
competence, or both. Take for example the case introduced in the beginning of this paper, García v Gloor; the court not only dismissed
García’s claim that the English-only rule had disparate impact on
him and his fellow Hispanic-American co-workers, but also compared García’s ethnic traits to a deleterious addiction:
In similar fashion [referring to Gloor’s use of an Englishonly policy], an employer might, without business necessity,
adopt a rule forbidding smoking on the job. The Act would
not condemn that rule merely because it is shown that most
of the employees of one race smoke, most of the employees
of another do not and it is more likely that a member of the
race more addicted to tobacco would be disciplined.35
35

Garcia v Gloor, supra note 1, at 270.

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 29, 2015

38

While the metaphor is flawed for several reasons, perhaps the most
blatant of these is the underlying assertion that the Spanish language
is easily likened to secondhand smoke. Although such a loaded
statement may not be intentional, the fact that the court later refers
to speaking Spanish as a “forbidden taint,”36 corroborates and undoubtedly reveals the court’s ethnocentric frame of reference. The
notion that primary language is immutable and considered a trait,
while smoking is a behavior, also shows a major conceptual misrepresentation.
Conversely, in most other cases the court itself has not made
conspicuous associations between a foreign language and negatively
connotative terms. Courts have however, accepted similar correlations from employers as a priori in the justification of Englishonly rules. That is, courts have generally deferred to employers’
justification that the allowance of Spanish or other languages in the
workplace creates an “offensive,”37 “derisive,”38 “uncomfortable,” 39
racially antagonistic,40 intimidating,41 isolating,42 humiliating43 and
ridiculing44 environment. Laden in these claims are assumptions
about Hispanics and the Spanish language that are backed by scant

36

Garcia v Gloor, supra note 1, at 268

37

Kania v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, supra note 27, at 732.

38

Id.

39

Pacheco v. New York Presbyterian Hosp., supra note 8, at 621.

40

Garcia v Spun Steak, supra note 10, at 1483 (Kenneth Bertelson, president
of Spun Steak, claimed the English-only policy gave the company racial
harmony).

41

Id. at 1489.

42

Id. at 1489.

43

Id. at 1483.

44

Pacheco v. New York Presbyterian Hospital, supra note 8, at 606.
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and vague evidence.45 Unfortunately, the fact that courts put such
premises under little scrutiny, inadvertently equates Spanish in the
workplace with gossip, insults, and toxic substances, and further legitimizes a dominant Anglo-centric cultural ideology.
As if the unchallenged smearing of their dignity were not
enough, bilingual Hispanic employees must fight an uphill battle
when it comes to debunking the raison d’être of their employer’s
discriminatory rules, even though the burden of proof that the policy
is not discriminatory should rightfully fall on employers’ business
justification. Instead of the mere presence of any English-only rule
being accepted as a prima facie case of discrimination, as the EEOC
recommends, courts generally expect Hispanic employees to produce a “substantial [amount of] objective”46 evidence that any harm
is caused. Courts often regard as “subjective”47 Hispanic plaintiffs’
claims that being commanded to speak English or lose their jobs
creates a burdensome, hostile, isolating, and intimidating work environment that makes them feel inferior or “like garbage.”48 Even the
courts that acknowledge English-only rules’ disparate effect tend to
follow the reasoning of García v. Spun Steak that:
Title VII is not meant to protect against rules that merely
inconvenience some employees, even if the inconvenience
falls regularly on a protected class. Rather, Title VII protects
against only those policies that have a significant impact.
45

See, e.g., Alfredo Mirandé, En la Tierra del Ciego, El Tuerto es Rey” (“In
the Land of the Blind, the One Eyed Person is King”): Bilingualism as a
Disability, 26 N.M. L. REV. 75, 102-03 (1996) (Mirandé gives a thorough
examination of the assumptions being made and the lack of evidence in
most English-only cases).

46

Pacheco v. New York Presbyterian Hospital, supra note 8, at 623; Brewster v. City of Poughkeepsie, 447 F. Supp. 2d 342, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

47

Brewster v. City of Poughkeepsie, supra note 50 (Court claimed there was
little objective evidence); Pacheco v. New York Presbyterian Hospital, supra note 8, at 626 (Court finds that “Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact that the conditions of Plaintiff’s employment were
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an objectively hostile or abusive
work environment”).

48

Brewster v. City of Poughkeepsie, supra note 50, at 350.
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The fact that an employee may have to catch himself or herself from occasionally slipping into Spanish does not impose
a burden significant enough to amount to the denial of equal
opportunity49
Thus some courts dismiss discriminatory claims, which according
to the EEOC should be accepted as prima facie, because plaintiffs
do not have enough substantial or quantitative evidence. While other
courts recognize there is an impact, but cite it as a mere inconvenience to workers.
(ii) The Creation of In-group Alliances with Employers
Yet when placed under scrutiny, courts’ standards of proof
and accuracy appear to be contradictory. On one hand, courts reject plaintiffs’ claims because they lack depth and data, while on
the other hand the court exonerates employers with similarly flimsy and poorly articulated business justifications. For instance, one
of the most frequently used business necessities for English-only
rules is that such policies allow supervisors to better oversee their
subordinates,50 but defendants do not provide an explanation or evidence that delineates how speaking Spanish inhibits supervision.
Those employers who do provide an explanation about supervision
say the absence of an English-only rule leads to misunderstanding
or miscommunications; while this is plausible, there is no “objective’
demonstration that such is the case, nor do employers give evidence
that Hispanic employees are in contact with supervisors enough to
justify speaking English at all times besides breaks.
An equally cited business justification for English-only rules is
that allowing Spanish and other languages to be spoken creates a
“hostile work environment.”51 Kenneth Bertelson, president of Spun
Steak, alleged that the English-only rule existed to “promote racial
harmony” in the workplace, yet he provided a singular example of
49

Garcia v. Spun Steak, supra note 10, at 1488.

50

See, e.g., Garcia v. Gloor, supra note 1, at 267.

51

Garcia v. Spun Steak, supra note 10, at 1489.
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two Hispanic workers who were suspected of talking about another
employee who was African-American.52 While it is a possibility that
the employees’ remarks were racially charged or motivated by bias,
Bertelson provides no “genuine issue of material fact”53 that Hispanic employees targeted the African-American employee because
of race. Outside of one possible incident, Bertelson does nothing to
demonstrate that there was a widespread racial tension that existed
and that the environment was so problematic that a harmony promoting English-only rule became exigent.
(iii) When Courts Follow the EEOC Guidelines
There are, however, a few courts that have adhered to EEOC
guidelines and consequently thoroughly scrutinized employers’
business justifications. For example, the court ruling on the case of
Premier Operator Services, a call center where several employees
were fired for violating an English-only rule, closely examined the
aforementioned business justifications of “harmony” and “improved
supervision” and ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor. The court maintained
that there was no evidence of a “discord” in the first place that would
justify an English-only rule to engender “harmonization,” in fact,
the rule had quite the opposite effect and “served to create disruption [italics added].” 54 Likewise the court in Premier Operator Services points out that allowing Hispanic employees to communicate
with each other in Spanish did not in any way limit their ability “to
communicate with their supervisors and managers… in carrying out
their job duties and responsibilities.”55 In similar case, Maldonado v.
City of Altus, the court again used the EEOC guidelines to interpret
the case and ruled in favor of the plaintiff after dissecting another

52

Garcia v. Spun Steak, supra note 10, at 1483.

53

Pacheco v. New York Presbyterian Hospital, supra note 8, at 607; Garcia
v. Spun Steak, supra note 10, at 1488.

54

EEOC v. Premier Operator Services, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1071
(N.D. Tex. 2000).

55

Id.
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weak business justification.56 These two courts’ analyses of employers’ rationales for English-only rules demonstrate that business necessities legitimized in other cases are openly rejected when placed
under scrutiny.
(iv) Fundamental Attribution Error and Further Evidence of an Ingroup, Out-group Bias
Further reifying evidence of an in-group, out-group bias, courts
are culpable of falling into the fundamental attribution error when it
comes to how they understand plaintiffs, plaintiff’s actions, and the
contexts in which plaintiffs are located. For instance, the language
used by the court in Gloor places an undue and unfair emphasis on
Hector García’s agency and personal characteristics while endorsing Gloor’s grounds for firing García. The court admitted that an
English-only rule could be discriminatory, but concedes that “...there
is no disparate impact if the rule is one that the affected employee
can readily observe and nonobservance is a matter of individual
preference. Mr. García could readily comply with the speak-Englishonly rule; as to him nonobservance was a matter of choice.”57 Further shifting the weight of the negative consequences to García, the
court repeatedly accentuates that he was “fully bilingual,”58 “fully
capable,”59 and that García constantly “exercised a preference,”60 and
thus “chose deliberately [italics added] to speak Spanish instead of
English.”61
56

Maldonado v. City of Altus, supra note 7, at 1307 (The court picked apart
the City of Altus’ trite justifications that English-speaking employees
felt that Hispanics were talking about them, that allowing Spanish to be
spoken led to miscommunication and a hazardous environment, and that
Hispanics could not be properly supervised, pointing out that the “[d]
efendants’ evidence of business necessity in this case is scant”).

57

Garcia v. Gloor, supra note 1, at 270.

58

Id. at 268.

59

Id. at 272.

60

Id. at 269.

61

Id. at 268.
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The court’s focus on García’s salience as an actor alone does
not, however, characterize the fundamental attribution error in the
case, rather it is the combination of the aforementioned attribution
with a disregard for situational, structural, and external factors that
highlight the court’s correspondence bias. That is, the court gives
no weight to evidence that 1) García was responding to a request by
an employee who spoke Spanish when he was fired62, that 2) García
only spoke Spanish in his home63, that 3) most of Gloor’s employees were Mexican-Americans64, that 4) in Brownsville, Texas, Gloor
Lumber’s location, at least 75% of the population was MexicanAmerican65, and that 5) García was hired because he spoke Spanish.66 Furthermore, because García’s primary language was Spanish
he was subject to a neuro-linguistic schema that did not favor English67 and made reverting to Spanish a feat that García would frequently perform unconsciously regardless of his intentions.68 69
62

Id. at 266.

63

Id. at 266.

64

Id. at 267.

65

Id. at 267.

66

Id. at 269.

67

BILL PIATT, LANGUAGE ON THE JOB: BALANCING BUSINESS
NEES AND EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 121 (University of New Mexico
Press, 1993) (Piatt points out that when a primary language is learned
“it forms an immutable perspective and understanding,” from which the
learner likely cannot “consciously purge [himself].”That is, the learner
cannot change the “neurological processes” controlling that language
which has “been set in place from a very early age”).

68

Itesh Sachdev & Howard Giles, Bilingual Accommodation, in THE
HANDBOOK OF BILINGUALISM 353, 359-60 (Tej K. Bhatia & William C. Ritchie eds., 2004) (showing bilinguals who find themselves
unconsciously code-switching consider the practice troublesome and unnecessary).

69

Garcia v. Gloor, supra note 1, at 270. (While the court for Gloor admits
“language might well be an immutable characteristic like skin color, sex
or place of birth,” it ultimately returns to inflexible reasoning, imposing that “the language a person who is multi-lingual elects to speak at a
particular time is by definition a matter of choice [italics added],”).
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In a similar manner, subsequent cases reproduce the faulty logic
of Gloor, under-lining plaintiff’s’ choice and ability “to comply”
while downplaying extenuating circumstances. In Spun Steak, for
instance, the court argued that employees whose primary language
was Spanish were not subject to a discriminatory policy because
“they [were] able to speak English,” stating “there is no disparate impact with respect to privilege of employment ‘if the rule is one that
the affected employee can readily observe and nonobservance is a
matter of individual preference.”70 Furthermore, the Spun Steak court
is quick to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims that an English-only policy
is problematic to them for linguistic reasons arguing that “The fact
that a bilingual employee may… unconsciously substitute a Spanish
word in the place of an English one does not override our conclusion
that the bilingual employee can easily comply with the rule.”71Thus
the court in this case, and following cases, focuses on the plaintiffs’
individual preferences, arguing that Hispanic employees can elect
whether or not to “comply” with the policy, therefore such a policy
could not be discriminatory. The reasoning of this argument is erroneous, however, since it rests on the premise that any policy with
which one can physically comply is inherently non-discriminatory.
(v) EEOC Guidelines Help Prevent Fundamental Attribution Error
In other cases where the EEOC guidelines have been applied,
however, courts have shown a less narrow-minded understanding
of the circumstances in which plaintiffs worked and lived. Again,
the court in Premier Operator Services recognizes the context of
the discriminatory claim and dismisses the Gloor and Spun Steak
reasoning that
Nonobservance of the English-only policy was not simply a
matter of individual preference for the class members. On a
daily basis, the Hispanic employees of Defendant were faced
with the very real risk of being reprimanded or even losing their jobs if they violated the English-only rule, even if
70

Garcia v. Spun Steak, supra note 10, at 1487.

71

Id. at 1488.

English-only or Ethnocentrism?

45

such non-compliance was inadvertent. There was no comparable risk posed by the policy for Defendant’s non-Hispanic
employees, particularly since they would not have the same
tendency to lapse into Spanish inadvertently. In fact, there
is no evidence that any person other than an employee of
Hispanic national origin was disciplined or terminated for
objecting to or violating the English-only policy.72
The court then debunks the reasoning of Gloor and Spun Steak by
arguing that “[s]ome of the most objectionable discriminatory rules
are the least obtrusive in terms of one’s ability to comply: being required to sit in the back of the bus for example.”73 Thus, in this case,
the court shifts its focus to the context of the rule and closely examines it to decide whether or not it is discriminatory, rather than
centering the discrimination claim on the plaintiffs’ ability for deference to the rule, recognizing the flawed final deduction of Gloor and
Spun Steak.
In sum, the ambiguous statutory language of Title VII allows
for courts to make judgments from the standpoint of an in-group
ethnocentric ideology. In some cases, the courts themselves devaluate plaintiffs’ ethnic traits, while in other cases courts accept employers’ devaluations. This process reifies the formation of in-groups
and out-groups, which is made manifest through courts’ inconsistencies in their scrutiny of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ claims. That is,
while many of employers’ business justifications are likely credible,
the lack of objective and quantitative evidence make them qualitatively no different than plaintiffs’ disparate impact claims. Yet the
court’s willingness to connect the logical dots, and fill in the empirical blanks for employers in the majority of these cases can result in
outcomes that favor employers. Further playing a role in the reifica72

EEOC v. Premier Operator Services, supra note 58, at 1070.
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Id. at 1075 ([quoting Judge Reinhardt who wrote the dissent in the denial
of rehearing in Spun Steak] The court also points out that “Under this
analysis, a black employee could not challenge a rule requiring the use of
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tion of dominant in-group ideology, courts’ fundamental attribution
error in terms of understanding plaintiffs’ actions and experience,
shapes how they misidentify discrimination and subsequently contribute to marginalization of a traditionally marginalized group.

V. Potential Solutions
Because the statutory language of Title VII prohibiting workplace discrimination based on national origin provides no clear definition of the protected class for whom the measure exists, much less
how discrimination of this type would manifest itself, we recommend revisions through legislation. While certain courts have made
meaning for “national origin” in their interpretation, these readings
are inconsistent and fail to incorporate the EEOC’s guidelines in
their entirety. Furthermore, current lack of consensus among courts
allows for the legitimization of a dominant cultural ideology and subsequent discrimination to occur. It is therefore exigent that Congress
make an amendment to protect linguistic traits that are correlated
with, but not universally accepted as part of, one’s national origin.
The traits protected under this amendment could also include, but
not be limited to, accent, physical ethnic features and both first and
last names. 74
With these changes, however, there is still some ambiguity concerning what discrimination on the basis of the aforementioned traits
would look like. Consequently, we suggest that in the cases where
the EEOC has previously written guidelines concerning discrimination, these guidelines should be considered by legislative bodies as

74

Perea, supra note 16, at 861 (In a similar vein, Perea suggests something
similar calling for a protection against discrimination on basis of language, accent, surname, and ethnic appearance).
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the groundwork for the proposed amendment.75 Moreover, here we
offer an example of some clear principles of the proposed subsection
of the amendment dealing specifically with linguistic traits in the
work place. First, the existence of any English-only policy should
be accepted as a prima facie case of discrimination, and therefore,
under the theory of disparate impact, the burden of proof should fall
on employers. Next, in scrutinizing an employer’s business justifications, the court should examine 1) whether the English-only policy
is supported by a legitimate business necessity,76 2) whether the employer’s business necessity is both logically and empirically justified given the nature of the work, 3) whether the English-only rule
has been tailored as narrowly as possible to the occasions in which
the previously established business necessity demands, 4) whether
the policy and the justification thereof is thoroughly documented by
employers, 5) whether the affected employees are aware that such a
policy is in place 6) whether the affected employees are aware of and
understand to which specific work situations the policy applies, and
7) whether the employees know that “isolated, accidental violations
of the policy will not result in adverse employment action.”77
75

See, e.g., Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S. 689, 91 S. Ct. 2186, 29
L. Ed. 2d 267 (1971), and Harry T. Edwards & Joel H. Kaplan, Religious
Discrimination and the Role of Arbitration Under Title VII, 69 MICH.
L. REV. 599 (1971) (The EEOC, as a federally commissioned branch
of government can help inform congress and courts, but as previously
demonstrated has been limited by courts’ decisions to overlook suggested
guidelines. In the cases which are not covered by the EEOC, I suggest the
addition of clearly defined traits and the manifestation of discrimination
based on those traits in different public domains such as the workplace,
schools, government facilities, etc. While adapting the EEOC’s guidelines
uniformly has not been done with the guidelines for national origin, courts
have consistently adapted the EEOC’s guidelines in the case of religious
discrimination).

76

I choose not to define this because “business necessity” is so multidimensional that any universal definition, such as what is in the business’ economic interest, may be too narrow and make the burden of proof overly
difficult for employers.
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Josh Hill, Devin Ross, Brad Serafine, & Richard E. Levy, Watch Your
Language-The Kansas Law Review Survey of Official-English and
English-Only Law and Policies, 57 U. Kan. L. Rev. 669, 737 (2009).
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VI. Counter Arguments
There are several premises that the previously outlined claims
rest upon that can be drawn into question by counter arguments.
First, a counter argument that could be made against these claims
is that an English-only rule is not equally discriminatory for all bilinguals. Our presentation of bilingual abilities as equal is, indeed,
somewhat of an oversimplification of bilinguals’ differing abilities;
as Christian Garza points out, language abilities should be thought
of as different points on a wide spectrum rather than a simple binary category of bilingual or not bilingual.78 While it is true that two
Hispanic bilingual individuals’ abilities to speak both English and
Spanish may vary greatly, and that an English-only policy may consequently present greater linguistic difficulty for one more so than
it does for another, the point of our argument is not that Englishonly rules are discriminatory because they may be difficult for all
bilinguals to comply with. Instead, our argument is that Englishonly rules are unjustly burdensome and discriminatory towards all
bilinguals because, as the plaintiff in Maldonado said, the rule is a
reminder that bilinguals are “subject to rules for [their] employment
that the Anglo employees are not subject to…this rule is hanging
over [their] head and can be used against [them] at any point when
the [employer] wants to have something to write [them up] for.”79
Furthermore, a potential counter-argument against the proposed
revision is that such a measure would be overly rigid and could hinder businesses’ efficiency and interests. That is, the added measure
would protect employees’ interests at the expense of the employer,
and could result in employers wrongfully being found guilty of discrimination because the mere presence of an English-only rule would
require employers to overcome a hefty burden of proof. However, it
is in both employers and employees’ interest that any employed business policy is clearly thought out, justified, articulated, and under78

Christian A. Garza, Measuring Language Rights Along a Spectrum, 110
Yale L.J. 379 (2000).

79

Maldonado v. City of Altus, supra note 7, at 1301 (these are the words of
Plaintiff Maldonado).
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stood, especially a policy determining when and where English is
spoken. In fact, by tailoring such policies to make English-only situations as narrow as possible, we suggest that employee morale and
employee-employer relations are more likely to improve. Moreover,
the strict adherence of employers to this policy will allow them to
have a clearer understanding of what is and is not acceptable under
law, thereby preventing unnecessary litigation costs. Thus, if applied
correctly, these types of revisions to Title VII that seemingly restrict
employers could actually be an asset to their businesses.
Another possible outcome of the proposed amendment would
be the transfer of discrimination to the supply networks from which
businesses hire. That is, with the more rigorous criteria for Englishonly rules in the work place, employers, fearing or not wanting to
deal with anti-discriminatory sanctions, may attempt to avoid compliance with such sanctions by choosing not to hire job candidates
who are bilingual. While this is a valid concern, such discrimination
would become apparent and is likewise prosecutable under Title VII.
Moreover, in a nation with a growing immigrant population and with
over 60 million citizens whose primary language is not English,80 the
demand for bilingual employees is already extant. Thus the failure of
employers to hire bilingual employees, because of fear of complying
with anti-discrimination measures, would likely stifle business success and growth in increasingly multicultural markets.

VII. Conclusion
The United States has been constructed, populated, re-constructed, and re-populated by people of many different ethnicities, colors,
religions and languages. Despite its diverse composition and the enactment of laws designed to mitigate discrimination, the American
society is still subject to tacit modes of cultural domination. While
blatant discrimination is easily recognized and penalized, the sym80

Camille Ryan, “Language use in the United States: 2011,” Washington, DC: US Census Bureau, August (2013) (National data show that
60,637,010 Americans speak languages that are not English in their
homes).

50

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 29, 2015

bolic power of dominant cultural ideologies is maintained in a nearly
unconscious manner in the every-day social interactions workers experience.
To the dismay of those marginalized by cultural hierarchy, such
as those whose primary language is not English, courts have failed
to bring justice. Instead courts have legitimized the symbolic power
of the dominant cultural ideology. The failure to adhere to the legitimized cultural ideology results in those whose primary language is
not English to be out-grouped and perceived as less warm, less competent and more responsible for their own suffering. Thus those who
are marginalized in their workplaces are also marginalized in the
American legal system. Because Title VII, the very law designed to
protect those most likely to be out-grouped and marginalized, is unclear, courts often allow for further discrimination to occur. While
the EEOC offers principles to guide interpretation of Title VII, the
lack of EEOC’s authority and courts’ unwillingness to adhere to the
outlined principles has resulted in disparity in terms of interpretation. It is therefore exigent that Title VII be revised to protect ethnic
traits, and apply the suggestions outlined the EEOC’s guidelines and
in this article.

Modern-Day Pirates: Examining the Legal
Difficulties of Copyright Enforcement
James L. Martherus1

H

I. Introduction

BO’s Game of Thrones is widely touted as the most pirated
show in history, with a recent episode registering over 1.5
million downloads within 12 hours of its initial airing.2 With
this volume of illegal downloads, content producers are justifiably
concerned. The Motion Picture Association released a letter claiming “$58 billion is lost to the U.S. economy annually due to content
theft.”3 There are those who refute this figure, but the fact that millions of files are downloaded every year is virtually indisputable. Far
from indisputable, however, is how these copyright infringements
should be treated. Until recently, most online piracy cases involved
prosecuting those who facilitate illegal content downloads like Nap-
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ster4 and LimeWire.5 Lately, however, these facilitators have developed evasion measures that make it even more difficult to prosecute
them.
The obvious solution is to start targeting actual infringers rather
than the facilitators. However, this approach has its own set of challenges. Economically, suing individuals for copyright infringement
is not nearly as effective as suing the facilitators. For each case, the
IP address of the offender must be obtained, and a long, expensive
trial follows. The time and expense of these cases make them unattractive to copyright holders. When copyright holders do choose to
prosecute individuals, they seek extremely high statutory damages,
making copyright infringement sort of like Russian roulette; either
you walk away unscathed or your life is ruined.
Further difficulties arise when one considers privacy laws that
make it difficult to actually catch infringers. Sometimes, when infringers download copyrighted content, their IP address is available,
meaning it is possible to identify which network the infringing party
used. However, newer methods of pirating content are constantly created, and some of these methods are virtually impossible to detect.
The bottom line is that neither content producers nor lawmakers
have come up with an effective plan to protect copyrighted material online. This essay proposes that the current copyright system
is incapable of preventing online infringement and must be restructured if it is to curb online piracy. Part 1 discusses the history of
U.S. copyright law, especially as it relates to online copyright infringement. Further, we will discuss the backlash against online
regulation and the “hacker ethic” that causes many of the problems
in online infringement. Part 2 examines recent cases relating to pirates who download content for personal use and why the current
law is unequipped to deal with these cases. Finally, part 3 proscribes
a new method for enforcing copyright restrictions against “casual
infringers.” This restructuring will include a new branch of the
United States Copyright Office that aids in the prosecution of casual
4

See A&M Records Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).

5

See Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 398 (Dist.
Court 2011).
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copyright infringers. As more and more of these casual infringers
are caught, the penalties would be drastically reduced. Copyright
infringement would bear a stricter liability, making it harder for the
infringer to refute. Thus copyright infringement becomes more like
a strict liability misdemeanor than a felony. We argue that this will
decelerate the rate of online piracy without preventing the free flow
of information.

II. History of U.S. Copyright Law
Although the first copyright laws established on the American
continent predate the Constitution, modern copyright law in the
United States stems from the copyright clause of the Constitution.
“Congress shall have power . . . to promote the progress of science
and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”6
As the copyright clause makes clear, the original goal of issuing copyrights was to promote intellectual progress. Copyrights
grant content producers exclusive rights to make and sell copies of
their content. Without copyrights, artists and others would not be
able to make a living producing content, thus stifling innovation and
growth. The clause requires that these copyrights be limited in time,
though the time limit has gradually extended from 14 years7 after
publication to 70 years after the authorI.s death.8
Over time, the range of content covered by copyright law also
became more extensive. At first, only maps, charts, and books were
covered. In fact, only the rights of the first publishing were guaranteed under the copyright act of 17909, subsequent editions were
subject to reproduction. Eligible content eventually extended to in-

6

U.S. Const. art. XIII, § 1.1.

7

Copyright Act of 1790 U.S.C. 1 Statutes at Large 124.

8

Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 U.S.C.

9

Wheaton v. Peters 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
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clude any “original works of authorship”10, namely; literary, musical,
dramatic, artistic, and other intellectual works.
In addition to expanding the breadth of content protected under
copyright law, penalties for copyright infringement have increased
dramatically. The Copyright act of 1790 stipulated payment of $.50
(about $13.10 in 2013 dollars11) per page of copyrighted material
found in the infringer’s possession.6 Today, copyright infringers can
be charged from $200 to $300,000 for each work copied. Even in
the case of “innocent infringement” (where no copyright notice is
given), the infringer can be charged as much as $200,000 per work.12
The first major change made to copyright law as a result of the
Internet age was the enactment of the Copyright Felony Act. During
the 80s and 90s, the computer industry boomed, creating a new platform for piracy: software. Software piracy is incredibly simple because of the intangible nature of the pirated material. Infringers can
make dozens or even hundreds of copies in minutes. This quickly
became a significant bane to the industry, costing upwards of $2.4
billion in revenue in 1990.13 Congress responded by passing Senate
Bill 893, which protects software with criminal sanctions. 14 Eventually, the bill was amended to make any sort of copyright infringement a felony if it was willful, profit-motivated, and exceeded a set
number of copies.15
The second major change came as a reaction to “hacker culture,”
which promotes freedom of information online and is not motivated
by any form of monetary gain. This non-monetary motivation created a major problem for lawmakers and content producers because
previous copyright law required the infringer to have made a profit
or to have had the intention to make a profit as a result of their in10
11		

17 U.S.C. § 102
MeasuringWorth.com, http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/ (last
visited March 10, 2015).

12

17 U.S.C. § 402(d).

13

See Hearing on S. 893, supra note 7, at 27.

14

See S. 893, 102d Cong. (I992).

15

See Saunders, supra note I7, at 679-80.

Modern-Day Pirates

55

fringement.16 These laws were insufficient to prosecute the new pirates unconcerned with financial gain. The problem came to a head
in United States v. LaMacchia.17 The defendant, David LaMacchia,
had set up a website encouraging others to upload copies of their
software, specifically Microsoft Excel and Sim City 2000.18 Since
LaMacchia did not seek monetary gain and was therefore exempt
from the criminal copyright infringement provision, the government’s only option was to charge him with “conspiring with ‘persons
unknown to violate . . . the wire fraud statute.”19 The court eventually dismissed the case because that “interpretation of the wire fraud
statute would serve to criminalize . . . the myriad of home computer
users who succumb to the temptation to copy even a single software
program for private use.”20 The judge himself noted the ineffectiveness of the current law and suggested that “criminal as well as civil
penalties should probably attach to willful, multiple infringements
of copyrighted software even absent a commercial motive on the
part of the infringer.”21
Partly as a result of this case, Congress passed the No Electronic
Theft (NET) Act, closing the so-called “LaMacchia loophole” which
allowed people like LaMacchia to avoid conviction by claiming no
commercial gain. The NET Act made two major changes to copyright law. First, the act changed the definition of financial gain to
include “receipt of anything of value, including the receipt of other
copyrighted works.”22 Second, the act allowed for criminal liability
“based on the commercial impact on the copyright owner rather than
the commercial purpose of the infringer.”23 The bill was controversial.
16

I7 U.S.C. § 5o6(a) (I976). Also See United States v. Cross, 8i6 F.2d 297,
30I (7th Cir. i987)

17

United States v. LaMacchia, 87i F. Supp. 535, 540 (D. Mass. I994).

18

See id. At 536.

19

See I8 U.S.C. § I343 (I994) (wire fraud statute).

20

United States v. LaMacchia, 87i F. Supp., 544 (D. Mass. I994).

21
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H.R. Doc. No. 2265, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
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Opponents argued that such measures opened the door for criminal
cases against minor infringers.24 The penalties stipulated in the NET
Act were also a source of contention, with maximum penalties of
$250,000 fines and five years in jail. Many observers saw these penalties as extreme punishment for what is a relatively harmless, if
irresponsible action.
The next major development in copyright enforcement came
shortly after in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). The
primary change brought about by the legislation was a ban placed on
any and all technology that “is primarily designed . . . for the purpose of circumventing protection . . . that effectively protects a right
of the copyright owner.”25 Further, the DMCA imposes even stiffer
penalties for infringers, raising the maximum penalty for first-time
offenders to $500,000 and five years in jail. Repeat offenders can be
fined up to $1,000,000 and 10 years in jail.26
The arguments against the DMCA are similar to those raised
against the NET Act. One of the more interesting criticisms is the
rampant misuse of the DMCA takedown notice. The DMCA protects
Internet and other service providers from liability for illegal activity
carried out by their users provided they comply with several conditions. One of these conditions is that the provider “responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to
be infringing.”27 To comply with this condition, for example, Google
must remove links to sites that allegedly contain infringing material.
However, Google released a statement claiming that 57 percent of all
takedown notices were businesses trying to harm competitors and
37 percent of all notices were not actually “valid copyright claims.”28
24

See I43 Cong. Rec. SI2689 (daily ed. Nov. I3, 1997), (statement of Sen.
Hatch).

25

See I7 U.S.C.A. § I20I(b)(I)(A) (West Supp. i999).

26

See 17 U.S.C.A. § 1204(a)(I-II)
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See 17 U.S.C §512(c)(1).
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www.pcworld.co.nz /article/ 483729/google_submission_hammers_
section_92a/. (Jul. 16, 2014).
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Opponents would argue that this is far from the worst consequence
of the DMCA.

III. Opposition and the “Hacker Ethic”
Those who oppose legislation that makes it easier to enforce
copyrights have three basic arguments. First, opponents argue that
increasingly harsh punishments for infringers will stifle free speech.
Second, opponents argue that such laws jeopardize the legitimacy
of the fair use principle. Finally, opponents argue that these laws
violate privacy rights of individuals.
There are two main groups of people concerned about the stifling
of free speech caused by laws like the DMCA: hackers and academics. The term hackers in this case does not refer to that group of individuals who use computer programs to infiltrate private networks,
rather it refers to the group of individuals who adhere to what has
become known as the “hacker ethic”. The hacker ethic was born at
MIT during the 50s and 60s, and basically rests on the principle that
access to information should be free and unlimited.29 The LaMacchia case is a perfect example of someone acting by the hacker ethic.
Opponents of copyright expansion argue that when everyone has the
opportunity to access software, they can make improvements that
the original writers never would have developed. The free flow of
information is the best way to make progress as a society. Copyright
laws prevent this sort of progress by making it illegal and extremely
dangerous to access this information without paying for it. The second group concerned with the stifling of free speech and progress
are academics and scientists concerned about the implications for
the fair use doctrine.
The fair use doctrine grants exceptions to the exclusive rights of
content producers. Specifically, fair use grants copyright exception
“for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
. . . scholarship, or research.”30 For some cases, such as quoting an
29

Levy, Steven. Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution. 1984 Doubleday: Garden City, NY. 28.

30

See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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author’s work in an academic paper, fair use is almost universally
recognized. In many other cases, however, it is ambiguous. The Supreme Court described fair use as an affirmative defense, meaning
the burden of proof is on the defendant.31
Furthermore, application of the fair use doctrine has been less
than consistent.32 What this means is that researchers and academics
not only face the risk of being charged with copyright infringement,
but they have no way to know how a judge will define what constitutes fair use. They are guilty until proven innocent.
Further concerns are generated over how privacy rights will be
addressed in copyright infringement cases. The modern conception
of the right to privacy stems mainly from an article written in the
Harvard Law Review in 1890.33 The authors of the article argue that
greater legal protection is needed for the privacy of thoughts, emotions, personal letters, etc.34 Since then, the Supreme Court has asserted the right to privacy on many occasions.35 The right to privacy
online is a fairly new topic and the courts have not ruled on whether
such a right exists. This lack of explicit protection makes stronger
copyright punishments even more alarming because it is unclear
how much information is available to law enforcement or even thirdparties. Until online privacy is better protected, stronger copyright
enforcement is sort of a wild card.

IV. The Inadequacies of Current Law

31

See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539 –
Supreme Court 1985 (561). See also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 US 569- Supreme Court 1994. (590).

32

Leval, Pierre. Toward a Fair Use Standard. Harv. L. Rev. 103, no. 5
(March): 1105-1136.

33

Warren, Samuel and Louis D. Brandeis. 1890. The Right to Privacy. Harvard Law Review 4, no. 5 (Dec): 193-220.
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35
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The current law governing copyright infringement is inadequate
to deal with copyright issues online. There are three essential problems with the current law. First, it is too expensive to prosecute individual infringers. Second, the penalties for copyright infringement
are extremely high. Finally, the current law fails to stem the tide of
illegal downloading.
The current system of enforcing copyrights lends itself to
prosecuting the big fish, the Napsters and Pirate Bays of copyright
infringement, but individuals are virtually ignored. For each individual to be prosecuted, copyright holders must gather evidence, open
a case, hire a lawyer, and hope that the court rules in their favor.
This process is expensive and the return on investment is small.
The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) learned
this the hard way when at one point they decided to launch a “legal
blitz” designed to educate the public of copyright laws and catch a
large number of individual infringers at once.36 The plan backfired
with a tremendous public backlash. The en masse prosecution led
to numerous embarrassments including the prosecution of a dead
woman,37 prosecuting a Mac user for using software only available
on Windows,38 and telling a college student to drop out of school to
pay her fine.39 Adding insult to injury, the RIAA ended up spending
$64 million to win $1.36 million.40 The current system is too burdensome and must be streamlined if copyright holders are to prosecute
36
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individuals. The expense of the current system leads to the second
problem with copyright laws, exorbitant penalties.
As discussed in our history of copyright law, maximum penalties have skyrocketed from $10 per page to up to $200,000 per
copyrighted work. Many have criticized these penalties as excessive.41 Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of Joel Tenenbaum.42 Tenenbaum was a student at Boston University when he was
accused of sharing 30 songs online. After various attempts to settle
the case out of court, the case went to trial in 2009.43 Tenenbaum
made several arguments, including a failed fair use defense before
being convicted and ordered to pay the plaintiffs $22,500 per song,
totaling $675,000. Almost a year later, Judge Gertner reduced the
fine to $67,500, citing the unconstitutionality and excessive nature
of the original sum.44 The judge further criticized the “potential for
injustice” inherent in the Copyright Act, saying the court “urges —
no, implores — Congress to amend the statute to reflect the realities
of file sharing. There is something wrong with a law that routinely
threatens teenagers and students with astronomical penalties for an
activity whose implications they may not have fully understood. The
injury to the copyright holder may be real, and even substantial, but,
under the statute, the record companies do not even have to prove
actual damage.”45 Unfortunately for Tenenbaum, the first circuit
overturned the fine reduction during the appeals process, forcing

41
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Tenenbaum to pay the full $675,000.46 The ruling was highly controversial, and many see the case as proof of the need for a change in
copyright law dealing with online content.47 Penalties for small-scale
copyright infringement are much too high.
The main argument for these high penalties is that they will
serve to reduce the amount of online piracy taking place. In reality,
it is difficult to gauge levels of online piracy. Most research suggests
that for the period immediately following the RIAA “legal blitz”, illegal file sharing continued to increase.48 Since 2012 there has been a
marked decrease in illegal file sharing, although many attribute this
to the advent of services like Spotify that provide a legal alternative to downloading content.49 Streaming services like Netflix and
Spotify have caused a decrease in illegal file sharing, but millions of
people still use illegal methods to obtain content.

V. The Solution: Felony to Fine
Current copyright law does not provide the inexpensive, quick
turnaround necessary to allow copyright holders to protect their
works. The process needs to be more streamlined, less expensive,
and equitable to both copyright holders and infringers. The solution
is a process that functions less like a lawsuit and more like a dispute
settlement. This type of system is not unprecedented. The Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) moderates
disputes through the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution
Policy (UDRP). If an individual registers a domain name that is the
same or confusingly similar to one held by a trademark owner, that
46
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trademark owner can file a complaint with ICANN. ICANN then
forms an administrative panel that determines whether the domain
name was registered in bad faith or in violation of the trademark. If
the panel rules in favor of the complainant, they award ownership of
the challenged domain to the trademark owner. UDRP has been very
successful, mediating over 6000 cases in its first five years.
Two notable articles have proposed just such a system. In 2004,
Mark A. Lemley and R. Anthony Reese argued for a change in the
copyright statute to allow copyright owners to either file a formal
lawsuit or pursue a dispute resolution option.50 This option would
presumably allow copyright owners to quickly settle cases where
there is clear precedent and little possibility of a legal defense. Additionally, each case would have to meet a damages threshold of
$25,000. This alternate system would consist of submitting evidence
online and presenting it to a Copyright Office administrative judge.51
Three pieces of evidence would be necessary; proof that the plaintiff
owns the copyright, proof that the work was downloadable from a
specific IP address at a certain time, and proof that the IP address
was assigned to the defendant at the time.52 If the defendant is unable
to provide a compelling defense, Lemley and Reese suggest that they
should be fined $250 per work.53 The system would also allow for
non-monetary awards to the plaintiff, such as officially labeling the
defendant a “copyright infringer”.54
Six years later in 2010, Will Moseley wrote an article in the
Berkeley Technology Law Journal discussing some possible improvements to the system proposed by Lemley and Reese.55 First,
Moseley proposes that the reach of this dispute resolution system
50

Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1345 (2004).
See infra Section IV.
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Id. at 1411-12, also at 1417-18.
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Id. at 1414.
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Id. at 1418.
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Id. at 1420-22.

55

Will Moseley, A New (Old) Solution for Online Copyright Enforcement
after Thomas and Tenenbaum, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 311 (2010).
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be extended from peer-to-peer networks to other content sharing
methods including use of BitTorrent protocols.56 Second, Moseley
sees the fixed penalty of $250 per work as ineffective. Someone who
downloads a few songs worth 99 cents should not be punished more
than someone who downloads a piece of software worth several hundreds of dollars. Moseley proposes that fines be based on a multiple
of the retail value of the work.57 For example, if the penalty were set
at 50 times the value of the content, someone who downloads 50
songs worth 99 cents apiece would pay a penalty of $2,500.
The Lemley and Reese approach and Moseley’s adjusted approach make a lot of sense. They would bring costs down for content
providers, and bring damages down from their astronomical level.
Moseley’s approach in particular would make copyright infringement cases move more quickly, and it is flexible enough to handle everything from inexpensive songs to high-end software. However, the
inclusion of the minimum damages award is counter-productive, and
I argue that it should be eliminated for two reasons. First, it eliminates the possibility of prosecuting most casual infringers. Second,
it is unnecessary because copyright holders will not pursue a case if
the potential damages award is “too low”.
Most casual infringers will not cross the $25,000 damages
threshold unless the damages are calculated with an extremely high
multiple of the retail value. Moseley suggests beginning with damages of 100 times the retail value of the infringed material.58 At this
level an individual would need to download 250 songs or 17 movies
within a 30-day period, much more than a casual infringer would
download. In fact, the high–profile cases litigated during the RIAA’s
“legal blitz” wouldn’t even qualify for this new system. Tenenbaum
downloaded only 31 songs, putting his potential damages at $3,100.59
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Id. at 342.
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Jammie Thomas-Rasset downloaded only 24 songs.60 Obviously, the
RIAA felt that these individuals were worth pursuing, despite the
low volume of their infringement. Under the new system, only those
who are regularly downloading large amounts of copyrighted material are eligible to be prosecuted using this system. This perpetuates
an ineffective practice of prosecuting only a small segment of the
pirating community. In fact, it eliminates the very segment of the
population for which the system is most equipped to handle. If the
damages threshold were eliminated, copyright holders would have
more flexibility with which to use the new system.
Finally, the damages threshold is simply unnecessary. While the
proposed system would certainly cut the costs of prosecution, there
will always be a modest cost associated with enforcing a copyright
claim. Copyright holders will self-enforce thresholds that seem appropriate to them. This would give the same flexibility afforded by
Moseley’s damages multiplier to the process of choosing which individuals to prosecute. For example, software companies may choose
to pursue those who upload 10 or more copies of their software, but
a record label may wish to pursue only individuals who upload more
than 50 songs. Regardless, the decision should be in the hands of the
copyright owners, not the court.
To illustrate how this system might work, I now present a simple
example. John Doe uploads approximately 150 songs to a file sharing website, Pirate Bay. Lawyers from the RIAA happen to be looking for copyright infringers and extract John Doe’s IP address as he
uploads the songs. The lawyers gather additional evidence, including screenshots of the alleged infringement and evidence that others
have been downloading the songs that Mr. Doe has uploaded. These
lawyers then send an application to an administrative judge, who
quickly determines whether the case is valid. If the case were valid,
the administrative court would communicate with the defendant and
ask for any evidence that they did not infringe the copyright. The
judge would then make a quick decision, deciding, for the sake of
our example, that the defendant is guilty. Assuming the current mul60

Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045 - Dist.
Court, Minn. 2010.
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tiplier for music is 25, the defendant would be charged 25 times the
value of the songs, or $3750. Part of this penalty would pay for the
court’s time, but most would go to the copyright holder.

VI. Potential Counter-Arguments
While I believe this system would dramatically improve copyright enforcement, many people will have legitimate doubts. I attempt to address these doubts below.
One possible argument is that copyright holders have little incentive to use the proposed system if they feel they could make more
money in traditional litigation. This concern is also valid; especially
since the alternate resolution system is designed for cases where little
to no options exist for a valid defense. This can be remedied by giving the defendant the option to choose the dispute resolution system
before litigation begins. Most copyright holders would choose the
alternate system in any case, since copyright cases against individuals have been known to cause serious reputational harm.61
Another possible argument against eliminating the damages
threshold is that copyright holders are only interested in those who
heavily abuse their copyrights. While this argument is valid for large
record labels and production studios, it fails to recognize the plight
of smaller labels and studios. Many independent artists are affected
by copyright infringement, but their work may not be uploaded often
enough to take advantage of the proposed system. Eliminating the
threshold allows these smaller artists to pursue claims against their
copyrights.
Overall, the proposed system is not without flaws, but many of
these flaws can be remedied as they are discovered.

VII. Conclusion
61

See, for example, Benson, Michael. 2010. ISPs and Music in the US: The
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Copyright laws in the United States are woefully outdated. They
were written at a time when copyright infringement meant expensive equipment and very specific intent to benefit financially from
the intellectual property of others. Modern copyright infringers are
much different, they infringe for wide-ranging reasons, many of
which are innocuous and virtually none of which are for profit. The
laws must be changed to reflect this paradigm shift. By developing a
dispute resolution system that is cheap, easy, and quick, we can ensure that copyright holders have incentive to keep creating without
obfuscating the original purpose of the copyright, “to promote the
progress of science and useful arts”.62
I believe the system proposed by Lemley and Reese, and improved by Moseley, has the potential to do just that. With a few minor
changes, like eliminating the damages threshold, the proposed system could reduce online copyright infringement significantly.
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Traditional Economics and the Fiduciary
Illusion: A Socio-Legal Understanding of
Corporate Governance
Jason Searle1

F

ollowing crises such as Enron and the financial meltdown of
2008, the conversation concerning what went wrong and what
needs to be changed is typically dominated by those voices
of legal-economic nature, that is, having a basis in traditional economic paradigms. The scholars and policymakers under this banner
typically rely on similar theoretical foundations to one another in
framing reform. The problem with our singular trust in this purportedly scientific and objective community is identified by the work of
emerging socio-legal thought, particularly from new economic sociology. Scholars in this field have recently questioned the neoclassical
economic model which serves as a basis for legal-economic scholars’ and policymakers’ reform proposals. Socio-legal thinkers are
aware that the solutions created by the legal-economic community
materialize in the law. However, as a socially embedded institution,
the law more often than not has farther reaching consequences than
accounted for by its black-letter intent and neoclassical, rational-actor foundation.
But much socio-legal thought, including new economic sociology, is very recent and has yet to cover much of the territory that
has been traversed by legal-economic scholars time and again. One
such area will be the focus of this paper: fiduciary duties in corpo1
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rate governance. The fiduciary set-up of corporate governance has
been greatly stressed and invested in by traditional legal scholars
and policymakers alike in response to corporate scandals and economic crises. Take Enron, for example—after the allegations that the
board of directors engaged in insider trading, new audit, nomination,
and compensation committee reforms were designed to make directors independent and better able to comply with fiduciary duties.2
While such reform sounded good in theory, its practical application
was less successful, as directors have been able to serve on these
committees without alarming the court of a conflict of interest.3 This
problem arises because the fiduciary model is based on a limited
theoretical perspective. Socio-legal thought recognizes this, and thus
can contribute to rethinking the issue of corporate governance.4 This
paper will specifically point out the flaws in supposing that the fiduciary set-up creates director accountability.
This article will proceed in Part I by laying out the fundamental
differences between the traditional take of legal-economic studies
and socio-legal thought, particularly with concern to new economic
sociology. After the boundaries are drawn in Part I, Part II will define fiduciary relationships and accompanying principles, and show
how they are a product of the traditional approach to law and economics. Part III will point to some major issues created by reliance
on the fiduciary model of corporate governance. Part IV will note the
potential for socio-legal studies to remedy some of the limitations
of the fiduciary model, especially in reference to the duty of care,
where it can build upon a more recent trend in legal scholarship. An
2

Reed Abelson, ENRON’S COLLAPSE: THE DIRECTOR’S; ONE ENRON INQUIRY SUGGESTS BOARD PLAYED IMPORTANT ROLE,
n.y. times, Jan 19, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/19/business/
enron-s-collapse-directors-one-enron-inquiry-suggests-board-playedimportant.html; Darren C. Skinner, Director Responsibilities And Liability
Exposure In The Era Of Sarbanes-Oxley, [June 2006] The Practical
Lawyer 29, 31-33.

3

Connolly v. Gasmire, 257 S.W.3d 831, 845-849 (Tex. App. 2008).

4

The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course, The Economist Sept.
7, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effectsfinancial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article.
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example of the support a socio-legal perspective might afford will be
given with the equity trustee. By avoiding oversimplification of the
human actor, socio-legal insight would suggest advantages to the equity trustee that have not been acknowledged in the more traditional
legal literature. Following this, Part V will conclude.

I. Neoclassical Economics vs. New Economic Sociology
In an honest effort to be objective and scientific, the legal-economic tradition up until the 1980s and 1990s was dominated by
the atomistic, rational human actor model of the neoclassical tradition.5 At around the same time, scholarly discussion concerning
corporate governance was revitalized, and was fated to be analyzed
under this socially negligent paradigm.6 This viewpoint, explained
M. Granovetter, an early new economic sociologist, was flawed for
being what he called “undersocialized.”7 While not totally unfounded, neoclassical accounts rested on faulty assumptions,8 and failed
to recognize the importance of the law’s and economics’ embeddedness in a social world. Granovetter also pointed out the overreaction
of some economists to this situation, which was to “oversocialize”
the human actor, discrediting the actor rationality envisioned by
the undersocialized neoclassical account. The folly in both of these
5

Gerald F. Davis, New Directions in Corporate Governance, 31 Ann Rev.
Soc. 143, 144 (2005). (The rational human actor model Davis refers to
consists of human actors primarily motivated to act in their own self-interest. The model assumes that the actor’s decision-making is completely
accounted for by a personal cost-benefit analysis, rendering social factors
inconsequential).

6

Id. at 159.

7

Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness, 91 Am. J. Soc. 481 (1985).

8

Andrew Lang, The Legal Construction of Economic Rationalities?, 40 J.L.
Soc’y 155, 162-163 (2013). (Lang explains how neoclassical economics
relies on two faulty assumptions: 1) Human actors possess perfect information, 2) Human actors exercise perfect rationality. We can easily see
how social contingencies undermine both of these assumptions, something
new economic sociology picked up on).
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groups was said by Granovetter to be based in oversimplifying the
human actor.9 By this he meant that neither lens alone was sufficient,
but a balance between the two was necessary for an accurate portrayal of reality.
Granovetter’s and other emerging new economic sociologists’
middle ground between the oversocialized and undersocialized accounts is explained well by Lang, who identifies the law’s ability
not only to regulate the operation of corporations, but also play a
constitutive role. This is to say that law is not in a passive role when
creating the rules for corporations, but is actively creating a framework within which CEOs, directors, and officers must operate and
run their business. Furthermore, what Lang calls “cognitive infrastructure,” the paradigm under which rationality is constructed, is
collective within this group because they share in the same corporate
governance market.10 Under this socio-legal perspective, rationality—the crux of neoclassical economics—still exists, but contrary
to neoclassical economics, its social embeddedness makes it an imperfect rationality.
While somewhat intuitive, the idea of markets and economic
actors as socially embedded had been overlooked, giving new economic sociologists the chance to shed light on numerous matters
previously left almost exclusively to the legal-economic camp.11
However, despite the strides new economic sociology has made, socio-legal perspectives on corporate governance only started to make
9

Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness, 91, Am. J. Soc., 481, 486 (1985).

10

Andrew Lang, The Legal Construction of Economic Rationalities?, 40 J.L.
Soc’y 155 (2013).

11

Michael Useem, The Social Organization of the American Business Elite
and Participation of Corporation Directors in the Governance of American
Institutions, 44 Am. Soc. Rev., 553, (1979). (Useem explored the world of
the business elite and discovered an “inner group” of corporate executives
who were categorized as such because of their upper-level involvement
in numerous corporate, NGO, and other organizations and their power
to promote the general interests of the entire capitalist class. Especially
common, and applicable to this paper, was Useem’s discovery that high
numbers of “inter-locking” directors, or directors serving on boards for
multiple corporations, were part of the inner group).
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way into the conversation ten to fifteen years ago.12 One of the scholars making headway in this respect, GF Davis, recognized the work
of Granovetter as more than enough reason for socio-legal insight
concerning corporate governance to be discovered.
Davis made his case for introducing socio-legal perspectives of
corporate governance by tracing the legal-economic approach back
to the origins of the corporate governance discussion. Industrialism created a separation of management (executives) and ownership (shareholders). This divide was criticized for years by so-called
“managerialist” scholars for the alleged tension it created between
management and ownership. Responding critically to these theorists
were the nexus-of-contracts (a.k.a. contractarian) theorists, who supposed that, rather than create rivalry, the management-shareholder
divide would incentivize management to perform their best.13
While bright lines may be difficult to draw today, vestiges of the
managerialist and contractarian camps still exist. As Mackerron put
it, corporate law scholarship is divided in two: the “traditional hierarchical” side (comparable to managerialist camp) supporting a fiduciary setup for corporations, and the “contractual” side supporting a
view of corporate accountability based in contractual obligations for
parties involved.14 The first group, more in support of the fiduciary
setup, bears more of a resemblance to the managerialist camp, as
their position is more skeptical of corporate management and therefore supportive of legal provisions to keep them in line. The second
camp is much more trusting of management and therefore supports
more contract-based mechanisms of enforcing accountability.
The focus of this paper is more to address the managerialist
camp of Davis’ account, which might seem odd considering they
12

G.F. Davis, New Directions In Corporate Governance, 31 Annu. Rev.
Sociol. 143, 156 (2005).
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Id. at 144-146.
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John A. MacKerron, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and the Nexus of
Contracts Corporation, 40 U. Kan. L. Rev. 679 (1991-1992). (While it is
outside the concern of this paper, it should be noted that MacKerron also
identifies a middle group, who either don’t find the corporate governance
setup debate useful, or who fall between the two camps).
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seemingly gave greater attention to social factors. But bear in mind
that in either camp, we can see places where theorists have either
under- or over-socialized the human actors involved. On the one
hand, the sternly skeptical attitude of managerialists toward corporate management assumes too much socially fostered deviousness
to be inherent in the board setup. On the other hand, a naive trust in
the laws of economics and self-interest of management to keep order
fails to acknowledge that “boards of directors in practice look little
like the antiseptic monitoring devices contemplated by theorists, and
are indeed very much social institutions.”15 So rather than pick one
side, I will seek to use socio-legal analysis to highlight the flaws
within either camp, and supplement them with insight sensitive to
social factors; such insight will acknowledge rationality as embedded in a social structure, but a rationality nonetheless, with room for
agency.
Having set new economic sociology and socio-legal studies
apart from neoclassical economics and the legal-economic tradition,
we may proceed to show how corporate governance fiduciary duties
have been handled by the latter, and how the former can offer valuable insight to the fiduciary duty discussion.

II. The Fiduciary Relationship and Traditional Approaches
Corporate governance law assumes the existence of a fiduciary
relationship between corporate management/directors and shareholders.16 By virtue of this relationship, directors on a corporation’s
board are said to owe the fiduciary duties of care (e.g. in decisionmaking) and loyalty (e.g. to the firm/shareholders).17 These duties
make manifest in law through legislation and case-law. Breach of
15

G.F. Davis, New Directions In Corporate Governance, 31 Annu. Rev.
Sociol. 143, 151 (2005).

16

A fiduciary relationship in a general legal sense is a relationship where
one or both the parties involved have some kind of legally binding obligation to one another. In the case of corporate governance, specific duties of
directors are enumerated that together are meant to ensure directors act in
the best interest of shareholders.

17
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these duties can supposedly lead to liability, though courts have
been extremely cautious about holding directors liable, especially
for breaches of duty of care. In fact, the existence of the business
judgment rule makes finding directors liable for damages or loss
very rare.18 Even after finding the board of directors was aware of
corruption in the Enron scandal, total damages awarded to shareholders from the board only ended up amounting to $13 million, meanwhile an estimated $27 billion in assets had been losing money off
the books.19
The importance of and deference to the business judgment rule
in the courts reflects the neoclassical concept of specialization—the
idea that directors, with their expertise and everyday involvement
in the business world, are better suited to make business decisions
than courts. Thus, the business judgment rule essentially says that
restraint should be exercised in calling director decision-making into
question in all cases except where there is evidence of bad faith conduct. This means that directors can make poor decisions, even ones
resulting in great firm loss, without being held liable, as long as those
decisions were made with the intent to increase firm and/or shareholder value.20 Thus, fiduciary duties, in theory, would expectedly be
fulfilled by a director acting in good faith, and their existence does
not violate the business judgment rule.
From the moment shareholder derivative litigation arises, United
Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co. permits business
judgment dismissal of a case before the court will even consider liability.21 United Copper extended the power of the business judgment
18

Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) See notes 76-101 infra and accompanying text.
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Former Enron Directors: Then and Now, Wash. Post (June 2, 2006),
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/therole-of-the-board-of-directors-in-enrons-collapse; The Role of the Board
of Directors in Enron’s Collapse Before Perm. S. Comm. on Investigations, 107th Cong. 5 (2003) (statement of Mich. Sen. Carl Levin, Member,
Comm. on Gov’t Affairs).
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rule from being merely a defensive measure to avoid personal liability to “an offensive weapon permitting directors to terminate
shareholder derivative suits.”22 To avoid case dismissal, the plaintiff
has the burden—in the absence of evidence that the board engaged
in fraud, illegality, or self-dealing—to pass the Aronson test.23 The
purpose of this test is to determine whether or not the particularized evidence shareholders bring forward would create doubt as to
whether the challenged behavior is business judgment protected.24
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation serves as a classic example of the strength of the business judgment rule. After just a year
of employment, Michael Ovitz was terminated from his CEO position with the Walt Disney Corporation. Initially, the board saw great
promise in Ovitz, and had thus built a generous severance package
into his contract amounting to $140 million. While charges were
brought against the board for such an apparent blunder, efforts to
find any on the board liable failed. The court agreed with the plaintiffs that, especially in light of the brevity of Ovitz’s employment,
the severance package seemed a bit excessive. However, the court
affirmed a lower court’s decision to dismiss the case on the grounds
that the business judgment rule protected the board’s decision in this
case just as it would have if they had given out a loan in good faith
which was ultimately dishonored.25
Caution in holding directors liable through a forgiving business
judgment rule is also motivated by a concern to not discourage talented individuals from becoming involved in corporate governance.
22

David A. Breyer, Business Judgment Dismissal of Shareholder Derivative
Suits by Board Litigation Committees: An Expanded Role for the Courts,
Vand. L. Rev. 235, 242-243 (1982).

23

Connolly v. Gasmire, 257 S.W.3d 831, 841 (Tex. App. 2008). (This test
says a corporation’s demand [to dismiss] will be excused if a shareholder
pleads facts that create reasonable doubt that 1) directors were independent/disinterested, or 2) challenged transaction was result of valid exercise
of business judgment. These criteria largely emphasize the director duty of
loyalty. If the shareholder fails to create doubt about either one, the case is
dismissed).
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Leading corporate governance scholar Stephen Bainbridge takes
for granted that greater chance of liability for corporate management necessarily reduces efficiency of decision-making. Because of
this, he reasons, risk of opportunism and plain carelessness must
be accepted as inevitable.26 Bainbridge is not alone; great trust of
directors is exercised widely in case-law and legal scholarship alike.
Glaspy, reviewing Gantler—which gave corporate officers the same
protections from liability enjoyed by directors—notes that the court
thought it “only rational to insulate officers if we are going to insulate directors, to keep the corporate governance running smoothly
and to encourage risk-taking...this seems a more ‘realistic approach’
for corporate America.”27 Bainbridge’s and Glaspy’s opinions capture the general consensus among corporate governance scholars
concerning directors and fiduciary liability, and this serves to illustrate how strongly neoclassical economic models have influenced
corporate governance law.
Such an attitude is also generally taken by legislatures crafting
the law. As it has traditionally been seen as corporation friendly,
Delaware serves as the capital state in the U.S. for corporations.28
The Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) and the Delaware
General Corporation Law (DGCL) both embody important corporate governance standards which were crafted under the influence
of the traditional legal-economic paradigm.29 The business judgment rule finds its place in the MBCA, which states that a director’s
challenged conduct can only be found deserving of liability if in the
decision made, “the director was not informed to an extent the director reasonably believed appropriate in the circumstances.”30 True to
the business judgment presumption, this law gives greater weight
26

Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics 283 (2002).

27

Meghan Glaspy, Delaware’s Gantler Decision: A Solution to Corporate
Corruption, 12 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 289, 308 (2014).
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Daniel. R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union
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to rational, incentivized directors’ business decisions. The DGCL is
not much different in its big-picture content. This law relies heavily
on fiduciary duties to regulate a corporation’s actions. It assumes
corporate actors will be driven by a sense of ethical duty and raw
self-interest to do what is best for their company, employees, and
shareholders regardless of outside circumstances and pressures.31
Case law also tends to follow the traditional, legal-economic
suit, as directors are held liable only very rarely. Those few cases in
which a court has given a stricter interpretation of directors duties,
and thus been more likely to hold directors personally liable, have
been treated by most of the legal scholarship with contempt. The
classic case to fit this description, Smith v. Van Gorkom, imposed
liability on directors for a breach of duty of care after the court decided they had failed to appropriately inform themselves before a
merger.32 From the very year it was decided, Van Gorkom garnered
great animosity from the legal-scholarly community, with Fischel
making the statement to be cited by hundreds after him—that Van
Gorkom was “surely one of the worst decisions in the history of corporate law.”33 Although Fischel regards the court’s facts in this case
as inaccurate, his piece accepts them as true for the sake of showing that, even under what he sees as the biased view of the court,
the business judgment rule should have protected the directors from
liability. Fischel justifies his support for a forgiving business judgment rule on several grounds, including the idea of specialization
and directors’ optimal position to make business decisions, and the
role of contractual and market mechanisms in rewarding good business decisions and penalizing bad ones.34 These bases of Fischel’s
analysis align him with the neoclassical economic tradition, and the
popularity of his work in legal scholarship is evidence of the general
consensus regarding holding directors liable.
31
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While there are critics of the business judgment rule and the
“insurance” it provides against liability for any action a director can
prove was done with a business-advancing motive, the great majority of legal scholarship, policymakers, and Delaware judges deem
business judgment protection a worthy and reasonable cause. Their
case rests upon neoclassical economic principles and theory. They
accept the problems that arise from weak accountability-enforcing
mechanisms because they assume directors to be rational actors who
are incentivized to perform well due to their relationship to the corporation; if they do well for the corporation, the corporation does
well for them.35

III. Critique of Legal Economic Approach to Fiduciary
Relationship
Because of the influence of the neoclassical economic paradigm under which corporate governance law is traditionally viewed,
the legal community’s perspective on the fiduciary relationship of
boards of directors suffers from severe tunnel vision. Case law, legislation, and scholarly work on the fiduciary relationship tend to exhibit one or more of the following five symptoms: 1) A naive trust in
the strength of fiduciary duties to encourage accountability of corporate management, 2) Reliance on weak reform of fiduciary duties
to create accountability after crisis, 3) Resistance to strong fiduciary
duty reform, 4) Ignorance to social considerations, and 5) Ineffective
monitoring of board accountability.
In the courts, we see a dominant presence of the third and fourth
symptoms, with some significant evidence of the first and fifth
symptoms as well. Follet supports this assertion in his commentary on Gantler. Similar to Glaspy (referenced in section II), Follet
identifies the general fear that “the specter of liability” is likely to
encourage inferior decision-making processes and discourage risktaking. The light handling of directors in the courts is good evidence
of this idea’s primal importance. However, Follet brings up another
interesting point which goes against the grain of what traditional
35

Id. at 1442-1443.
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perspectives on corporate governance would predict. Even absent
protections from liability, corporate management has been seen
to take extreme risks.36 Without socio-legal insight, such evidence
seems to work against the rational actor model. But from a sociolegal stance, it is acknowledged that directors are no strangers to the
rules constraining their behavior. Many are even “repeat players”
in the judicial system, which can create a great disparity in power
between a corporation’s directors and shareholders when a lawsuit
arises.37 And when directors cannot cover all their bases to avoid
liability, they use special litigation committees, to whom the courts
look when considering whether or not to dismiss litigation.38 While
supposedly comprised of “disinterested outsiders,” these committees
are, after all, formed by the firms being sued, thus leading to a conflict of interest.39 Thus, the law in courts does not always play out
as intended because it is created, enforced, and complied with in a
social world.
The ability of directors to work the system through understanding the law and its limitations is epitomized in the case of fiduciary
duties. Take for example the duty of care. While in theory this duty
is supposed to ensure that directors make informed, sound decisions,
even legal-economic scholars have admitted the ruling of Disney
practically incapacitates what was already a weak duty of care.40
New economic sociologists might identify the disconnect between
shareholders and directors. While shareholders expect that a duty
36
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Vand. L. Rev. 235, 243 (1982).

39

Jerold S. Solovy, Barry Levenstam, & Daniel S. Goldman, The Role of
Special Litigation Committees In Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 25
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of care ensures decisions are made on an informed basis with the
interest of firm value in mind, the duty as enforced looks very different from what its standard might suggest. But, as long as the duty
is there, and as long as scholars and reformists continue to unjustifiably stress the importance of fiduciary duties, shareholders might
not consider other ways in which accountability might be achieved.
Still, corporate governance law continues to emphasize fiduciary duties. Especially in the event of market failures, legislators
create law assuming that new superficial modifications to directors’
fiduciary duties will have a meaningful impact. This means that
most of the time, fiduciary duty tightening and greater regulation
implemented have negligible effect or are simply advisory.41 Where
this is not the case, reform tends to be ridiculous and impossible for
directors to comply with alone, which leads them to hire committees
to account for new compliance measures.42 Such new requirements
in Sarbanes-Oxley may have been tedious, but, as Skinner noted,
were not premised upon any new theories of director responsibility.43
While failing to create actual accountability, it would be sociologically naive to believe that fiduciary duty reform makes no difference in corporate governance behavior. This kind of legislation often
comes as a knee-jerk response to market failure. Sarbanes-Oxley
and Dodd-Frank came about because of such circumstances, and instead of representing effective reform, scholars point out how these
acts either did nothing or simply added useless tedium to corporate
operations.44 A socio-legal approach would recognize that as some
kind of a response, these acts serve in part as smoke and mirrors to
disguise the fact that nothing meaningful is actually being done to
bring about change.45 Furthermore, new stipulations of legislation
alter the environment under which directors operate, which reflects
41
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as a change in the definition of rational behavior. But rather than
making directors more effective, this modified rationality results in
directors taking more time to ensure they can avoid liability, resulting in less efficient performance.46
More impacting legislation than the hasty and poorly construed
acts responding to corporate scandals and financial crises are the
MBCA and the DGCL, the foundational corporate law statutes referenced previously. The duty of care and the duty of loyalty, as construed in these laws, are heavily based on the ideas of neoclassical
economic thought—individuals are assumed to act rationally and
are uninfluenced by other economic players.47 But the duties these
laws are supposed to create and enforce are weak. A socio-legal perspective would recognize that, as experienced players in corporate
governance, directors and corporate management are able to play the
field—so to speak—to avoid the actual restraint and consequences
imposed by these laws.48 We saw this empirically proven in the financial crisis and even after, as corporate management was often
able to deploy “golden parachutes” while their firms experienced
significant loss or even burned to the ground.49 This was all done
while the MBCA and DGCL were in place. Dodd-Frank’s provision
to remedy this situation, establishing a non-binding shareholder vote
on executive pay,50 was a classic case of an ineffective supplementary reform.
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There may be hope for a change in perspective. Some scholars
in the corporate law circle have recently deemed that considering
the duty of care a fiduciary duty is dangerous,51 while others simply
think that corporate law has evolved to nullify the potential effects
fiduciary duties could have. Once scholar supporting the latter position, Alces, asserts that corporate fiduciary obligation is a myth. Of
three traditional scholarly views in support of fiduciary duties, Alces
points out that none are compatible with current, real-life application. To Alces, describing the duties of care and loyalty as “fiduciary” is a misnomer that confuses shareholders about how much power
of redress they actually have.52 Overall, there is an emerging movement in the legal scholarship away from the fiduciary relationship.

IV. Socio-legal Insight on Fiduciary Duties and Director
Accountability
Bringing socio-legal insight into the discussion about fiduciary duties and director accountability could manifest in various
ways with various dividends. From introducing qualitative studies
to determine how boards become effective, to highlighting the importance of social relationships within the corporate management
setting, to creating new models under which director accountability
can be studied, socio-legal work has great potential to enrich and
inform by itself. However, there is also a great opportunity for sociolegal insight to build upon and add to scholarship emerging from the
more traditional legal-economic circles, especially with concern to
fiduciary duties and director accountability mechanisms.
Part of the reason we look to build upon work already done by
more traditional legal-economic scholarly work is because we recognize, as Davis and colleagues point out, that the more traditional
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models have their place.53 They write in specific reference to the
neoclassically-based agency theory. The premise of self-interested
actors combined with the split between management and principals (i.e. shareholders) makes for a theory whose implications resultantly point to regulatory measures to improve firm management
performance. These regulatory measures can be either external (e.g.
fiduciary obligations) or internal (e.g. board of directors).54 It is interesting that despite the skeptical view agency theory presumes of
management, it still trusts the board, which management typically is
a part of, to regulate appropriately. Still, agency theory’s reasoning
behind its endorsement of certain regulatory measures is fair, but
unsupported by additional theory, it fails to provide insight into how
managerial and principal interests can be aligned,55 a more proactive
way of accomplishing the task that regulation sets out to achieve.
Various socio-legal approaches have taken us closer to understanding the alignment of management and principal interests.
Ahrens and Khalifa note that, left to agency theory, corporate governance remains a black box, leaving the inner-workings unknown.
Therefore, the authors propose socio-legal insight, in the form of
qualitative methods capturing the “lived experience” of governance,
is in order.56 Along with this foundational method, the authors note
that different models of corporate governance can guide qualitative
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studies.57 Regardless of the specific model chosen, it becomes apparent after a deeper look into corporate governance that mere compliance with government codes—which is what agency theory would
propose to create management accountability—is not a good indicator of good governance practice. A better way to measure good
governance comes when directors’ control function is accompanied
by an exceptional service function. For instance, under the accountability grounded theory model, the authors pointed out that we can
measure success of a board by how “engaged” or “passive” directors
are. More engaged directors probe and challenge executives to fulfill their control roles, but they also support executives in decisions,
fulfilling a service role.58
The findings under the accountability model may be expounded upon by referring to stewardship theory, which actually arose
in response to agency theory’s alleged “simplistic view of human
nature.”59 With a sociological foundation, stewardship theory takes a
more forgiving view of corporate management than agency theory.
Rather than seeing management as motivated solely by self-interest,
the theory envisions management with collectivist values that will
motivate them to act in the best interests of the company. This theory would thus suggest that management autonomy should be maximized, or in other words—regulation should be eased.60 Roberts,
McNulty and Stiles, who use stewardship theory to study boardroom
accountability, are like Davis in the sense that they do not attempt
to choose between agency theory and stewardship theory. Rather,
they argue that we should be able to recognize when each theory

57

Id. 10-11

58

Id.

59

Daily, Dalton, and Cannella, Corporate Governance: Decades of Dialogue
and Data, 28 The Academy of Management Review, 371, 372 (2003).

60

James H. Davis, F. David Schoorman & Lex Donaldson, Towards a
Stewardship Theory of Management, 22 no. 1 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 20, 26
(1997).

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 29, 2015

84

applies.61 For instance, citing a study conducted by Westphal, the
authors note how development of closer social ties between the CEO
and the board was shown to provide greater mutual trust, space for
advice-seeking by executives, less defensive behavior, and more
learning.62 In this case, an interpretation using stewardship theory
would account better for the observed phenomenon than would
agency theory. Still, stewardship theory poses the danger of placing too much trust in fostering collaboration, which can result in
complacency and group-think, so it is important to have a careful
balance of control through appropriate regulation.63
Despite the value of agency theory and stewardship theory in
different instances, in the U.S. there is a greater need to realize the
insights of stewardship theory than agency theory; just look at our
response to the great financial crises of the last decade or so—Sarbanes Oxley and Dodd-Frank. The thousands of pages constituting
these acts implemented regulations and rules which law scholars
have deemed tedious and unlikely to create a greater level of accountability.64 On the other hand, the UK response to their own
economic crises has been to explore what could be done more proactively to strengthen effectiveness of non-executive directors.65
This is where we see the value in McNulty’s and Stiles’ focus on the
connection between non-executive directors and executive management. However, their study does leave the agency theory concern of
a management-principal divide unsettled. Just because management
and the board of directors get along does not mean minority shareholders are protected. In today’s corporate governance environment,
61
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it is obvious that minority shareholders can still be slighted even if
executives and directors are on the same page.
This is where a new direction in the mainstream corporate governance literature can be built upon through socio-legal insight. This
direction moves toward contract-based corporate governance, rather
than a fiduciary set-up. Following this trend, Alces envisions an equity trustee, a person who would replace the current fiduciary duty
set-up. Rather than being another director, an equity trustee would
be the eyes, ears, and voice of the non-governing minority shareholders.66 Thus, they would be a force for keeping directors accountable.67 What Alces—as a traditional legal-economic scholar—has
not stressed as much is the potential for an equity trustee to enhance
directors’ service roles.
From a socio-legal standpoint, realizing the value of an equity
trustee goes back to the fundamentals and Granovetter. While undersocialized, traditional accounts suppose that a director will be
motivated to perform well by having an obligation to n persons,
Granovetter would recognize the strength of this relationship would
increase were the director required to answer to a person, one who
represented shareholders.68 Taking this into consideration accounts
for the rationality supposed by traditional legal scholars, but it is
shown to be a bounded rationality shaped by many factors, including
social relationships. Furthermore, combining this with McNulty’s
and Stiles’ findings, it is apparent how an equity trustee could abet
the service role of a director. Just as engaged directors were closer
to management (and thus able to perform their roles better), so too
would an engaged equity trustee put minority shareholders a step
closer to directors and management, bringing about similarly positive outcomes.
With concern to more accountability-related factors, there is
even greater incentive to introduce the equity trustee. Shareholder
66
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derivative litigation could be avoided, not only because the equity
trustee would be actively involved in monitoring and influencing
board deliberations, but also because the equity trustee would be in
a contractual relationship with the board, which would give them a
certain level of latitude in promoting director accountability, proactively averting the need to sue over a breach of fiduciary duties.

V. Conclusion
Legislators, courts, and legal scholars all tend to follow the legal-economic tradition as they respond to financial crises and corporate scandals. This leads to reform based on faulty assumptions
that oversimplify the human actor, and in the case of corporate governance accountability mechanisms, this leads to a futile reliance on
the fiduciary setup.
New economic sociology and other emerging socio-legal research can supplement the legal-economic tradition’s oversight by
identifying important social considerations relevant to corporate
governance. Potential socio-legal contributions are many and various, but as a specific example, it was shown how they can lead us to
conceptualize directors in a different light than traditional approaches, which helps us appreciate both control and service functions of
directors. This new framework supports a recent idea in emerging
contract-based legal scholarship—the equity trustee—which could
serve as an alternative to the current fiduciary setup that would both
create greater accountability and improve director performance.

The Right to Privacy in Mandatory Drug
Testing: Exploring the Public and Private
Domains
Adam Farrell and Jon Collier1

I. Introduction

I

n 1987, Edward P. Twigg was working as material planner for
Hercules Corporation in Mineral County, West Virginia, assisting in the maintenance of supplies for the business.2 Twigg had
been with the company for nearly a decade, and had performed his
duties satisfactorily as evidenced by numerous positive evaluations
and promotions.3 In December, 1984, Hercules Corp. implemented
“a policy of mandatory, random drug testing for its employees.”4 This
was heavily implemented throughout 1986, and Twigg was selected
for a mandatory urinalysis drug test twice during that year, providing a negative result both times. Twigg was vocal in communicating
to his superiors his objections to the policy, but submitted to the test
both of these occasions. In July 1987, Twigg was selected again for
a mandatory drug test to be administered on that day. Twigg voiced
his opposition to the policy again, to which the management at Alle1

Adam and Jon are students at Brigham Young University, majoring in
Asian Studies and European Studies respectively. They plan to enter law
school during fall 2016. Special thanks to the authors and editors of the
BYU Pre-Law Review for their help in preparing this article for publication.

2

Twigg v. Hercules Corp., 406 SE 2d 52 – W. Va. 53, 53 (1990).

3

See generally Id.

4

Id. at 53
87

88

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 29, 2015

gany responded by informing him that he would be terminated from
employment if he did not submit to the drug test. Twigg refused to
submit to the test, and was consequently discharged by Hercules on
July 29, 1987.
Experiences like that of Edward Twigg are not uncommon—
private companies have been implementing policies of mandatory
drug testing for decades, and most large companies in the United
States currently require drug testing of their employees.5 Private
companies have a strong incentive to test their employees, as drug
use in the workplace can lead to numerous problems such as lost productivity, accidents and injuries, insurance rate increases, and legal
liability.6 Furthermore, employers in the United States have historically operated under the “employment-at-will”7 doctrine, which
gives them wide discretion in disciplining employees and taking actions to control the workplace environment.8 In the years since drug
testing technology has become available and affordable, many employers have exercised this discretion by requiring their employees
to undergo mandatory drug testing, usually at random, in order to
preserve the commonly accepted notion of ideal working conditions.
These policies, however, have been shown to be somewhat problematic. On one hand, questions have been raised as to the effectiveness of drug testing programs in the workplace, as well as the
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actual negative impact of drug users in the workplace.9 While these
are important developments to consider, there is little evidence to
suggest that an employer would not be justified in terminating an
employee who is known to use illicit drugs, so this article will operate under the assumption that such a decision would be justified.
The problems with these policies arise primarily with the methods
used to obtain information about the employee’s drug use, especially
as it pertains to the employee’s right to privacy.10 Jurisprudence in
the public sphere has dealt with the balance between an employer’s
right for information and the employee’s protection from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.11 Such cases
have found that “it is undisputed that a drug test is a search under
the Fourth Amendment, and that the government generally has the
burden of justifying a warrantless search.”12 While the protections of
the Fourth Amendment do not directly apply in the private sphere,
many states have incorporated that principle into their state constitutions, and courts have often cited the right to privacy as an element
of common law.13 With the understanding of privacy as a human
right (at least to some extent), it becomes imperative to determine
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whether an employer’s use of mandatory, suspicionless drug testing
violates that right.
Claiming that the drug testing policy of Hercules Corp. violated
his right to privacy, Twigg appealed his case to the Supreme Court
of West Virginia. The Court cited an earlier ruling which established
precedent requiring employers to be “held liable where an employee’s discharge contravenes a substantial public policy,” which had
previously limited the discretion of employers in their decisions to
terminate at-will employees.14 The Court had also previously ruled
(in Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp.) that an employee could
not be fired upon refusal to take a mandatory polygraph test, further limiting the testing procedures an employer was allowed to
implement.15 Based on the findings of these two rulings, the Court
was required primarily to decide whether Twigg’s privacy had been
violated by the requirement to submit to a urinalysis drug test. In
protecting the right to privacy, the Court found that mandatory drug
testing should only be conducted by an employer in cases where (1)
the employer has reasonable suspicion of the employee’s drug use,
or (2) the job responsibilities of the employee involve the safety of
others or public safety.16
The West Virginia Supreme Court’s decision in Cordle includes
the following statement: “In West Virginia, a legally protected interest in privacy is recognized.”17 This “legally protected interest in
privacy” must be the basis of policy decisions regarding mandatory
drug testing, both in the public and the private sphere. Reasonable
exceptions, such as the ones listed by the Court above, must be made
at times, but the law should fundamentally serve to protect the privacy
of United States citizens. This article will discuss the historical legal
14
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basis of drug testing, constitutional issues with mandatory testing
(particularly as it relates to the Fourth Amendment), and the ways in
which drug testing policies consistently violate the right to privacy.
It will advocate the establishment of the right to privacy as the primary consideration in cases regarding mandatory drug testing.

II. Historical Legal Basis for Drug Testing
One of the main motivating factors behind the emergence of
drug testing is the prevalence of drugs in American society. Many
experts, some within the legal community, consider drugs to be “one
of America’s most pervasive, serious, tragic and seemingly intractable social problems.”18 The National Institute on Drug Abuse measures the nationwide drug use trends in an annual study called the
National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), which provides
important information about drug use and its consequent abuse and
dependence among Americans. According to the Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration, survey participants report which substances they have used (1) in the past month, (2) in the
past year, and (3) over the course of their lifetime. The data collected
from the NSDUH suggests that in 2012, 23.9 million Americans,
or 9.2% of the population, were current users of illicit drugs (which
indicates that they have used within the past month). In 2002 the
rate was 8.3%, and there has been a steady increase over the past
decade.19 Because of this increase and the prevalence of drugs in
the United States, a larger emphasis has been placed on combatting
illicit drug abuse.
Although there has lately been a measurable increase in the trend
of drug use, drugs have always had a presence in American society, as
have the problems associated with them. Throughout America’s history there have been several attempts to deal with the drug problem,
including several different efforts by the United States government
18
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to control drug use. For example, alcohol has been the subject of
various forms of restriction, including complete prohibition with the
ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment20. This effort criminalized
alcohol and prohibited the sale or use of it. This amendment was later
repealed with the ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment21, and
the government shifted towards regulation. The criminal stigma was
removed from alcohol, and while the use of alcohol was accepted,
there were different controls imposed which alleviated some of the
negative effects of alcohol. As the regular use of alcohol has become
more prevalent, alcohol use has begun to be seen as acceptable as
long as it kept within reasonable limits. Illegal drugs, however, are
by their very nature prohibited in the United States, and mandatory
drug testing has been imposed to mitigate the adverse effects of illicit drugs in society. The concern in the United States about rising
drug use is driven by the significant costs associated with the use of
drugs, which have been stated to include the following: crime, an increased burden on the justice system, healthcare, increased disease,
and lost work productivity. Rather than adopt the regulatory measures that have proven more efficient in controlling alcohol abuse,
the United States has generally maintained a policy of eradication in
regards to drug use, citing the negative consequences listed above.
In recent years, one of the largest combative efforts against drug
use has been drug testing. These screening programs have been particularly prevalent in the workplace. The push for drug testing in
the work place originated with the government implementation of
screening in the military in 1981.22 Years later, in 1986, President
Ronald Reagan issued the executive order for a drug-free federal
workplace stating, “The Federal government, as the largest employer in the Nation, can and should show the way towards achieving
drug-free workplaces” through “demonstrating to drug users and
potential drug users that drugs will not be tolerated in the Federal
20
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workplace.”23 This extended the practice of drug testing to federal
employees in sensitive positions. The broad terminology of “sensitive positions” meant that the proposed executive order “would
permit drug testing of more than half of all Federal civilian workers.” Almost every Federal agency would establish a drug testing
program that would “cover employees who have access to secret or
sensitive information.”24
The government has continued to use the workplace as its focus
to fight drugs, because drug abuse costs employers $81 billion annually25. In addition to the direct costs, “drug use, abuse or addiction
among employees and their family members can cause expensive
problems for business and industry, ranging from lost productivity,
absenteeism, injuries, fatalities, theft and low employee morale, to
an increase in health care, legal liabilities and workers’ compensation costs.”26 As part of the United States Department of Labor, the
federal government has established the Drug Free Workplace Alliance. To promote safety and raise awareness of the consequences
of drug use, this agency incorporates the technology of drug testing as a means to increase safety and productivity in the workplace.
Following the example of these agencies and precedents set in the
Federal workplace, the private sector also adopted drug testing procedures, and drug tests have since become common practice. After
Reagan’s executive order was issued, drug testing in the nation’s
largest companies grew from 3 percent in 1983 to over 50 percent
in 1987.27 Today, over 80 percent of Fortune 500 companies have

23

The provisions of Executive Order 12564 of Sept. 15, 1986, appear at 51
FR 32889, 3 CFR, 1986 Comp., 224

24

Bernard Weinraub, Administration Aides Back Tests of Federal Employees
for Drugs. N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1986.

25

Drugs and the Workplace. National Council of Alcoholism and Drug Dependence. https://ncadd.org/learn-about-drugs/workplace (last visited Mar.
24, 2015)

26

Id.

27

Peter Boyer. ABC to Start Drug Tests. N.Y. Times, July 10, 1987

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 29, 2015

94

some form of drug testing for their employees.28 Despite the fact that
private employers are not required to screen for drug use, testing
is based on the assumptions that drug use has negative effects on
productivity and is costly to employers, and that drug testing is an
accurate method of increasing productivity by eliminating potential
problems.
While drug tests indicate the use of drugs, they do not necessarily measure impairment. Because they fail in that important area,
it is hard to use the test on the grounds of increasing productivity,
as it only shows prior use of drugs. It is critical to consider the relationship between drug test results and job performance “because the
mere presence of drugs—even if it can be established that their use
occurred during work—does not necessarily establish that the worker’s job performance was impaired or represented a safety hazard.”29
To illustrate the weak connection between drug use and impairment,
consider the case of James Barron30. Barron was a welder working
at a construction site in 2012. He was unwinding a hose when he
fell more than fourteen feet to the concrete floor, suffering injuries
to his spine, arms, and liver, and a possible intracranial bleed. The
costs of his injuries would have normally been alleviated by worker’s
compensation, but Barron was denied the additional funds. He was
forced to undertake a drug test after the incident, and the test was
returned positive. His claim for disability compensation was denied
because it was determined that he had drugs in his system based
on the results of this test. In reality, Barron had shared a quarter of
a gram of cocaine with a friend two full days before the accident.
While his claim was denied on the grounds that he was impaired
at the time of the accident, the drugs had no effect on his mental
state at that time.31 This tenuous relationship between drug use and
28
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workplace impairment makes intrusive mandatory drug tests seem
less justifiable, since consideration of the employee’s privacy outweighs the possibility of a result that will indicate nothing about the
employee’
It is clear that drug testing is not the most effective way to measure loss of productivity, yet employers in both the private and public
sectors continue to embrace it based on that reasoning. Because of a
weak federal policy and inconsistent state policies, the private sector
is left largely unregulated. Some states have recognized the violation
of personal privacy surrounding drug testing and have legislated to
protect the privacy of employees. Outside of those states that protect
their citizens’ right to privacy, private employers are able to require
drug testing of employees without suspicion of drug use and despite
good performance at work. In most jurisdictions, private employers
are able to perform drug tests on their employees for any reason, or
for no reason at all. This type of drug testing has been ruled unconstitutional in the public sphere, and the basis for those rulings—the
right of an individual to privacy—should be applied in the private
sphere as well.

III. Constitutional Issues with Mandatory, Suspicionless
Drug Testing: Fourth Amendment Protection
The advent of effective drug testing technology was immediately followed by the rise of constitutional questions surrounding these
procedures: Does a urine-based drug test constitute a search? Does
such a search require a warrant? In which cases would this search be
considered “unreasonable?” These and other questions began to be
answered through two cases: National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association.
Both cases were argued before the United States Supreme Court on
November 2, 1988, and decided on March 21, 1989.32 Though these
cases dealt with government organizations and federal law, they set a

32
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precedent for future cases to be decided by lower courts dealing with
state law and private organizations.
In the first case, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association, the Federal Railroad Administration had recently enacted
regulations that allowed them to conduct blood and urine tests for
alcohol and drugs on all crew members immediately following an
accident or safety violation.33 The suit was brought immediately by
labor organizations affected by this regulation, which held that this
violated Fourth Amendment rights. The Fourth Amendment stipulates that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”34 The petitioners held that this new
regulation constituted an unreasonable search, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, stating that these tests were indeed
warrantless searches, and as such, must meet the conditions of “reasonableness” and probable cause imposed on other such searches.
Citing several previous rulings, the Supreme Court found that these
tests constituted a government search, and that such a search must be
reasonable in order to be constitutional.35 They held, however, that
the searches proposed by the FRA were reasonable insofar that “the
Government interest in testing without a showing of individualized
suspicion is compelling.” The majority argued that the employees
who were tested under this law were required to “discharge duties
fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary
lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences,” and this was
reason enough to have them tested for drugs and alcohol through
these invasive procedures.36 The dissenting justices, however, were
adamant that the court had allowed the urgency of the war on drugs
to overpower the strength of the law contained in the Fourth Amendment. Citing the World War II relocation camps and the trials of
the McCarthy era, Justice Thurgood Marshall warned, “[H]istory
33
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teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency,
when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure.”37 In the
fervor to combat the scourge of drugs, the basic consideration of
human rights must not be left behind.
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, the court
was charged with deciding whether the United States Customs Service violated the Fourth Amendment by requiring a urinalysis drug
test from employees seeking transfer or promotion to certain positions.38 These positions were required to meet at least one of three
criteria: (1) they directly involved a drug interdiction or enforcement; (2) they required the employee to carry a firearm; or (3) they
required the employee to handle “classified” material.39 The U.S.
Customs Service felt that these employees would be particularly susceptible to bribery, lapses of judgment, or corruption as a result of
their drug use, and that the consequences of these actions could be
harmful enough to warrant preventative drug screening procedures.
The petitioners alleged that these procedures violated their Fourth
Amendment rights, and the District Court agreed. The Court of Appeals reversed, however, and the Supreme Court upheld that ruling
in a 5-4 decision. The majority in this case used a balancing test,
measuring the public interest against the personal privacy of government employees. They failed to rule on employees who handle “classified material,” however, as the umbrella of employees proposed by
the Customs Service was too broad.40 In his dissent, Justice Scalia
(who upheld the FRA in Skinner) demonstrated a key difference between these two cases:
I joined the Court’s opinion [in Skinner] because the demonstrated frequency of drug and alcohol use by the targeted
class of employees, and the demonstrated connection between such use and grave harm, rendered the search a reasonable means of protecting society. I decline to join the
37
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Court’s opinion in the present case because neither frequency of use nor connection to harm is demonstrated or even
likely. In my view the Customs Service rules are a kind of
immolation of privacy and human dignity in symbolic opposition to drug use.41
Along with Marshall’s dissent in Skinner, Scalia’s dissent points
out the potential problems that arise when organizations (especially
those under the control of the government) are allowed to perform
invasive searches without probable cause.
These two decisions provided a framework by which future cases
were decided in lower courts. In these decisions, the court adopted
a balancing test to decide whether the use of random or mandatory
drug testing for government employees was constitutionally permissible, balancing the interests of the government against the liberty
and the privacy of the individual being tested. The court found that
in many cases, mandatory drug testing without a warrant violates
the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, protecting individuals
from unreasonable search and seizure. It held that in most cases, a
warrant must be obtained following demonstration of probable cause
in order for an employee to be subjected to a mandatory drug test. It
also held, however, that the government might have “special needs
beyond the normal need for law enforcement” which are sufficiently
compelling to overcome the individual’s privacy interests, which
would allow drug testing without a warrant.42 The court, however,
allowed for a few notable exceptions to this rule: (1) customs officers
involved in front-line drug interdiction; (2) customs officers who
carry firearms; and (3) train operators where a documented problem with drug/alcohol related accidents existed in the industry.43 Essentially, these cases set the precedents that the Fourth Amendment
protects individuals from drug testing without suspicion, except for
cases of considerable importance that allow for suspicionless searches
41
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and allow officials to override the Fourth Amendment’s regular requirements of probable cause.
As cases involving drug testing emerged, the Court used the
cases of Skinner and Von Robb as their standard for permissible suspicionless drug testing. However, in 1997 the Court moved away
from the precedents set in these cases, when they were presented
with yet another case concerning the constitutionality of mandatory drug testing by a state government. Chandler v. Miller44 was
a case brought to the Supreme Court regarding a statute legislated
by the State of Georgia, which required candidates of state office to
complete a drug test in order to qualify for the position45. The drug
testing programs in this case were similar to Skinner and Von Raab,
however, unlike those cases the Court held that Georgia’s statute was
unconstitutional and that it did not meet the special needs requirement to not recognize individual right to privacy and countermanded
constitutional protections given in the Fourth Amendment.
In Chandler v. Miller, Georgia’s drug testing program was considered unconstitutional because the Court decided that this requirement did not meet the exception to the Fourth Amendment. They
recognized that the drug test was indeed a suspicionless search, and
in order to conduct the search they had to meet the framework to
merit a search without individualized suspicion. This was inconsistent with the Courts previous interpretations in Skinner and Von
Raab. This dissonance between cases demonstrated the need to
protect privacy. While the Court continues to analyze suspicionless
drug testing cases as a resolution, a more permanent and consistent
solution would come from state recognition of privacy rights. As
the Court’s erratic decisions illustrate, “consistently interpreting and
applying the special needs test in suspicionless drug testing is not an
easy task for the court. It is a much more difficult chore for the lower
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courts, which are expected to apply the Supreme Court’s muddled
interpretations.”46
These rulings have since been incorporated into federal drug
policy, which requires that federal employees only be subjected to
drug testing when there is a sufficient, demonstrable need for sobriety (such as in the operation of heavy machinery). Lower courts and
individual state legislatures, however, have interpreted these rulings more broadly, allowing both public and private organizations
to enact stringent drug testing policies that infringe on the Fourth
Amendment rights of individuals. State policies that fail to follow
the rulings of the Supreme Court in these cases often lead to misunderstanding and the violation of individual rights protected in
the Fourth Amendment. Such was the case when Luis Lebron was
denied temporary financial assistance after refusing to submit to a
mandatory drug test. In the case of Lebron v. Secretary, the 11th
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Fourth Amendment rights of
Mr. Lebron were violated by the requirement to submit to a mandatory drug test in order to receive financial aid, since the State “failed
to establish a substantial special need to support its mandatory suspicionless drug testing of [financial aid] recipients.”47 The court cited
Skinner and Von Raab in its determination of whether the State was
justified in requiring applicants to submit to mandatory drug testing,
finding that these applicants did not necessarily “discharge duties
fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary
lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences,”48 and thus
could not be required to submit to a drug test without probable cause.
Another case of privacy violation occurred in State v. Moreno,
where a Utah juvenile court ordered a drug test that was not in accordance with the Supreme Court’s rulings in Skinner and Von Raab.
The juvenile court had found Mr. Moreno’s daughter guilty of possession of marijuana and attempted possession of methamphetamine,
46
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and they considered this reason enough to require Moreno to submit
to a drug test.49 In the Utah Supreme Court case, “the juvenile court
held that it had the power to order parents to submit to drug testing
in the context of a child’s delinquency adjudication because the Legislature empowered it to impose reasonable conditions on parents
whose children were under the jurisdiction of the court.”50 The court
reversed this decision, stating that “[t]here is nothing in the Juvenile
Court Act that suggests that the parent of a delinquent juvenile has a
limited right to privacy,”51 and that the interests of the Government
in this case do not outweigh Mr. Moreno’s distinct right to privacy.
They cited Skinner in saying that “except in certain well-defined
circumstances, a search or seizure ... is not reasonable unless it is
accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable
cause.”52
While the verdict in State v. Moreno was a promising sign of
reform, placing a high priority on constitutional rights, it was a small
victory for privacy among several rulings which have supported the
continued invasion of it. Legal scholars have recently noted that the
enthusiasm for the “War on Drugs” in the late twentieth century
caused many judges to give undue weight to arguments against drug
possession and use based on the “pressing concern” of drug proliferation.53 This was the concern expressed by justices Marshall and
Scalia in their dissenting opinions, which mentioned that the effort
to eliminate drugs in the United States must not come at the expense
of individual liberties and privacy. While the risks of drug use are
still known and proven, more recent research has indicated a shift in
the way drug policy should be understood. Information on drug use
and possession, like all other personal information, must be based
on information ascertained by constitutional means, and the fact that
49
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a potential crime is drug-related offers no less protection to the defendant.54 This has been implemented reasonably well in federal law
regarding drug testing, with a few notable infringements on individual privacy. The drug testing policies of certain states, however,
more commonly include laws or requirements that infringe on the
individual privacy protected in the Fourth Amendment.
(i) A Comparative Analysis and Case Study of State Laws on Drug
Testing
Unlike many organizations under federal jurisdiction, employers only under the supervision of state governments (and sometimes
the state governments themselves) tend to have excessively loose
standards when it comes to drug testing. Many states offer few protections to personal privacy, allowing employers or businesses to
require a drug test at any time. As Justice Scalia eloquently stated
in Von Raab, “The impairment of individual liberties cannot be the
means of making a point… Symbolism, even symbolism for so worthy a cause as the abolition of unlawful drugs, cannot validate an
otherwise unreasonable search.”55 The Fourth Amendment explicitly
protects the right of an individual to privacy, specifically against unreasonable search.56 While private organizations may not be subject
to this amendment, state governments should seek to enact and enforce laws that protect the privacy of individuals, especially when it
comes to the intimacy of drug testing.
Utah’s track record for restricting drug testing by private entities is poor, at best. While some small victories for privacy have occurred (such as State v. Moreno, though that involved a government
entity rather than a private firm), Utah law generally permits a company to require its employees to submit to a suspicionless drug test at
any time.57 Some advocates for widespread drug testing argue that if a
worker is not using drugs, they have nothing to fear from mandatory
54
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drug testing, and should have no objections to it. By the same reasoning, an individual who is not harboring criminal activity in her
house should have no objection a random, suspicionless search of
her home. Clearly, this is not the case. The homeowner has a right to
privacy (a right that is the basis of the Fourth Amendment), and the
same is true for an individual’s right to the privacy of his or her own
body. Utah State Law needs to recognize these rights and protect
them through restrictions on a company’s ability to test for drugs.
Under Utah law, a company’s reasons for drug tests are broad
and varied. They may test in order to investigate possible employee
impairment (a case that would theoretically need to involve reasonable suspicion of impairment) or to investigate workplace accidents
or theft (a case in which drugs could theoretically be tied to the incident, though the connection is tenuous).58 Where the Utah Code
certainly oversteps the boundaries of personal privacy is in the
following: Individuals may be tested in order to “maintain safety
for employees or the public,” “maintain productivity,” “maintain
product or service quality,” or to “maintain security of property or
information.”59 These provisions have no basis in reasonable suspicion, and they violate an individual’s right to privacy. The only protections granted by the Utah Code stipulate that the employer must
distribute the drug testing policy to employees, but a written notice
that your rights are being violated does not make that violation justified.60 The Utah government, like all other state governments, must
regulate drug testing within the state, restricting forms of drug testing that violate the right of an individual to privacy.
Apart from safety-sensitive industries, the federal government
does not require employers to conduct drug testing, but it also does
not prohibit testing. In fact, Federal law sets few limits on drug testing policies and assumes it to be regulated at the state level. Because of this assumption there is a large disparity in drug testing
laws in different states. While Utah’s Legislature has attempted
to regulate drug testing, they offer little protection for employees
58
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and often violate constitutional rights. In many states, such as Utah,
employees’ privacy rights are overlooked in order to combat the war
on drugs. However, the state constitution of California gives each
citizen an inalienable right to pursue and obtain privacy61. California’s right to privacy covers not only government employees, but
employees in the private sector as well.
This constitutional amendment was adopted in 1972 and gives
privacy the constitutional status of an inalienable right. Because of
this, California was one of the first states to provide private employees protection from random drug testing. In the case of Luck v.
Southern Pacific Transportation, the plaintiff Barbara A. Luck, an
engineer at the Southern Pacific Transportation Company, was fired
after her refusal to submit to a random drug test by her employer.
Luck refused to comply as she viewed this request to be unfair and
unnecessary. The company told her that they had no reason to suspect she was impaired and had no complaints with her job performance. Luck filed suit against her employer on the basis that she was
exercising her constitutional right to privacy when she refused to
submit to a urine sample. The court concluded that the random drug
testing required by Southern Pacific was an unjustified invasion of
privacy. The jury found that Luck was fired for exercising her constitutional right. 62 This case set the precedent that random testing of
employees (not in a safety-sensitive position) is unlawful in California and that employees in both the public and private sector have an
inalienable right to privacy.

IV. Conclusion
As demonstrated by Twigg v. Hercules Corp., the right to privacy
should be the primary concern of lawmakers and private companies
when considering the use of mandatory drug testing. These rights
are best protected when they are enshrined in law, as in the state
61
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constitution of California. While the Federal Government’s standard
of drug testing in the workplace offers limited protection of the privacy of federal employees, it does little to regulate and ensure the
privacy rights of employees in the private sector and certain states.
Because of the lack of regulation at a federal level, incongruence
has emerged among state drug testing policies, especially for private
companies. The Supreme Court has established that drug testing is a
search, and the Fourth Amendment protects employees from unreasonable searches and establishes the need for probable cause in cases
of mandatory drug testing involving government employees. This
has been effectively applied to private companies under the policy of
the citizen’s right to privacy, as in Twigg v. Hercules Corp. However,
in most jurisdictions, the employee’s right to privacy is being routinely and needlessly violated. This intrusion of privacy is spurred
by irrational fears surrounding the war on drugs, which have led
many to believe that sacrificing constitutional rights in order to combat illegal drugs is necessary. This compromise of our rights has led
states to require drug testing in order to receive government benefits,
and for private corporations to disregard the privacy rights of their
employees. The right to privacy must be established as the primary
consideration in determining whether a mandatory drug test is justified. Whether this is accomplished through amendments to state
constitutions or through the common-law recognition of the right to
privacy, employers in both the public and the private spheres must be
compelled to abide by this standard.

The Role of Athlete-Agents and the Law: A
Conflict of Interest?
Justin Park1

I

n 1983, running back Billy Sims was entering the last year in
a three-year contract with the Detroit Lions. The managers of
the Lions offered Sims a $3.5 million contract extension to keep
him in Detroit; however, knowledge of the contract extension never
reached him.2 Sims’ agent, Jerry Argovitz, having a significant financial interest in the USFL expansion team, the Houston Gamblers,
wanted Sims to sign with the Gamblers and did not relay to him
the news of the contract extension.3 Instead, Argovitz negotiated a
contract for Sims with the Houston Gamblers for $3.5 million. Argovitz did not represent his client’s best interest; in contrast, he used
his client’s exorbitant earning potential to create financial gain for
himself. Argovitz’s actions warranted a lawsuit in Detroit Lions, Inc.
v. Argovitz,4 although numerous laws and regulations have since been
enacted concerning athlete-agents, they still do not effectively prevent
similar problems from occurring. Rather, the laws rely on legal ideas
whose definitions are disputed. This is a major issue, considering the
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immense opportunity to exploit professional athletes’ substantial
earnings.
Large annual salaries are seen in other sports leagues such as the
NBA, NHL and recently, the MLS. In 2013, the average salary for
a major league baseball player was $3,386,212, while the minimum
salary for 2014 was set at $500,000.5 Although athletes and executives benefit monetarily from the success of the multi-billion dollar sports industry in the U.S.,6 they are not the only parties taking
advantage of the financial success of professional sports. Representatives of professional athletes, known as athlete-agents or “sports
agents” can earn millions of dollars by representing professional athletes in contract negotiations and other services. Current regulations
allow athlete-agents to earn up to 3%,7 4%,8 4%9, and 5%10 in the
NFL, NHL, NBA and MLB respectively. Due to the high earning
potential of athlete-agents and the relatively low number of potential clients, the athlete-agent industry is a highly competitive field
in which agents compete fiercely for clients in order to cash-in on
potentially lucrative professional-sports-services contracts.
For many athlete-agents, revenue from contract negotiations is
only the tip of the iceberg as far as moneymaking is concerned. Providing financial services from the money earned from contracts can
be turned into large amounts of cash through investments and other
5
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business opportunities initiated by the athlete-agent. However, legal
issues are prone to arise from what happens to the money after the
contract has been negotiated. These issues particularly concern conflicts of interests and violations of the fiduciary duty that the athleteagent has towards his/her clients.
While this review does not consider all aspects of the athleteagent industry, it will focus on the fiduciary relationship between
athlete-agents and athletes. This review will examine how the relationship is defined by current laws and regulations and how it is
threatened by deficiencies within them, which allow athlete-agents
to engage in practices that take advantage of their clients. Reform,
such as a separation of duties in the form of a law or regulation, is
needed in order for the laws and regulations to more appropriately
govern athlete-agents considering they are engaged in a fiduciary
relationship with their clients.
Section I of this paper will specify the problem and introduce
the various responsibilities of an athlete-agent as well as the fiduciary duty. Section II will examine legislation and regulations placed
upon athlete-agents, including the UAAA, SPARTA and the players
associations’ regulations. Section III will discuss the fiduciary relationship between athlete-agents and athletes in the context of current
laws and regulations. Finally, section IV will explore possible remedies and their counterarguments for the issue at hand.

I. Roles of an Athlete-Agent and the Fiduciary Duty
It is safe to say that athlete-agents play an important role in managing many aspects of athletes’ lives. For example, they assume significant responsibilities through representing their clients in a wide
range of matters, including:
Contract negotiations, tax planning, financial planning,
money management, investments, estate planning, income
tax preparation, incorporating the client, endorsements,
sports medicine consultation, physical health consultation,
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post-career development, career and personal development
and counseling, legal consultation and insurance matters.11
Due to the complex and important nature of the services that an athlete-agent may provide, laws and regulations have been established
in order to attempt to protect athletes from unscrupulous activities
perpetrated by athlete-agents. However, the current laws and regulations do not effectively define the role of the agent-athlete. A clear,
defined role for the athlete-agent as well as stipulations to limit his/
her power will reduce conflict of interest, namely a separation of duties between contract negotiation and financial advisement.
This clearer and more defined role within the laws and regulations concerning athlete-agents is necessary because athlete-agents’
owe their clients a fiduciary duty,12 which is the “legal duty to act
solely in another party’s interests.”13 The opportunity for significant
monetary gain as well as the wide range of services that are offered
by athlete-agents often leads to problematic actions by the athleteagent due to an overreliance on the somewhat vague definition of
fiduciary duty.14 Often, these problems come in the form of mismanagement of the client’s money, improper incentives, and other
activities that violate those fiduciary duties. These all-too-common
improprieties create the perception that the athlete representation
business is “composed of individuals too willing to compromise ethics and competent representation for financial gain.”15
While the current laws and regulations limit athlete-agents’
power in order to prevent legal issues, athlete-agents still retain the
ability to act in behalf of athletes in a wide range of services that
could possibly lead to a conflict of interest, which is a “situation that
11
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can undermine a person due to self interest,”16 thus violating the fiduciary duties owed to the client. Therefore, the relationship between
the agent and the athlete is very complex and at times problematic.

II. UAAA, SPARTA and the Players Associations
In 2013, former NFL player Terrell Owens sued his former agent
Drew Rosenhaus for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and negligence.17
Rosenhaus allegedly advised Owens and dozens of other clients to
invest their money with Jeff Rubin. Rubin, a close business associate
of Drew Rosenhaus, invested the athlete’s money in a now bankrupt
casino, costing the athletes as much as $43.6 million.18 The point of
conflict is not necessarily that Jeff Rubin was an inexperienced and
unskilled financial manager; it is that Rosenhaus potentially violated
his fiduciary duty by advising his clients to invest their money in his
business associate’s failed casino project. Rosenhaus denies any relationship to the casino,19 and his allegations of a breach of fiduciary
relationship remain contested due to the inadequate existing laws
and regulations.
Unfortunately, the example of Drew Rosenhaus is just the most
recent in a long line of athlete-agents who have been accused of
taking advantage of their clients for personal gain. Because athleteagents have such a responsibility-assuming relationship with their
clients, they have the opportunity to use their clients’ high earnings
for their own leverage and personal gain. This violation of trust between athletes and athlete-agents is nothing new, as lawmakers took
16
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action at the beginning of this century to further prevent these types
of injustices. Two different pieces of legislation were created, which
have attempted to more clearly define the relationship between athlete-agent and athlete: the Uniform Athlete Agents Act (2000) and
the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (2004).
The Uniform Athlete Agents Act (2000), also known as UAAA,
was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws20 and has been implemented by 40 states.21 The
UAAA was meant to provide uniformity among the states by offering a centralized law that would counteract the many conflicting
laws concerning athlete-agents, which varied from state to state.22
The UAAA (2000) concerns itself mostly with student-athletes
and their relationship with athlete-agents. The act defines a studentathlete as: “an individual who engages in, is eligible to engage in,
or may be eligible in the future to engage in, any intercollegiate
sport.”23 Student-athletes are protected by the UAAA from athleteagents’ recruitment practices while they remain student-athletes.
Under the act, athlete-agents may not “give any materially false or
misleading information,”24 “furnish anything of value to a studentathlete before the student-athlete enters into the agency contract,”25
or “furnish anything of value to any individual other than the student-athlete or another registered athlete agent.”26 These restrictions,
along with others, are, if broken, punishable by law in the states that

20

Need for and Benefits of the Uniform Athlete Agents Act (UAAA), NCAA.
com, http://www.ncaa.org/enforcement/agents-and-amateurism/need-andbenefits-uniform-athlete-agents-act-uaaa (last visited Jan. 20, 2015).

21

UAAA Laws in the 50 States, NCAA.org, http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/ENF/
UAAA/map/index.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2015).

22

Shropshire & Davis, supra note 15 at 162.

23

Unif. Athlete Agent Act § 2-12 U.L.A. (2000).

24

Unif. Athlete Agent Act, supra note 23 § 14.A.(1).

25

Unif. Athlete Agent Act, supra note 23 § 14.(A).2.

26

Unif. Athlete Agent Act, supra note 23 § 14.A.(3).

The Role of Athlete-Agents and the Law: A Conflict of Interest?

113

have adopted the UAAA.27 These measures are necessary to protect
the amateur status of collegiate athletes.
Although the primary purpose of the UAAA is focused on
protecting student-athletes up until they become professionalathletes, portions of the act specify qualification requirements for
athlete-agents. The act states that individuals may not act as athleteagents unless they are registered with each state that has adopted
the UAAA.28 Under the UAAA athlete-agents are also required to
provide pertinent information found in the agency contract with the
athlete. One function of the agency contract, under UAAA specifications, is to warn the student-athlete that his/her collegiate eligibility
will be lost if they request the services of an agent.29 It also instructs
athlete-agents to inform the student-athlete’s athletic director within
72 hours of signing the agency contract, thereby, protecting the educational institution from damaging NCAA penalties.30 Therefore the
UAAA, first and foremost, protects educational institutions from
NCAA sanctions; secondly, it protects student-athletes from being
considered ineligible to compete at the collegiate level. While the
UAAA achieves its purpose in regulating athlete-agents’ activities
with student-athletes, it fails to appropriately define and structure
the agent-athlete relationship in legal terms. The act is void of any
restrictions that effect athletes after they have finished their collegiate careers. The relationship between athlete-agent and the postcollegiate athlete is left untouched.
Like the UAAA, the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act
(2004), also known as SPARTA, primarily protects educational institutions as well as student-athletes. However, SPARTA is federal
law that was enacted by Congress in 2004. Although it is intended to
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work congruently with the UAAA,31 it repeats many points found in
the UAAA. Similar to the UAAA, SPARTA inadequately addresses
the post-collegiate relationship between athlete and athlete-agent.
In essence, SPARTA is a simplified and more direct version of the
UAAA. Although both SPARTA and the UAAA provide a foundation for more laws and regulations to be added, the two acts leave
much to be interpreted by the sports leagues themselves. In particular, the regulation of athlete-agents and the defining of the agentathlete relationship are left primarily to the players associations.
The players associations (labor unions) of the major sports in
the United States hold most of the responsibility to regulate athleteagents. Players associations derive their authority from the National
Labor Relations Act, which states they have the power to regulate
athlete-agents.32 Each players association has set forth regulations that
are supposed to work with state and federal laws that concern athleteagents. These regulations set by the players associations are more restrictive and defining than the federal laws and many state laws.
The players associations’ regulations encompass all services
provided by the athlete-agent. For example, the NFLPA’s regulations
cover the providing of counsel with respect to negotiating their individual contracts with Clubs, as well as “any other activity or conduct
which directly bears upon the Contract Advisor’s integrity, competence or ability to properly represent individual NFL players and the
NFLPA in contract negotiations.”33 The other players associations
have established similar regulations regarding the scope of their
regulation. For the purpose of simplicity, in this paper I will use the
NFLPA’s regulations as a representative of the players associations’
regulations from the other leagues.34 The seemingly comprehensive
coverage could explain the lack of protection provided by state and
31
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federal laws for post-collegiate professional athletes. In the players
associations’ regulations, the relationship between an athlete-agent
and an athlete is defined as a fiduciary relationship.35 More specifically, the regulations state that an agent should “act at all times in a
fiduciary capacity on behalf of players.”36 However, the regulations
do not prohibit athlete-agents from providing financial services to
clients, which can lead to conflict and lawsuits, as is seen in the
Rosenhaus example. Although the players associations are more effective in defining many aspects of the relatinship between athletes
and athlete-agents than the UAAA and SPARTA, they still fail to address the fiduciary conflict that exists concerning the athlete-agents’
ability to perform so many services, specifically financial services.
The failure of the players associations as well as the UAAA and
SPARTA allow athlete-agents to engage in practices that violate
their fiduciary duty. Section III will discuss threats to the fiduciary
relationship between agent and athlete despite laws and regulations,
which ineffectively control the behavior of athlete-agents towards
their clients.

III. The Agent-Athlete Relationship
Federal and state laws, as well as the regulations set forth by the
players associations, explicitly, and implicitly, define the relationship
between an athlete-agent and an athlete as a fiduciary relationship.
A fiduciary relationship between athlete-agent and athlete requires
the athlete-agent to act in the best interest of the athlete in all services entrusted to the athlete-agent. The regulations established by
the players associations do not restrict the range of services that
the athlete-agent can perform on behalf of the athlete. The services
that an athlete-agent can perform range from contract negotiation to
money management, and even to estate planning.37 This is the deficiency in the laws and regulations that most often leads to fraud and
35
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mismanagement on the side of the athlete-agent. Fraud and mismanagement occur among many other high-income professions, however, athletes are particularly vulnerable due to the breadth of services
that one individual or firm is allowed to provide to athletes, as well
as the nature of professional sports, which requires the athlete to
focus solely on their performance on the field.38
In addition to giving counsel in contract negotiations, athleteagents often offer a wide range of financial services to their clients,
permitted under the current laws and regulations. Some agents work
for agency firms that employ several people in order to handle the
athlete’s finances. On the other hand, some agents operate individually, separate from any firm, and act as an agent, financial advisor,
and asset manager. Regardless of whether the athlete-agent works as
an individual or a part of a larger firm, the separation of services is
necessary to avoid a conflict of interest, which disrupts the fiduciary
relationship that is expressed in the laws and regulations concerning
athlete-agents.
The conflict of interest occurs when an athlete-agent negotiates
a contract for the athlete, and then uses the athlete’s money that was
made from the contract to invest in the agent’s private endeavors.
Many times the athlete-agents are neither financial advisors nor financial managers, but rather have connections to them. This often
leads to poor investments that were the result of pure self-interest
on the side of the athlete-agent. The law should obligate the athleteagent to have the athlete’s best interest in mind while acting on his/
her behalf, thus complying with their fiduciary role. However, the
law fails to fulfill this purpose, thus, leading to the agent violating
the fiduciary duty.
One prominent example is of former financial advisor and
founder of the sports agency Global Sports and Entertainment,
Donald Lukens. Lukens convinced several professional athletes to
allow his firm to represent them in contract negotiations and accept
their investment management services. Lukens and his firm used
the money made from the successfully negotiated contracts to invest
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in supposedly “safe” and “secure” investment vehicles.39 These vehicles were in reality quite risky and the SEC filed a complaint alleging
that Lukens “duped” hundreds of clients, including several NBA and
NFL athletes.40 Although Donald Lukens’ firm defrauded hundreds
of high-income individuals, who were not professional athletes, the
fact that Lukens and his firm were allowed to represent professional
athletes in contract negotiations and then invest the money earned by
the athlete in high-risk investments constitutes a conflict of interest.
This destroys the fiduciary relationship defined by the current laws
and regulations. The fact that current laws and regulations do not
separate services that are allowed to be carried out by one individual
or firm has led to such unlawful incidents, and will continue to do so
unless something is changed.
The need to separate an athlete-agent’s duties in order to preserve the fiduciary relationship is seen in the example of John W.
Gillette Jr. Throughout the 1990’s Gillette built up his business with
high profile clients such as all-pro linebacker Junior Seau.41 However
in 1998, Gillette was sentenced to 10 years in prison, after he had
defrauded his clients out of more than $11 million.42 According to
the SEC, Gillette “made materially false and misleading statements”
and “converted clients’ funds to his own use.”43 The lack of a separation of an agent’s responsibilities allows the athlete-agent control
over the production of funds, the distribution, as well as investment.
The fact that Gillette converted clients’ funds to his own use clearly
illustrates that the athletes’ best interests were not in mind when
Gillette negotiated the athletes’ contracts. When the athlete-agent
negotiates contracts and represents the athlete in order to gain funds
for his/her investment purposes, it breaks the structure of a fiduciary
39
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relationship, in which the agent must act only according to the best
interests of the principal (the athlete).44
The NFLPA regulations concerning contract advisors as is found
in section 3(B) prohibits:
Holding or seeking to hold, either directly or indirectly, a financial interest in any professional NFL club or in any other
business entity when such investment could create an actual
conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest
in the representation of NFL players.45
Since players associations’ regulations apply to all of the agent’s
activities that affect their clients, this particular regulation should
resolve the problem that this article discusses. However, the fact remains, that the athlete-agent is not prohibited from benefitting from
investments and other financial advice based upon the money that
is earned by the athlete through successfully negotiated contracts,
which sets up a situation that automatically creates an inherent conflict of interest. It is possible that the athlete-agent’s intention is to
negotiate a contract in order to coerce the athlete give that money
back so that the athlete-agent can use that money to make even more
money through other services. This does not comply with the concept of a fiduciary relationship as is outlined in current laws46 and
regulations.47
The enforcement of the above-mentioned subsection found in
section 3(B) has been played out in court. The ruling, however, provides an interpretation of a breach of fiduciary duty that brings the
current non-separation of duties of athlete-agents into question. In
Detroit Lions, Inc. v. Argovitz,48 the defendant, Jerry A. Argovitz,
was found to have committed a breach of fiduciary duty towards
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his client, Billy Sims.49 Argovitz had a financial interest in both, the
Detroit Lions and the now defunct Houston Gamblers, and he inappropriately exercised his influence by withholding information from
his client for personal gain. According to the ruling, he “manipulated Sims’ contract negotiations with the Lions in light of his own
interest in the Gamblers,”50 thus breaching his fiduciary duty to his
client. This ruling shows that once the athlete-agent compromises
the athlete’s best interest, it is a breach of the fiduciary duty that an
athlete-agent has towards his/her client.
This ruling could also apply to an athlete-agent, who negotiates
his/her client’s contract and then acts as an investment manager and/
or advisor, taking the money to invest it. It is highly likely that the
athlete-agent will be influenced by the opportunity to make money
off of the money from the contract, so a law must be made to create
more roadblocks to prevent agents from doing so. This is a volatile situation in which the athlete-agent is prone to earn even more
money by acting as a money manager. Therefore, the athlete-agent
is hindered in his/her ability to fulfill his/her fiduciary duty towards
the client, because the contract negotiations are tainted by the opportunity to use the money earned through the contract to make even
more money for the athlete-agent. A separation of an athlete-agent’s
duties will help get rid of the all-too-common fraud, mismanagement and violations of the fiduciary relationship. The firm and/or
individual that represent an athlete should only be involved in either
contract negotiations or fund management, not both.

IV. The Separation of Duties—A Solution
The multiplicity of clashing responsibilities claimed by athleteagents causes a conflict that violates the agents’ fiduciary duty.
Therefore, a clear distinction between responsibilities must be made
that disallows athlete-agents to engage in both contract negotiations
and other activities that involve the investment and/or advisement of
the money made from the contract. In short, a separation of duties
49
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must be implemented in either a national law, or within the players
association’s regulations.
While this proposed solution would not eliminate all violations
of fiduciary duties among athlete-agents, it would reduce the number of lawsuits and threats of lawsuits from professional athletes.
The proposed solution would also be effective in preventing inherent
violations of fiduciary duties found in the way the laws and regulations are currently structured. In order to more clearly show how
this would be possible it is helpful to apply the separation of duties
retroactively to the previously mentioned incident of Donald Lukens.
After Lukens would negotiate his clients’ contracts, he would
invest their money in financially unstable companies, telling his clients that they were “safe” investments. The issue of providing poor
advisement on false information was exacerbated by the fact that
he was previously acting as his clients’ contract negotiator. If a law
or regulation was enacted that would prevent Lukens from offering
financial advisement after he negotiated their contracts, his clients
would not have been subject to Lukens’ shortcomings as a financial advisor; his clients would be forced to seek financial advisement
elsewhere. Lukens’ role as a contract negotiator became ambiguous
with his role as a financial advisor.
Although many athlete agents are also registered financial
advisors,51 the problem is that the line between roles of contract
negotiator and financial advisor has become ambiguous. This creates an environment for plausible deniability by the athlete agent.
An athlete agent could argue that his poor advisement was given to
his client as a friend from the relationship they developed through
the contract negotiations, which would relieve him of violations to
the fiduciary duty. A law or regulation to more clearly define the
fiduciary duty would remove plausible deniability of fiduciary duty
from financial advisement. Financial advisors are held to their own
standards, which differ from athlete agents.
It could also be argued that a separation of duties would reduce
the efficiency of the individual athlete-agents as well as sports agencies. Instead of performing all services for an athlete, the athlete
51
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must search out multiple individuals or firms for contract negotiations and financial management. Although this is a valid argument,
the inconvenience does not outweight the breaches of fiduciary
responsibility that are currently allowed. In addition, a law would
actually make the industry more easily regulated because it would
separate the legal standards and duties of athlete agents from financial advisors, thus reducing the ambiguity and in turn, the legal issues surrounding the profession. Enacting a law or regulation will
result in fewer corruptions of athlete agents in financial advisement.

IV. Conclusion
The athlete-agent industry is as competitive as ever considering
the record size contracts that are under negotiation in every major
sports league in the country. Wherever there is an opportunity to
earn large amounts of money in a relative short amount of time, there
will be opportunities to commit fraud and to violate certain duties.
Strict regulation is needed in these circumstances. Although the current laws and regulations concerning athlete-agents are fairly comprehensive, they fail to protect athletes by allowing athlete-agents to
engage in a wide range of services that result in a conflict of interest,
and thus, a breach of the fiduciary relationship. A separation of duties would prevent fraud, instead of catching it after it has already
happened. Hopefully, as sports becomes more commercialized and
athletes become more valuable, the laws and regulations will conform appropriately by applying stricter definitions of an athleteagents’ responsibilities.

The Conundrum of the Curtilage: A Critical
Interpretation of Florida v. Jardines
Justin Shaw1, T. Mark Frost2, and Michael Stevens3

I

n late November of 2006, the Miami police received an unverified tip regarding a man who was surreptitiously producing illegal narcotics in his home.4 Two officers from the local drug-unit
were dispatched along with a drug detection dog. Upon arrival, they
surveyed the house for a few minutes and found closed blinds, an
empty driveway, and no observable activity. Recognizing this, one
detective took the leashed dog and casually walked to the front door;
whereupon, the dog confirmed the presence of narcotics on the property. With this indication, the detectives left the premises and obtained a search warrant. After searching the home, they confirmed
the existence of prohibited substances.
When the case went to trial, the accused demanded that the evidence (the drugs) be suppressed on the grounds that it was obtained
in an unlawful manner constituting an “unlawful search or seizure.”
The defendant argued that the search was “unlawful” because the
police officers invaded an area of private property to gain the necessary information for a warrant. The case eventually reached the
Supreme Court wherein the justices hotly debated the question as to
whether this instance constituted a Fourth Amendment search. The
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justices argued that the use of the dog in the acquisition of evidence
and the porch and its inclusion in the protections afforded to a home
qualified as a Fourth Amendment search. In a five-four decision, the
Justices decided that the porch was incorporated into the curtilage;
thereby, validating the defendant’s claims. The narcotics were suppressed as evidence because the policemen’s search was considered
unconstitutional in accordance with the Fourth Amendment.
The facts of this case come from the Supreme Court Case, Florida v. Jardines. The dilemma examined in the case questions the
boundary between government intrusion and government protection. By ruling that the porch is included in the curtilage, the laws regarding the surrounding area of one’s home have become even more
ambiguous. This ambiguity results from a porch’s lack of privacy,
generally available to areas inside the home and the enclosures of a
curtilage. The decision jeopardizes the rights of citizens by causing
uncertainty in knowing property boundaries. The ambiguity is also
problematic for law enforcement officers who desire to protect the
community, but are unsure where the partition of citizen protection
begins and ends.5
While the Supreme Court already ruled on the issue, setting a
precedent for future cases, this paper offers an alternative solution
wherein the porch operates in its own unique legal position. This
unique position in the law is more consistent with past legal precedent and reconciles both the majority opinion and dissenting opinion
of the Supreme Court.
This article shall examine the definition of curtilage throughout
American legal history, including various cases that have extended
the definition of the curtilage, as well as cases that have used past
precedents in determining whether a specific instance qualifies as a
curtilage or not. Part I shall examine the history of the curtilage. Part
II will identify the failure of consideration by the majority opinion
in distinguishing the porch’s “publicness.” Part III shall analyze the
decision in Florida v. Jardines and establish how it is inconsistent
5
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with past precedent. Part IV will seek to clarify and expand on the
dissenting opinion to describe a better interpretation of the definition
of the curtilage. Based upon these opinions, Part V proposes that the
walkway and porch of a home operate in their own sphere, carving
out what would then be its own unique position in legal procedure.

I. Background
(i) The Progressive Definition of Curtilage
The curtilage has progressed to become an integral part of the
law, protecting outlying parts of a person’s property that are entitled
to the protections given to the home. Laws regarding searches and
seizures in the United States developed from clauses in the Fourth
Amendment. The Fourth Amendment was principally created to
inhibit government searches and seizures of one’s dwelling. The
amendment was drafted due to continual abuses of the writs of assistance, an unlimited search warrant enacted by the British government which allowed searches without necessary cause to look for
evidence of smuggling.6 Derived from common law, the term curtilage was defined in 1891 in Black’s Law Dictionary as,
The enclosed space of ground and buildings immediately surrounding a dwelling-house. In its most comprehensive and proper
legal signification, it includes all that space of ground and buildings thereon which is usually enclosed within the general fence immediately surrounding a principal messuage [sic] and outbuildings,
and yard closely adjoining to a dwelling-house, but it may be large
enough for cattle to be levant [sic] and couchant therein.7
This definition since determined what qualifies as curtilage and
what does not. It has assisted in granting protections to certain areas
of the home that would otherwise be unprotected. Nevertheless, this
developing definition still retains a large level of ambiguity. Even in
established definitions, certain words can be explained in a variety
6
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of ways. The Court has, therefore, been operating on a case-by-case
basis.
(ii) United States v. Dunn
In the Supreme Court Case, United States v. Dunn, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officers learned that a certain carpenter had been buying large quantities of chemicals typically used
in the manufacture of controlled substances.8 The officers placed
tracking “beepers” within some of the equipment containers. These
beepers led the officers to the carpenter’s ranch. Through the use
of aerial photography, the DEA learned that the suspect’s truck had
been parked at a barn behind the ranch house. The entire ranch was
enclosed by a fence and contained several smaller barbed wire fences.
Without a warrant, officers traversed the border fence, barbed
wire fences, and wooden fence to reach the barn. As they approached,
they could smell pungent chemicals plausibly issuing from the barn.
Also, while they approached, they could hear the faint workings of
a small motor, supposedly coming from inside the barn. While the
officers did not enter the barn, they halted at a locked gate, shined a
flashlight inside, and observed what appeared to be a drug laboratory. Having gained the evidence they needed, they left. The DEA
officers returned twice the following day to vindicate the presence of
the laboratory. The officers obtained a warrant, arrested the carpenter, and seized the chemicals.9
The suspect argued that the evidence be suppressed on the basis
that it was obtained through an unreasonable search and seizure. The
Court of Appeals suppressed the evidence stating that the barn was
within the resident’s curtilage, and that it carried a reasonable expectation of privacy. When the case went before the Supreme Court,
the justices overturned the Court of Appeals decision and held that
all the evidence was admissible. This landmark case significantly
contributed to the definition of the curtilage because The Court was
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able to specifically dictate the stipulations of what does and does not
qualify as a curtilage. The court stated,
[C]urtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to
be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within
an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses
to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident
to protect the area from observation by people passing by.
We do not suggest that combining these factors produces a
finely tuned formula that . . . yields a “correct” answer to all
extent-of-curtilage questions. Rather, these factors are useful analytical tools only to the degree . . . they bear upon the
centrally relevant consideration — whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be
placed under the home’s “umbrella” of Fourth Amendment
protection. Applying these factors to respondent’s barn and
to the area immediately surrounding it, we have little difficulty in concluding that this area lay outside the curtilage
of the ranch house.10
This decision contributed immensely to the definition of the curtilage. The Court identified four independent factors (proximity of the
area, if the area is in an enclosure, the nature of its uses, and steps
taken to protect the area) that should help in determining whether a
specific area qualifies as curtilage. Each factor must be separately
considered if a reasonable conclusion is to be made.
(iii) California v. Ciraolo
The Supreme Court Case, California v. Ciraolo, made another
significant addition to the understanding of the curtilage.11 Dante
Carlo Ciraolo had been growing marijuana in his backyard; high
fences concealed the cannabis’s visibility. Upon receiving an anonymous tip, the Santa Clara Police Department dispatched detectives
10
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in a private plane to discover if there was any basis to the claim. The
policemen flew over the house at an altitude of 1,000 feet and took
photos of Ciraolo’s backyard for investigation. The officers were able
to observe, without any visual enhancements, the existence of the
marijuana. The officers obtained a warrant based upon this observation alone.
Similar to the Florida v. Jardines case, the defendant requested
that the evidence be suppressed based upon the manner that the evidence was obtained. Ciraolo argued that obtaining evidence through
an aerial search qualified as an unreasonable search, therefore violating the exclusionary rule.12 The exclusionary rule states any evidence collected in a way that violates a citizen’s rights is prohibited.
The question then was if evidence obtained by the naked eye, in an
arguably public place constituted an unlawful search. The case also
analyzed whether the backyard should be included in the protections
of the curtilage.
The Supreme Court allowed the evidence to stand. Chief Justice
Warren Burger wrote in the majority opinion, “The Fourth Amendment simply does not require the police traveling in the public airways at this altitude to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is
visible to the naked eye.”13 The logic for this conclusion takes into
consideration the “publicness” of the space in question. The police
officers could not be held to the impractical stricture of ignoring
what they see while investigating an air space or public area. This
question of “publicness” is an important distinction to understanding an area legally.
In the case, Florida v. Jardines, the essential question is whether
or not the porch should qualify as being part of the curtilage being a
“public” or visible area. The dispute in the case arises from the act
of the detectives walking along the pathway to the house and stopping while on the front porch. Detective Douglas Bartelt approached
the house with his trained narcotics dog. Bartelt later noted that the
dog had responded to the smell of drugs while on the driveway before even reaching the porch of the house. The dog began tracking
12
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as it is trained to do, then centered on the strongest location of the
odor. The dog began to “bracket,” or as detective Bartelt described,
the dog began “tracking that airborne odor by…tracking back and
forth,”.14 Finally, the dog concluded its search at what happened to
be the base of the front door. With the discovery, the dog sat down
indicating that it had discovered the scent’s most powerful point.
With this information, one detective left, having obtained the information required for a warrant. The other detective stayed put on the
driveway. While there, he could hear the air conditioner running and
could smell the traces of marijuana.15 Later, police arrested Joelis
Jardines after he attempted to flee from police. Upon examination
of the home, the investigators confirmed that cannabis plants were
being cultivated there.
When the case went to trial, Jardines requested that the evidence
obtained (the cannabis) be suppressed due to the unreasonableness
of the drug-sniffing dog’s use in obtaining evidence. The arguments
focused largely on the question of “[w]hether the officers’ conduct
during the investigation of the grow house, including remaining outside the house awaiting a search warrant is, itself, a Fourth Amendment search”.16 The exploration of this and other questions was the
basis for the opinions of the court.

II. Failure of Consideration in “Publicness”
(i) Failure of the Majority Opinion
The court failed to consider the “publicness”17 of the porch when
deliberating over Florida v. Jardines. As the arguments were heard
14

Jardines, 569 U.S. at 2.

15

Mark M. Dobson, Is a Drug Detection Dog’s Sniff at a Private Home’s
Front Door a Search Under the Fourth Amendment?, 40 Preview U.S.
Sup. Ct. Cas. 59, 59-62 (2012) (discussing the primary details of the
case).
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Florida v. Jardines, 73 So.3d 34 (2nd Cir. 2011), cert. granted, (U.S. Jan.
6, 2012) (No. SC08-2101).
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Meaning visible to onlookers.

130

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 29, 2015

for both sides, it was decided by a 5-4 majority that the porch is included in the curtilage, and the evidence condemning Joelis Jardines
should be tossed out. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion for
the case. The foundation of Justice Scalia’s opinion rests upon the
notion that the curtilage is established as a protected area against
unreasonable searches and seizures. This point has been thoroughly
attested through numerous cases relating to the subject as previously
presented. In Justice Scalia’s estimation, the curtilage bears similarity to the inside of the house, receiving many of the same rights and
protections.
Nevertheless, the curtilage differs acutely from the interior of
one’s home. This fact is not articulated in the majority’s opinion. The
porch of one’s home is placed under this protective umbrella without
the consideration of its unique position as a public area (meaning visible to onlookers). Much of what can be lawfully performed within
the confines of a person’s home would otherwise be illegal if engaged in on his or her porch. This distinction is vital in establishing
what activities are permissible on the porch and other public areas
on private property.
(ii) The Relative Expectation of Privacy
Because it is a public area, the porch surrenders many of the
rights guaranteed to the interior of the home. For instance, a person
is free to mill about nude within the enclosure of his or her home.
However, the same activity, when done in the plain sight of the porch,
becomes illegal. The differentiation between the two activities lies
in the publicity of the event. The terminology for this category of
unlawful conduct is “public indecency” or “indecent exposure.”18
This same practice can even be considered lawful when carried out
in the backyard. It is legal as long as it is beyond the visibility of
others. Why? Because the backyard is allowed a relative expectation

18

Kelly D. Johnson, Illicit Sexual Activity in Public Places 1 (33rd ed.
2005).
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of privacy.19 The porch is, thus, fundamentally different from other
areas of the curtilage.
The façade of one’s residence is tremendously public. It is generally understood that anything that a person may wish to remain
private should be removed from the front windows (within visible
sight) of the home. This “reasonable expectation of privacy” was
established in the Supreme Court case, Katz v. United States.20 In
the concurring opinion, Justice Harlan identified an objective prong
for searches dealing with the Fourth Amendment, namely, that the
space in question is reasonably recognized (objectively) by society
as a place that should receive privacy.
In dealing with questions regarding the curtilage, it is helpful to
consider the searches allowed by the Fourth Amendment and what
constitutes a “search.” The porch is certainly a location that is sufficiently public to surrender any “reasonable expectation of privacy.”
In the Jardines case, the officers did not look through any windows
to gain evidence. Rather, they were investigating in plain sight, an
area visible to the general public. Jardine’s closed blinds protected
the depths of his home. Justice Scalia ignores the fact that the porch
differs significantly from the interior of the home. These differences
manifest the neglect of the majority opinion.
The inconsideration of the “publicness” of the porch creates ambiguity for citizens. Suppose cannabis were being grown on the front
porch of a home and law enforcement officers received an anonymous tip detailing this fact. Would the officers need a warrant to
approach the front door to confirm the plant’s existence? Would the
officer need a warrant to survey this apparently public area? Having
the porch included in the protections of the curtilage, it treats the
area similarly to the inside of the home. Such ambiguous questions
are raised with the inclusion of the porch in the protections typically
granted to a home.

19

Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model For Fourth
Amendment Protection, Minn. L. Rev. 605, 583-642 (1989).

20

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
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III. Consistency With Past Precedent
(i) Consideration of Dunn Case in Jardines
A citizen’s home is protected under the Fourth Amendment.
This law should prevent unauthorized government intrusion. Likewise, property owners have other areas that deserve the safety of the
Fourth Amendment. For instance, one’s garage is a place that needs
to fall under the “umbrella” of the house.
As mentioned, the determination of such locations is typically
in a case by case basis. The disputed spot must qualify under some
of the stipulations dictated in the case, United States v. Dunn. One
of the qualifications established is the nature of the area’s use. The
majority in the Jardines case did not properly consider the “nature of
[the area’s] uses” with the porch.21 It is vital to recognize that some
areas of the curtilage differ from others. The Dunn case decided
that a private barn, protected by fences and other safe guards, was
determined to be outside of the home’s curtilage. It is peculiar that a
seemingly private barn, behind a home and barred by fences, gates,
and other exterior warnings, is not a part of the curtilage. In contrast,
the curtilage encompasses the front porch, a place where solicitors,
hawkers, and peddlers of all kinds are able to enter without the consent of the homeowner.
In United States v. Dunn, the Supreme Court established four
factors vital in determining the curtilage of a home. The second factor questions “whether the thing is within an enclosure surrounding
the home”.22 Unfortunately, an acknowledgment of this delimitation
is absent in Justice Scalia’s interpretation. Generally speaking, the
façade of a citizen’s home is not always enclosed. Does this mean
that only those who have enclosed their front yard or porch are protected? Such questions become evident after examining the majority
opinion. The uncertainty contributes to the ambiguity of the Court’s
decision.
21

Dunn, 480 U.S. at 302.
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Curtilage Definition, Legal Information Institute, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/curtilage (last visited Jan. 30, 2015).
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The opinion in Florida v. Jardines also fails to recognize the
precedent established in California v. Ciraolo in which a man was
growing marijuana in his backyard, shielded from view by large
fences. The court determined the warrantless observation of one’s
backyard was legal inasmuch as the location was “visible to the
naked eye.”23 Visibility played a significant role in the decision of the
court. How then is the porch, arguably more public than a backyard,
an area that is more protected? The narcotics in Florida v. Jardines
were made public by their scent given to the dog. The detectives
reported also that they could smell the marijuana drifting from the
house by the home’s air conditioner. The evidence was made public.
The five senses are not treated differently by the Fourth Amendment. No protections can be granted for information exposed to the
public. For instance, the sound of one’s voice, the style of one’s handwriting, the smell of illegal drugs, all when made public can be used
as evidence in the court of law.

IV. The Dissent and its Consideration of Trespass Laws
(i) The Fourth Amendment
An intrusion into the home/curtilage would qualify as a “search”
as dictated by the Fourth Amendment. The intrusion would also be
grounds for action against trespassing. However, there is another
distinction of trespass, which denotes “the act of knowingly entering
another person’s property without permission. Such action is held
to infringe upon a property owner’s legal right to enjoy the benefits
of ownership.”24 Such an act would violate the Fourth Amendment.
These rights, similar to the idea of the curtilage, are to protect people’s property from invasions of privacy. Nevertheless, law enforcement officials have in past instances, disregarded trespass laws to
obtain evidence lawfully.

23

California, 476 U.S. at 212-215
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Trespass Definition, Legal Information Institute, http://www.law.cornell.
edu/wex/trespass (last visited Jan. 30, 2015).
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(ii) Oliver v. United States
In 1982, Kentucky State Police acquired reports that marijuana
was being grown on a farm within their county; the officers were dispatched to investigate. Upon arrival, officers drove to a locked gate
labeled with a “No Trespassing” sign. Alongside this locked gate,
however, was a small footpath. The agents walked along the footpath, around the gate, and discovered a field of marijuana. Initially,
the District Court suppressed the evidence and held that the petitioner had “a reasonable expectation that the field would remain private
and that it was not an ‘open’ field that invited casual intrusion.”25 The
Court of Appeals reversed the decision; the Supreme Court upheld
this reversal in Oliver v. United States.
In Oliver, the court held, “[A]n individual may not legitimately
demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home”.26 Certainly, the
court did not imply that any “priva[te] activity” may be conducted
“in the area immediately surrounding the home.” There are undoubtedly, as mentioned, certain activities that are prohibited in the area
surrounding the home.
Justice Alito wrote the dissenting opinion, in which he argued
that the decision to suppress the evidence on grounds that the evidence was obtained in an unlawful manner simply does not hold
because it does not follow prior Supreme Court jurisprudence. In
Justice Alito’s dissent, he states, “trespass law provides no support
for the Court’s holding.”27 Justice Alito further concludes that while
the curtilage is constitutionally protected, it is categorically different from other areas of the home in that Detective Bartelt and his
dog were on the paved sidewalk—the course any visitor would use
to approach the house. He was not sulking around in the bushes, nor
climbing on the roof.
When detective Bartelt approaches the door of a house, he is well
within his rights to do so. This right was established in Kentucky v.
25

Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).

26

Id. at 172.

27

Jardines, 569 U.S. at 2.

The Conundrum of the Curtilage

135

King where it was determined that a policeman may approach the
front door of a residence and it is not specifically categorized as a
“search”.28 Also, as Justice Alito cites in his dissent, “police officers
do not engage in a search when they approach the front door of a residence and seek to engage in what is termed a ‘knock and talk,’ i.e.,
knocking on the door and seeking to speak to an occupant for the
purpose of gathering evidence.”29 A detective is still able to approach
a front door because it is the typical entryway to the house. This
demonstrates the variance between a front door and the backyard. If
a cop were to be sneaking around the perimeter of the backyard, then
a resident would be justified in calling the police.
With this establishment, the matter in question becomes the
physical use of the dog. In both United States v. Place30 and Illinois
v. Caballes31, the Supreme Court established that a sniff by a police
dog, specially trained to detect the presence of narcotics is not a
“search” under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. It is considered “sui generis,” or a “special category,” which is intended only to
reveal the presence of narcotics.32 In United States v. Place, the canine was used to approximate the location of drugs concealed in luggage at an airport.33 Likewise, in Illinois v. Caballes, a drug-sniffing
dog was used in a routine traffic stop to locate contraband.34 Both
of these cases establish that the utilization of a drug-sniffing dog in
the locating and confiscation of narcotics is not inherently unlawful.

28

Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 1, 1-4 (2011).
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V. Resolution: Porch as a Distinct Legal Location
The Jardines search did not involve an intrusion into intimate
or private areas of the home. The dog and the police officer merely
walked along the path to the home’s porch—a reasonably public area
from its traditional use. The dog was not rummaging through the papers of Joelis Jardines in the home’s interior. Any other citizen who
approached the door with a dog would have been well within their
constitutional rights to approach the front door of a home. In Jardines, the dog merely conveyed a public fact; it sat down at the front
door, indicating that drugs were present in the home. As mentioned,
one of the police officers remarked that he could smell the scent of
marijuana emanating from the home’s air conditioning unit. The
dog’s indication enabled the police officers to secure a warrant—the
necessary documentation to perform a search.
As a result of the deviation from past precedent and the failure
to consider the difference of the porch as a public space, the porch
needs to occupy a distinct position in legal understanding. The porch
deserves rights and privileges that are not afforded to a public space.
It needs to protect one’s home from invasion and misconduct. Nevertheless, the fact remains, the porch and the walkway leading to the
porch is a relatively public space. The porch is a paradox because
it is accessible to those who wish to engage with the homeowner,
but it is private in the sense that there are certain activities that are
restricted on the porch because it is another person’s property. This
paradox does not align with the definition of a curtilage. The porch
should not be as protected as a curtilage, because a curtilage implies
an inclosure or private space. The resolution between these two conflicting concepts is the porch needs to occupy a special space beyond
that of curtilage.
The porch, receiving its own special recognition in the law,
would relieve much of the ambiguity surrounding the porch and it’s
incorporation into the curtilage. This new distinction will operate
upon the principle of reasonable intent. Therefore, one is able to approach another person’s home (including the walkway to the porch
and the porch itself) with reasonable intent to somehow engage with
the homeowner. This difference will give a level of privacy to the
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homeowner who does not wish for misconduct on their porch, as
well as a level of accessibility to those who wish to approach the
home and engage with the homeowner. Under this idea, the evidence
in the case of Florida v. Jardines would not have been suppressed
because the police, acting upon a tip, had a reasonable intent to approach the home.
The new conception of the porch reconciles the two opinions
(both Scalia and Alito) of the court, and does not disregard prior
precedent regarding the matter. Thus, in future cases dealing with
the porch of one’s home, the courts would be able to analyze the
reasonable intent of the offender. We define porch as the area surrounding the front entrance of one’s home. When the front of a home
has two or more main entrances, each entrance shall be included
under the protections afforded to the porch. Also, in cases regarding
a home that sits upon land that is a great distance from a street, a
person may approach the home with the reasonable intent of somehow engaging with the homeowner. Obviously this proposal has its
shortcomings; nevertheless, it is an appropriate proposition to curtail
some of the problems that have occurred on the porch of a home.

The Constitutionality of Indefinite Detainment
of United States Citizens as Terrorist Suspects
Spencer Kelly, Tiffany Erickson, and Eric Backman1

O

n April 27, 2010, Syed Fahad Hashmi appeared in federal
district court to accept a plea bargain. He pled guilty to
conspiracy to provide material support to Al Qaeda. Three
other charges which the federal government and filed against him
were dropped, and Hashmi was sentenced to 15 years in prison. This
ended Hashmi’s nearly four-year pretrial incarceration and he was
sent to a super maximum security prison in Colorado. However, the
weeks and months spent in anticipation of a criminal trial were filled
with demonstrations held, concerts performed, and letters written
in support of Hashmi and to raise awareness of what many saw as
inhumane conditions in which he was held. Hashmi was being held
under Special Administrative Measures, had spent nearly three years
in solitary confinement, and had gone five months without contact
from anyone other than his attorney.
Hashmi’s story has raised public discussion regarding conditions of pretrial confinement, particularly regarding potential terrorist suspects. Other suspected terrorists, including Jose Padilla and
Yaser Hamdi, have raised the visibility of the issue while giving
it new dimension. For many, the mere mention of detainment of
1
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terrorist suspects brings to mind Guantanamo Bay and similar holding facilities. As complicated and, at times, messy as policies regarding terrorist suspects can be, the three above-mentioned men add
a new wrinkle: they are American citizens. Their detainment and
prosecution must also account for the rights and privileges afforded
them by their citizenship. In recent years, the United States government has tightened security measures and passed tougher legislation
to combat the threat of further terrorism.
The implementation of this legislation with other legislation, particularly SAMs (as outlined below) is unnecessarily overstepping the
boundaries protecting the rights of American citizens—particularly
those outlined in the fifth and sixth amendments. The most glaring
violation is the disregard of habeas corpus. This legislation is riddled
with loopholes and ought to be amended to reduce the excessive infringement on the Constitutional rights of American citizens. We
contend that current legislation should be amended to impose a timeframe in which citizens deemed as terror suspects must be charged
in order to preserve their right of habeas corpus, and the conditions
under which they are held ought to be reexamined in order to meet
the standards guaranteed these suspects by the Constitution. Ultimately, government infringement on the rights of American citizens
held under suspicion of terror must be cut back where possible and
carefully monitored where necessary.
Section one of this paper will give a brief history of the relevant legislation concerning detaining terror suspects. In section two
of this paper, we explain the role of habeas corpus in the detention
of terror suspects, how the government can legally infringe on that
right, and how the government has overstepped their legal bounds
regarding habeas corpus. In section three, we outline other various
Constitutional rights that play a role in detaining suspected terrorists, how the government should uphold these rights, and how it has
potentially violated them. Finally, in section four, we outline ways
in which the government can cut back current policy to better protect Constitutional rights and better monitor detainment policy and
procedure in order to minimize or eliminate infringement while
still ensuring the safety of our nation. This section will propose
changes to current legislation as well as suggestions to better protect
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Constitutional rights under current detainment policy and law. Specific changes in legislation to better ensure the Constitutional rights
of suspected terrorists will be outlined, guided by principles of
change that are in line with our argument that more can and should
be done to protect the rights of detained terror suspects. Though the
balance between national security and individual rights can be difficult to maintain, we argue that changes should be made in order
to balance the scales that currently are tipped too far away from the
Constitutional rights of American citizens held under suspicion of
terrorism.

I. A History of Relevant Legislation
On May 17, 1996, the Code of Federal Regulations accepted new
anti-terrorism measures. These came about, in large part, because of
the recent domestic terrorist bombing attack in Oklahoma City just
two years prior, and the new code Prevention of Acts of Violence
and Terrorism in the Code of Federal Regulations (hereafter CFR)
fell in line with contemporary legislation. The key element to the
Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism is the establishment
and implementation of Special Administrative Measures. A Special
Administrative Measure (hereafter SAM) is a restriction placed on
a prisoner’s housing and/or communication privileges. Specifically,
a SAM “may include housing the inmate in administrative detention
and/or limiting certain privileges, including, but not limited to, correspondence, visiting, interviews with representatives of the news
media, and use of the telephone.” This is done by the Bureau of Prisons, under the direction of the Attorney General, in cases when such
measures are “reasonably necessary to protect persons against the
risk of death or serious bodily injury.” These measures are imposed
for up to 120 days, though with approval from the Attorney General
they can be extended for up to one year. However, they may be “extended thereafter by the Director, Bureau of Prisons, in increments
not to exceed one year,” and such extensions may be continued indefinitely.2
2

28 CFR §501.3
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The creation and use of SAMs has been both enabled and expanded by other pieces of legislation. On April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act was signed into effect. The
biggest effect of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(hereafter AEDPA) is the limitation in procedural and substantive
scope of writ of habeas corpus. Procedurally, AEDPA banned successive petitions for habeas corpus, requiring instead that all appeals
be put into one petition. Substantively, AEDPA limited the scope
of habeas corpus in that such petitions are granted only if convictions are made “contrary to…clearly established Federal law” or
“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence”.3 This means that prisoners who wish to appeal for habeas
corpus pursuant to trial and conviction are given one chance to make
an appeal and are given a very limited scope in which to appeal.
Another piece of legislation that has greatly aided the implementation of SAMs is the Uniting and Strengthening by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act
of 2001 (hereafter the Patriot Act). The Patriot Act provides terms
under which any individual believed to be “engaged in any…activity that endangers the national security of the United States” may
be detained indefinitely. This is under the terms that the individual,
once in custody, “may be detained for additional periods of up to
six months only if the release of the alien will threaten the national
security of the United States or the safety of the community or any
person.” 4 The combination of these measures allows for any individual suspected of terrorist activity or affiliation to be detained indefinitely in solitude.

II. The Role of Habeas Corpus
Habeas corpus plays a crucial role in evaluating the constitutionality of indefinite detainment without formal charges. A writ of
habeas corpus is a procedural order that demands a prisoner’s detainment be evaluated by a judge, and possibly suspended, based
3
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on factual evidence and legality. The underlying principle of habeas
corpus is to protect detainees from being victimized by the executive
office’s whims, effectively acting as a judicial check on the executive. This privilege has existed in English law since the Magna Carta
in 12155 and was included in American law with the drafting of the
Constitution in 1787. Habeas corpus has a rich history of protecting
citizens from an unchecked executive branch, and it has evolved tremendously since the inclusion in 1787.
While filing a writ of habeas corpus may provide some protection for uncharged detainees, the government, with the help of the
courts, has so far preserved the right to deny release because the
legality of detainment of terrorist suspects has yet to be detailed.
Anti-terrorist legislation has provided loopholes for officials to detain suspects for up to a year without being formally charged, which
can be renewed indefinitely.
In regards to detention, habeas corpus is oftentimes a prisoner’s
most effective chance at being released, or even hearing the charges
against them, particularly in cases involving national security. Habeas corpus not only provides a judge with the opportunity to review
facts, but it can also provide a legal proceeding when there may not
have been a formal trial before detention by reviewing the process of
detainment, not merely the justification. If there had been no formal
charges and/or court proceedings, this writ may be necessary for
prisoners to receive any protection through the courts from executive detention. In essence, filing a writ of habeas corpus is a prisoner’s way to ensure that due process is followed, at least in the cases
involving American citizens6.
While the great writ may be a central component in detention trials, there is the Suspension Clause in the first article of the Constitution
that states, “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
5
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Safety may require it”. Courts have refused to lend strong interpretation to this clause, which has left habeas corpus as a somewhat unavailable tool for wrongfully, or not so wrongfully, detained citizens.
The clause is what has provided a legal cushion for the detainment
of terrorist suspects by the executive branch. Up to this point, the
extent of habeas corpus as a guaranteed protection of rights has not
yet been determined, which provides the necessary loopholes that
have been used by the executive office to indefinitely detain American citizens under the broad interpretation of the Suspension Clause.
This clause not only means that some detentions may be appropriate, but that the opportunity of hearing charges and having a judge
review factual evidence for detention may be denied completely.
New anti-terrorism legislation, in partnership with the Suspension Clause, provides an opportunity for too broad of an interpretation of government’s power to detain American citizens. Currently
the Suspension Clause operates as a somewhat unsupported and
vague protection of a privilege, not a right—a procedural purpose
that has been untouched and unexpanded to the point necessary
for the protection of American citizens’ rights. While there may be
some cases in which detainment is necessary to protect the American public, there should be additional specific legislation detailing the appropriate occurrences for executive detention to provide
more protection and limit government invasion of rights, rather than
open-ended clauses and legislation that unlawfully expands executive power. The current need for habeas corpus in post-9/11 government has evolved from its purpose in 1787 during the drafting of
the Constitution, and the need has grown enough to require a more
definite detailing of the executive branch’s power in detaining terrorist suspects.
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The Supreme Court made some progress in defining and expanding the privilege of access to habeas corpus in the Boumidiene7 case
by ruling that those detained at Guantanamo Bay had the right to habeas corpus. Even having this right protected is crucial to upholding
and protecting the rights that the framers of the Constitution fought
so hard to keep. Indefinite detainment does not have to end, but prisoners should be able to request that a judge review the facts and the
legality of detention. Through the Hamdi case, the Supreme Court
ruled that habeas corpus might extend rights beyond the boundaries
of due process8. There have been some steps forward in defining and
allowing the privilege of habeas corpus, but there must be a greater
expansion and new legislation passed that will limit the executive
office’s ability to indefinitely detain “enemy combatants”.

III. Other Constitutional Factors
As mentioned in the introduction, this section will outline other
Constitutional rights which play a role in detaining suspected terrorists, how the government should uphold these rights, and how it has
potentially violated them. Specifically, this section will examine the
effect of SAMs on due process and how that relates to the cases of
suspected terrorists. This section will also briefly discuss the suspension clause and its role in the cases of detaining suspected terrorists.
The fifth amendment protects American citizens from discretionary detention: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
a grand jury, […]nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
7
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due process of law9.” This last clause—the Due Process Clause—is
repeated elsewhere in the constitution, specifically in the fourteenth
amendment, which, along with repeating the Due Process Clause,
includes what came to be known as the Equal Protection Clause:
“nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws10.” The Supreme Court has determined that the Equal
Protection Clause extends to the Bill of Rights. In short, due process
of law is a constitutionally protected right in every jurisdiction in
this country. The right to a trial by jury is something owed to every
American citizen—including naturalized citizens, another protection guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment11. The cases of Syed
Fahad Hashmi, Jose Padilla, and others highlight the overstepping
which has taken place by the federal government of its own laws.
There is undoubtedly an argument to be made that SAMs, the
Patriot Act, and other related legislation and executive action form
an ugly but necessary part of national defense in the modern world.
Potential threats are greater, more numerous, and more insidious
than ever before. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the
needs and shortcomings of our national defense system, although
there is much to be said in defense of counterterrorist measures.
However, the case of Hashmi may prove particularly troublesome
for that argument. First of all, as a United States citizen his right to
due process is constitutionally protected—a right which has been
violated not so much by any error on the part of the judicial system,
but by executive action which sanctions the unlawful detention of
American citizens. Any such action taken by a legislative body or,
as in this case, by an executive branch, blurs the lines of checks and
balances, and provides a scenario in which American’s rights—let
alone human rights in general—can be systemically and repeatedly
violated. This is seen in the lack of due process given to Hashmi
and other citizens arrested on terror charges. Second, Hashmi’s
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U.S. Const. amend. V.
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U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

11

See id.
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prosecution was never linked to any act of terrorism or violence12.
Hashmi did not have a history of violence nor of participation in
extremist religious organizations—he was a college student in New
York—and given that information, his detention seems much less
just than it did simply knowing that he plead guilty to conspiracy to
provide material support to Al Qaeda. Hashmi’s innocence (or lack
thereof) is not the central point of this paper. However, regardless of
whether or not Hashmi was truly guilty of conspiring to aid a terrorist organization, what has happened to him and others like him sheds
light on the injustice that laws such as SAMs can create.
Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, hundreds of suspected terrorists were detained. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the first of
a series of Supreme Court cases regarding detention of suspected
terrorists, the primary defense was the above-mentioned Due Process Clause. In a plurality decision from that case, the Court put
forth that one of the most important protections offered by the Due
Process Clause is “the interest in being free from physical detention
by one’s own government13.” The Court has also extended the reach
of the Due Process Clause to protect pretrial detention. Legislation
like SAMs stand in direct opposition to these decisions and constitutional clauses. To allow them to persist is to open a door through
which citizens’ rights can be infringed upon unscrupulously.
In the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001, there has
been a heightened awareness on the part of the American people
with regard to ongoing potential terrorist threats. There are those
who would advocate impunity for those who are protecting the United States from other attacks. Such advocates argue that terrorists
ought to be stopped at any cost since nothing could be worse than
losing American lives in a manner like the September 11th attacks.
While it is true that we as a nation ought to do as much as legally
possible to prevent future attacks from occurring, legislation like
SAMs creates the risk that the rights of Americans will be violated.
The case of Syed Hashmi serves as an example. As an American,
12

United States v. Hashmi, F. Supp. 2d 76, 78 (2008).
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Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (plurality opinion) (citing
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
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he is to be considered innocent until proven guilty—something that
cannot be proved if, as has been done thanks to SAMs, there is no
due process for him. In other words, if people like Hashmi are detained indefinitely through extensions provided by SAMs and not
brought to trial, where and when will they be able to defend themselves and their actions? It is understandable to take precautions that
help protect American lives, but it need not happen at the expense of
other American’s liberty.
Article 1 Section 9 of the Constitution states, “The Privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it14.”
In another case involving a suspected terrorist, Boumedine v. Bush,
instead of using the Due Process Clause, the defense argued that the
Suspension Clause extended to detainees who were noncitizens15.
Even in cases involving noncitizen terrorist suspects, the Suspension
Clause ensures that due process and habeas corpus are respected.
This adds further evidence to suggest that, in the case of Hamdi,
Hashmi, and others like him, detainment for an undefined period
of time is unlawful, as such detainment suspends due process and
limits habeas corpus nearly to the point of nonexistence.

IV. Recommendations
The right of all prisoners to file a writ of habeas corpus needs to
be protected. While current legislation has been written to try and
ensure the maximum protection of the United States against terrorist
attacks, the level to which prisoners’ rights regarding habeas corpus
have been infringed is unacceptable. Prisoners, including American citizens, are given one chance to file a writ of habeas corpus.
Under normal circumstances, a prisoner is able to file multiple writs
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U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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Boumedine v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008).
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of habeas corpus in order to maximize their chances of release16. If
a detained terror suspect does not obtain release on his first writ of
habeas corpus, he is out of chances. The injustice of this is multiplied
by the ability of the government to detain a terror suspect indefinitely. Because the government can hold a suspect without filing charges
for a year and renew that year indefinitely, theoretically, a suspect
can be held for life without being charged and only one chance for
freedom.
Ideally, a terrorist suspect should be allowed to file multiple
writs of habeas corpus. The limit was originally imposed to prevent
detainees from filing multiple writs frivolously, thus impeding the
justice system. However, restricting filing to one time during an entire incarceration period is overly restrictive. Therefore, a terrorist
suspect should be allowed to file a writ of habeas corpus multiple
times while incarcerated, though removing all restrictions may not
be well advised. The possibility of frivolous writs being filed would
increase with an increase in the limit of writs. Courts have already
taken measures generally to prevent frivolous writs by not requiring the courts to address a writ of habeas corpus if it either does not
present new grounds for relief that were unaddressed in a previous
writ, or if it is clear from the face of the petition that there are no
applicable grounds for relief. Using these same measures for suspected terrorist suspects will help ensure them their Constitutional
right to habeas corpus while preventing frivolous or needless use of
the court system.
Furthermore, a limit needs to be established to the renewal of
years held without charges. Within five years, the government should
be able to provide enough evidence to file charges. If, within that
time period, the government cannot substantiate charges against a
terror suspect, the suspect should be able to obtain release. That way,
even if terrorist suspects are still limited to filing one writ of habeas corpus, they can receive a fair chance at freedom. Although the
16

Multiple writs of habeas corpus are often filed as Constitutional rights
may be violated in different steps of the legal process or as new pieces
of evidence come to light. Normally, a prisoner can file a writ of habeas
corpus at any stage of the judicial process to petition for release, while a
citizen held as a terror suspect is only give one chance.
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process of gathering evidence and forming a case against a suspected
terrorist can be lengthy and difficult, we hold that five years is more
than sufficient time. In highly publicized cases, the process often
takes substantially less time. Recently, as the entire nation watched,
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was arrested and charged, and is currently being
prepared for trial with preliminary measures already underway. This
all took place within a year and a half. Surely, the same can be accomplished for other suspected terrorists in more than three times
the amount of time.
The need to establish a limit to how long suspects can be held
without being charged is further substantiated by the Constitutional
right to a speedy trial. A citizen’s right to face trial under due process of law is clearly violated when a speedy trial is not granted. If a
trial can be indefinitely delayed, the due process is clearly violated.
Furthermore, terrorist suspects are often held under executive orders
or SAMs, and the judicial system is entirely bypassed. This is a clear
violation of the Fifth Amendment, because there is no indictment by
a grand jury for these crimes. SAMs further infringe on Constitutional rights in the restrictions they place on a prisoner’s communication, including with his lawyer, which hampers due process.
(i) Counter-Arguments
The recommendations made herein are, in many ways, a drastic
departure from current legislation. They would close loopholes established in current legislation that allow terror suspects to be held
indefinitely and allows them to file multiple writs of habeas corpus.
Essentially, they allows these suspects to be treated more equally
under the law, just as others suspected of criminal behavior, with
fewer added restrictions. Many people, however, are sensitive to the
loosening of restrictions surrounding terror suspects. Terror suspects people are accused of heinous crimes. The citizens held under
this legislation have betrayed their country and hurt or even killed
their fellow countrymen. In light of the crimes of which these people
stand accused, it may seem right or fulfilling to maintain harsh restrictions.
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However, it is important to remember that the rights and protections that factor in to the criminal justice system were designed to
protect people accused of all types of crimes, even the most extreme.
As difficult as it may be to accept, all citizens deserve their legal protections. The emotion behind the crimes of which these citizens are
accused are strong, but shouldn’t be allowed to influence the legality
of treatment for terror suspects.

V. Conclusion
Combating terrorism is a serious issue in the United States and
will likely continue to grow. As increased numbers of terrorists, both
at home and abroad, are detained and tried for their crimes, the issues
involved will only become bigger and more complex. While current
policies and legislation have lasted this long, their flaws will only be
magnified as the issue they address grows. Left unaddressed, these
problems will become more complex and affect more people. These
issues need to be nipped in the bud, rather than be allowed to grow.
Furthermore, these issues are ultimately a matter of the liberties
and rights guaranteed to American citizens. Regardless of their position before the law, Americans deserve to exercise the full extent of
their rights as outlined in the Constitution. As Benjamin Franklin
said, “Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little
temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.” We should
not be willing to sacrifice the liberty of a few for perceived temporary safety. In other words, the Constitutional rights of a few should
not be sacrificed for the many. Furthermore, if the government is
able to begin denying Constitutional rights of some citizens, it sets
a dangerous precedent. Constitutional rights ought to be guaranteed
and not conditionally. In order to preserve the liberty of all citizens,
we need to preserve the liberty of each citizen.
The conditions regarding the detainment of terrorist suspects is a
delicate issue. The importance of the balancing act between protecting national security and guaranteeing citizens their rights cannot be
understated. However, the current situation has tipped the balance
too far away from Constitutional rights, and unnecessarily so. The
benefits gained from such extreme measures are little, especially
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when compared to the gravity of depriving citizens their Constitutional rights. Particularly in terms of habeas corpus, due process,
and other important Constitutional rights, change can be made that
will ensure citizens their rights while still keeping the nation safe
from terrorist attacks.

